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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the intersection between authors' moral rights and conflict-
of-laws. The research question has been triggered by two important, interlinked 
factors. The first is that the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to moral 
rights are the same as those applicable to copyright. The second concerns the 
fact that moral rights are different from copyright - both in their nature and in the 
interest they aim to protect. Since these two factors coincide, it is questionable 
whether it ought to be the case that moral rights are subjected to the same 
choice-of-law rules as are applicable to copyright. 
The thesis therefore aims to discover whether the currently applicable choice-of-
law rules available in the context of moral rights are suitable for achieving the 
goals and objectives of conflict-of-laws. In the course of this thesis, I evaluate 
the potential validity of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-of-
laws and instead attaching it to the characterization model of general personality 
rights.  
The research question is mainly addressed from the perspective of Rome I and 
Rome II Regulations. However, as there is no EU harmonization concerning 
general personality rights in conflict-of-laws, the examination will be directed 
towards France and England as examples of civil and common law traditions. 
Moreover, reference will also be made to CLIP and ALI principles by reason of 
comparison.  
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A. Research question and importance: 
 
This thesis is intended to answer the following research question:  Are the 
currently applicable choice-of-law rules to copyright designed with authors' 
moral rights in mind or should authors' moral rights be detached from copyright 
in conflict-of-laws? 
The importance of this research question is ascribed to the rapid development in 
technologies that have helped many creators become their own publishers in an 
increasingly borderless world. The internet, the crucial medium in this regard, 
has helped creators publish and communicate their works to the public at a low 
cost. This innovation however, has brought with it serious disadvantages the 
most important of which related to the fact that creators' works are subject to 
innumerable copyright and moral rights infringements. Most importantly, these 
infringements often involve one or more foreign elements, something which 
leads to questions of choice-of-law. 
In recent years, the importance of determining the applicable law to cross-border 
copyright disputes has received serious attention, and there has been much 
research dedicated to addressing this issue including text books, PhD theses, and 
journal articles1.  
                                                           
1
 For example: James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (Calerndon Press, Oxford 1998) (hereafter referred to as Fawcett and 
Torremans, 1998); Phillip Michael Johnson, ‘Private International law, intellectual Property and 
the Internet’ (DPhil thesis, Queen Mary, University of London 2005) (hereafter referred to as 
Johnson, DPhil thesis, 2005) ; Mireille M.M. Van Eechoud, Choice of law in copyright and 
related rights: Alternatives to the lex protectionis (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003) 
(hereafter referred to as Eechoud, 2003); Rita Matulionyte, Law applicable to copyright: A 
comparison of the ALI and CLIP Proposals (Edward Elgar Publishing limited, Cheltenham 
2011) (hereafter referred to as Matulionyte, a comparison of the ALI and CLIP, 2011) ; Rita 
Matulionyte, ‘The law applicable to online copyright infringements in the ALI and CLIP 
Proposals: a rebalance of interests needed?’ <http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-1-
2011/2961/JIPITEC_Matulionite.pdf> last accessed 18 Sep 2012 (hereafter referred to as 
Matulionyte, The law applicable to online copyright, 2011). 
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However, suggestions and proposed solutions concerning the applicable law to 
copyright have usually assumed application of these rules to copyright in general 
i.e. including moral rights as an integral element to copyright. Studies have 
rarely given much discussion on the position of moral rights as an independent 
set of rights from copyright from the perspective of conflict-of-laws.   
It is important to note that moral rights are subject to choice-of-law rules that 
were not drafted with moral rights in mind. As a result, the applicable law to a 
cross-border moral right dispute will not necessarily be the law with the 
strongest connection to the legal issue at question. In addition, the currently 
applicable choice-of-law rules do not provide sufficient guidance with regard to 
the law to be applied to authorship or the law to be applied to determine the 
validity of waiver of moral rights. This comes as no surprise since these rules 
were not drafted with moral rights in mind at the first place.   
In this context, there is a need to examine the particular position of moral rights 
in conflict-of-laws from another perspective. Recognition of moral rights as 
rights protecting the personality of the author in relation to his or her work raises 
a query regarding the intersection moral rights have with general personality 
rights in conflict-of-laws. This is of particular significance especially with regard 
to the recent EU proposal to include general personality rights in the Rome II 
Regulation.    
 
B. Goals 
 
There are two main goals for this research. The first is to illustrate the 
inaccuracy of subjecting moral rights to the same choice-of-law rules applicable 
to copyright by examining problems associated with such application. The 
second is to search for alterative, more suitable, choice-of-law rules that take the 
particular nature of cross-border moral rights disputes into consideration. 
Problems and difficulties associated with the application of lex loci protectionis 
cannot be overlooked. Therefore, the search for alternative rules or solutions 
must take into account several important factors including the content of moral 
21 
 
rights protection, the centre of gravity in cross-border moral rights disputes, the 
theories and objectives of choice-of-law, and the relationship between 
substantive law and choice-of-law. 
Examination of these factors over the course of this thesis is aimed at proposing 
a set of specifically designed rules to be applied to cross-border moral rights 
disputes. 
 
C. Scope and limitation 
 
In general, the research topic covers the intersection between Intellectual 
Property (IP) and Private International Law (PIL). In this regard, examination of 
relevant thesis issues will only be limited to certain topics and will not address 
either subject matter in whole since to do so would require two separate studies.   
Therefore, this study will only address rules of conflict-of-laws2. Reference to 
other PIL rules3 will be limited to the necessity and relevance of these rules to 
the issue at question.  
The question of applicable law will be limited to moral rights. The use of the 
term 'moral rights' in this thesis is to be understood as those rights protecting the 
non-economic interests of both authors and performers, the term has nothing to 
do with 'morality'. The two internationally recognized moral rights (the 
attribution and integrity rights) will be the primary focus of this research as 
recognition of these two rights represents the minimum international 
requirement. As for authors' economic rights in the context of conflict–of-laws, 
these issues will be examined up to the extent of their relevance to the primary 
question of this research.  
 
                                                           
2
 In this thesis, conflict-of-laws and choice-of-law are used interchangeably. Both terms refer to 
applicable procedural rules designed to determine the applicable law in a cross-border dispute. 
 
3
 Jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
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Analysis of the applicable laws to moral rights will cover moral rights in 
contractual obligations as well as moral rights in non-contractual obligations 
(infringement). The study intends to cover infringement in traditional scenarios 
and in online (ubiquitous infringement) scenarios. 
The geographical scope of this research, is by no means intended, nor able, to 
cover all relevant issues related to the primary question of moral rights in 
conflict-of-laws. Nevertheless, the complexity of the subject requires addressing 
the research question from a comparative point of view. Therefore, the thesis 
will cover the related international and regional instruments. This includes the 
Berne Convention (BC), the Rome I and II Regulations and the CLIP and ALI 
Principles. Examination of these Principles is affiliated with their significant 
influential role.  
In addition to that, as there is no EU instrument on harmonization of moral rights 
or general personality rights, the traditional comparison between common and 
civil law traditions is required. In this respect, examples will be outlined from 
French and English legal systems as examples for both legal traditions. 
Examples from other jurisdictions like the US and Germany will be used 
occasionally when relevant. Furthermore, as this writer is sponsored by the 
University of Bahrain, reference to the Bahraini legal system – as an example for 
the civil law tradition in the Arab States- will be provided in the footnotes 
whenever possible. 
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D. Methodology and structure 
 
Over the course of this thesis, evaluation and analysis regarding the suitability of 
the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to moral rights will be based on the 
'allocation method' as this is the adopted method in Europe and most countries in 
the world.  The purpose of this method is to first allocate the 'seat' in the legal 
relationship and accordingly point to the applicable law which should have the 
strongest connection with the 'centre of gravity' of the legal relationship.  
The thesis is divided into 4 parts; the first being this Introduction. Part 2 covers 
the status quo through examining the applicable law to author's moral rights in 
relation to copyright both in contractual and non-contractual obligations 
including the question of initial ownership and authorship. The aim of Part 2 is 
to highlight whatever difficulties and problems associated with the currently 
applicable rules.  
Following the identification of these problems, Part 3 examines alternative 
perspectives to copyright. It investigates the possibility of detaching moral rights 
from copyright in conflict-of-laws. There are two main reasons behind the idea 
of 'detachment'. The first is the strong common ground that moral rights share 
with general personality rights, and the second is the uncertain judicial attitude 
towards moral rights in cross-border disputes where it seems that courts take the 
matter beyond the scope of copyright. Accordingly, Part 3 starts with identifying 
the complications associated with having moral rights as part of copyright in 
conflict-of-laws. The investigation is then carried out from this point onwards.   
Part 4 introduces the writer's new proposal. It starts with preliminary factors 
including theories and objectives of choice-of-law and the relationship of 
choice-of-law with substantive law. It then examines the shared elements 
between moral rights and general personality rights in conflict-of-laws. Finally, 
it explains the writer's 'new proposal' in the light of the recent EU proposal to 
include general personality rights in the scope of the Rome II Regulation.  
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Part 2 
 
Status Quo: Examining the Applicable Law to Moral Rights in 
Relation to Copyright 
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Today, the economical and moral interests of copyright holders are at risk. The 
new digital age4 facilitated copying at a low cost. It further provided the 'copier' 
with an endless list of possibilities and options from choosing the quality of the 
copy to making alterations to the original work, and much more5. The internet, 
as a revolutionary invention, has increased the potentiality of copyright 
infringement. The border-less nature of the internet6 has increased the likelihood 
of encountering international elements in copyright cases.  
As a consequence, copyright and Private International Law (PIL)7 had to 
intersect8.  
                                                           
4
 For more details on types of technological challenges facing moral rights see Mira T. Sundara 
Rajan, ‘Moral rights in the digital age: New possibilities for the democratization of culture’ 
International Review of Law Computers & Technology, volume 16 No. 2  (2002) available 
online at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808306> p 189 last accessed 4 Sep 2012 (hereafter referred 
to as Rajan, 2002). 
5
 Paul Torremans, ‘Moral rights in the digital age’  in Irini A. Stamatoudi and Paul L.C. 
Torremans (eds), Copyright in the new digital environment: the need to redesign copyright 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 99 (hereafter referred to as Torremans, 2000) . 
6
 The internet has been described as  borderless in nature, geographically independent, portable, 
widely used, one to many…etc. for a detailed list and discussion on the internet’s characteristics 
see Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private international law and the internet (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands 2007) 29-44 (hereafter referred to as Svantesson, 2007) .   
  
7
 The two most common names for the subject are Private International Law and Conflict-of-
laws. Both titles are commonly used throughout the world to refer to the same topic, however, 
several objections were put against both titles see for example Lawrence Collins (ed), Dicey, 
Morris and Collins on The conflict of laws (14th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 36 
(hereafter referred to as Collins, 2006). In this thesis the term conflict-of-laws will only be used 
to reflect the narrow sense of the term, meaning to refer to the situation where several conflicted 
laws are nominated to be applied to a particular case (choice-of-law).  
8
 Historically, Intellectual Property disputes were domestic in nature. Cross – border disputes 
were related to contracts and torts like personal injuries suffered abroad, thus in the later cases 
courts were faced with questions of PIL but not in relation to Intellectual Property. Today, the 
situation became very different with the emergence of the internet and new forms of technology 
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This Part is intended to examine the status quo for the applicable choice-of-law 
rules to moral rights as an element of copyright. To answer the first part of the 
research question: 'Are the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to copyright 
designed with author's moral rights in mind?'  One must thoroughly examine the 
present legal position of moral rights as an element of copyright in conflict-of-
laws.  
Therefore, this Part is divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter I: Introduction (where the primary focus is on the transfer of moral 
rights from national to international protection).  
Chapter II: Examination of moral rights in contractual obligations in conflict-of-
laws. 
Chapter III: Examination of choice-of-law rules governing moral rights in cross-
border torts including the question of authorship  
Chapter IV: Evaluation and conclusion for Part 2.   
  
                                                                                                                                                         
see Richard Garnett, ‘An overview of choice of law, Jurisdiction and foreign judgments 
enforcement in IP disputes’ (2007) Melbourne Law school - Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
205 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=958854> last accessed 2 Aug 2012, pp 2-3 (hereafter referred to as 
Garnett, 2007). 
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Chapter I 
Introduction: The development of moral rights' protection from national to 
international in relation to conflict-of-laws 
 
 
A. Overview of moral rights 
 
'Moral rights' are rights that protect the non-economic interests of the author. 
These rights intend to protect the personality of the author in relation to his work 
based on the author's ownership to his inner personality9.  
As moral rights protect the non-economical aspect of an author's interest, they 
are considered as independent from economic rights, and  
'Every attempt to justify moral rights solely on economic grounds is 
deemed flawed because the essence of moral rights—the rights that 
represent the inner process of the creative act and its final embodiment 
in expressive enterprises—is distinct from the economic aspirations of 
the creative act'10.  
The theoretical basis of moral rights was tackled from different approaches. 
However, the philosophical approach developed by Kant, was used as the basis 
of the whole theory of moral rights11. Therefore, moral rights were first based on 
the naturalist approach which viewed author's work as inseparable part of his 
                                                           
9
 Lior Zemer, 'Response: The dual message of moral rights' 90 (2012) Texas Law Review See 
Also 125 -143 available online <http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/vol/90/responses/zemer> last 
accessed 30 Sep 2012, p 135 (hereafter referred to as Zemer, 2012). 
 
10
 Zemer, 2012, p 132, nevertheless, moral rights do have economic consequences discussed 
further in footnote 398. 
 
11
 For an interesting and brief commentary on the theoretical justification of moral rights see 
Rocherieux Julien, 'The future of moral rights' [2002] IP Dissertation available at 
<www.kent.ac.uk> last accessed 3 Oct 2012, pp 4-5 (hereafter referred to as Julien, 2002). 
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personality rooted in the natural law12. At a later stage, the personalist ideas had 
more powerful influence and were responsible for the development of moral 
rights through case law13. Besides influence of the personalist ideas, French 
courts significantly contributed to the development of those rights in the 2nd half 
of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century14, to the extent that French 
case law is seen as responsible for the emergence of these right15.  
It is agreed that theoretical origins and major developments of moral rights took 
place in Continental Europe (namely France and Germany), at the same time, the 
interests protected under author's moral rights were also recognized in England. 
The Statute of Anne16 – the foundation of the English and American copyright 
system17 recognized John Lock's concepts of ''natural rights'' and ''just reward'' to 
authors18. English case law illustrated how English law recognized the right of 
                                                           
12
 And accordingly, only physical persons are to be considered as creators of the work.  Gillian 
Davies, Copyright and the public interest (2nd edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002) 140-150 
(hereafter referred to as Davies, 2002). 
 
13
 The concept of personalist author's rights was the result of change in the situation in the 2nd 
half of the 19th century where focus started to be on the aesthetic character of works in France. 
This had huge influence on the theory behind copyright in France along with the concept of 
personalist author's rights; Davies, 2002, pp 169-177.  
14
 For more details see Davies, 2002, pp 140-150. 
 
15
 Rigamonti, 2006, Harv. Int’l L.J. at p 356 also see Dane S. Ciolino, 'Moral rights and real 
obligations: a property – law framework for the protection of author's moral rights' 69 (1994) 
Tul. L. Rev. 937 (hereafter referred to as Ciolino, 1994). 
 
16
 Statute of Anne 1710 
 
17
 R.R. Bowker 1912, Copyright its history and its law (2nd edn William S Hein & Co. Inc.  
Buffalo, New York, 2002)  24 (hereafter referred to as Bowker, 2002).  
18
 The Statute also recognized the role of copyright protection as means to encourage creativity 
and benefit the society, Christopher May and Susan K. Sell , Intellectual Property Rights: A 
critical History (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, London 2006)  93 (hereafter referred to as May 
and Sell, 2006). 
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integrity through protection of the right of personality under common law 
rights19 such as passing off, defamation and slander of goods20. Thus, the 
essence of moral rights as it is understood today was –as common law lawyers 
argue- protected under common law. Nevertheless, moral rights did not stand a 
chance in making the same successful story in Britain as they did in Continental 
Europe. This was mainly attributed to the legal situation in Britain which was 
based on the golden age of contractual freedom21. 
Despite these historical differences between civil and common law traditions, 
moral rights succeeded in gaining more international recognition and 
importance22. The result was an international commitment towards providing 
moral rights with minimum level of protection, namely the attribution and 
integrity rights23. Interestingly, acceptance of moral rights is wider than 
international agreements on IP rights that have actually been included on the 
agenda of internationalization, an example of that is certain kinds of patent 
rights24. Moreover moral rights were recognized in art (27/2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
                                                           
19
 Robyn Durie, ' Moral rights and the English business community' [1991] Ent. L. R.42 
(hereafter referred to as Durie, 1991). 
20
 Rupert Sprawson, 'Moral rights in the 21st Century: a case for bankruptcy?' [2006] Ent. L. R. 
58 – 64 (hereafter referred to as Sprawson, 2006). 
 
21
 Hence, conflicts between interests had to be decided in accordance with business efficacy. 
Nevertheless, the golden age of contractual freedom did not stand in the way of applying torts of 
defamation and passing off accordingly, W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: 
Patents, copyright, trade marks and allied rights (6th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007)  375-
402 (hereafter referred to as Cornish and Llewelyn, 2007). 
 
22
 Moral rights protection in international law will be discussed directly below. 
 
 
23
 As set in art 6bis Berne Convention.  
 
24
 For more details see Mira T. Sundara Rajan, ‘Moral rights and copyright harmonization: 
prospects for an “International Moral right”?’ 17th BILETA annual conference, April 5th-6th 
2002, Amsterdam. Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809619>  
last accessed 10 Oct 2012,  p 4. 
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Therefore, moral rights were clearly introduced into the UK in chapter IV of the 
CDPA 1988.  The CDPA 1988 recognizes moral rights as being separate from 
economic rights. These rights are not property or personality rights, nor are they 
considered natural or common rights, rather, those are statutory rights the breach 
of which is breach of statutory duty25. The Act recognises 4 moral rights all of 
which are non-transferable yet can be waived26:  
The first moral right is the attribution right or the right to be identified as author 
or director of a copyright film. This right however, cannot be exercised unless it 
has been asserted27. Therefore, one can say that the paternity right is not 
automatically granted to authors and directors under CDPA 198828. Exceptions 
to the right of attribution are listed in Section 79 of the CDPA1988. Exempted 
works reflect the strong lobbying power enjoyed by newspaper and publishing 
industries29.The attribution right also does not apply to computer programs, 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
25
 CDPA1988 – Sec 103(1). 
 
26
 Moral rights under CDPA 1988- can be waived. Waiver can be specific or general and can be 
in relation to present and to future works, CDPA 1988 – Sec 87. 
27
 Assertion can be done in two ways. Either by including a statement to be identified as an 
author when assigning the copyright in the work, or by a written instrument signed by the author 
or director. When it comes to artistic work there are two more ways in addition to the above 
mentioned ways,  if the artist is identified on the original, copy, frame or any other attachment of 
the work, and when including an identification clause in any licence agreement which permits 
making copies of the work, see Sec 78 CDPA1988. 
   
28
 When the bill was discussed in the House of Lords, Lord Hutchinson stated that: "added right 
is given to the artist and the author but then it is immediately taken away in the sense of making 
it extremely difficult for him to enjoy his right at all". See Julian Turton and Martine Allen, 
Moral rights are now protected, published in  Moral rights reports presented at the meeting of 
the International Association of Entertainment Lawyers MIDEM - Cees Van Rij (editor) Hubert 
Best (Survey editor)  (MAKLU publishers, Cannes 1995) 161 (hereafter referred to as Turton 
and Allen, 1995). 
 
29
 L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, Oxford university press, Oxford 
2004) 235 (hereafter referred to as Bently and Sherman, 2004). 
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computer - generated works and the design of a typeface, yet there is no logical 
justification for those exceptions30. 
The second moral right is the integrity right or as named in the CDPA1988 
'Right to object to derogatory treatment of work'. The right entitles the author of 
literary, dramatic, musical, artistic work or the director (of a film) to object to 
any derogatory treatment for his work. There is no assertion requirement like the 
case with the right of attribution31. 
The third moral right is the right to object to false attribution. This right is 
considered to be the oldest statutory moral right in the UK32 and is the converse 
of the right to be identified as the author33. The right can be exercised by any 
person falsely attributed as the author of a work. It does not depend on the 
copyright in the work and thus not considered by some scholars to count for an 
actual moral right34. This right is not recognized as a moral right neither under 
BC nor under other legal systems35.   
                                                           
30
 Bently and Sherman, 2004, p 235. 
 
31
 Hector McQueen, Charlotte Waelde & Graeme Laurie, Contemporary Intellectual Property 
Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 102-106 (hereafter referred to as 
McQueen, Waeld and Laurie, 2008). 
 
32
 Bently and Sherman, 2008, pp 239-241. 
 
33
 Cornish and Llewelyn, 2007, pp 497-498. 
 
34
 Irini A. Stamatoudi, ' Moral rights of authors in England: the missing emphasis on the role of 
creators ' [1997] I.P.Q. 491 (hereafter referred to as Stamatoudi, 1997). 
 
35
 McQueen, Waelde and Laurie, 2008, p 98. Dr. Osama Ahmed Bader says that if we 
distinguish between the author and his intellectual work and imagined that the author’s name 
was falsely attributed to a work which he did not create, then moral rights are not violated 
because -according to his argument- the attack here is towards the author’s reputation and has 
nothing to do with the work. However, if the author’s name was not mentioned on his own work, 
the infringement here is in relation to author’s moral rights, Osama Ahmed Bader, some of the 
problems concerning dealing with author’s work on the internet (2nd edn, Dar-Alnahda Alrabia, 
Cairo 2002) 22 (hereafter referred to as Bader, 2002). 
32 
 
The fourth and final moral right is the right to privacy of certain photographs 
and films. This right – like the right to object to false attribution- is not 
recognized as moral right under BC or other legal systems36. It simply entitles a 
person who commissioned the taking of photographs or film for private purposes 
to object to publication or communication of the work in question to the public. 
The right to privacy applies to the whole or substantial part of the photograph or 
film. It subsists as long as the copyright subsist in the work.  
 
On the other hand, France, as an example of civil law tradition37, is generally 
considered 'the birth place of moral rights'. The French legal system was familiar 
with the notion of moral rights before the introduction of the BC38. France has 
adopted the view that what was presented in article 6bis is merely a minimalist 
                                                           
36
 McQueen, Waelde and Laurie, 2008, p 98. 
37
 All Arab countries (except for Sudan) are considered to be part of the civil law tradition. The 
first statute for the protection of author’s rights in the Arab states was the Othmanian law for 
authorship in 1910. This law remained in force in many Arab states until fairly recently when it 
was replaced with modern laws; Morocco was the first country to replace this law in 1916 
followed by Lebanon in 1924. As for the situation in the other Arab states, authors were 
protected in miscellaneous provisions within civil and criminal law, note that the Egyptian law of 
1954 was the first Arabic statute issued after independence of Arab States see Mohamed Hussam 
Lutfi, fundamental principles of author’s right: courts’ decisions in the Arab states (WIPO 
Publication, 2002) 5-6 (hereafter referred to as Lutfi M, 2002) and Abdulla Mabrouk Alnajar, 
Author’s moral right in Islamic and comparative law (Dar Almareekh for publishing, Riyadh 
2000) 30-34 (hereafter referred to as Alnajar, 2000). The shortage in the protection provided for 
authors in the Arabic statutes was obvious and there was a serious need for an independent 
author’s rights law. As a result, author’s rights laws started to emerge starting with Lebanon 
1946, Egypt 1954, Tunis 1966, Libya 1968, Morocco 1970, Iraq 1973, Sudan 1974, Saudi Arabia 
1990, Alnajar, 2000, pp 30-34. 
 
38
 For more details see: Elizabeth Adeney, The moral rights of authors and performers: an 
International and Comparative analysis, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 165-168 (hereafter 
referred to as Adeney, 2006). 
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approach to moral rights and that interpretation should not be confined to this 
concept39.  
The association of moral rights with human rights in UDHR supported the 
French approach towards moral rights as fundamental personal rights. Thus, 
moral rights in the French legal system are enjoyed by all authors regardless of 
the value of the work40. These rights are inalienable and perpetual except for the 
right of revocation which ends after the author's death41.   
 
French law recognizes the following 5 moral rights42: 
 
                                                           
39
 Adolf Dietz, Legal principles of moral right (civil law) General report, published in Le droit 
moral de l'auteur -The moral right of the author, (publication of ALAI : Association litteraire et 
artistique internationale Congress of Antwerp 19-24 Sep 1993) 55-56 (hereafter referred to as 
Dietz, 1993). 
 
40
 Eric Lauvaux, Moral rights as an obstacle to the exploitation of musical works, published in  
Moral rights reports presented at the meeting of the International Association of Entertainment 
Lawyers MIDEM - Cees Van Rij (editor) Hubert Best (Survey editor) Chris Wilde (Translator)  
(MAKLU publishers, Cannes 1995) 72-73 (hereafter referred to as Lauvaux, 1995). 
 
41
 Dietz, 1993, pp. 67-70, the Bahraini copyright law titled Act no 22 / 2006 concerning the 
Protection of Author’s right and Neighboring Rights (hereinafter Bahraini Author’s Right Act) is 
similar to the French droit d’auteur in that both Acts have authors as the central and primary 
focus. The long duration of protection to moral rights is justified on the grounds that these rights 
protect the personality related interest of the author on one hand, and the interest of the 
community on the other hand. See Roger Van den Bergh, ‘the role and social justification of 
copyright: law and economic approach’ [1998] IPQ 31 (hereafter referred to as Bergh, 1998). 
42
 See Stamatoudi, 1997, I.P.Q. 478; note that, France regards its moral rights provisions as an 
important tool to protecting  its national identity, Dorothee Thum, ‘Who decides on the colors of 
films on the internet? Drafting of choice of law rules for the determination of initial ownership of 
film works vis-à-vis global acts of exploitation on the Internet’  in  Josef Drexl and Annette Kur 
(eds), International Property and Private International Law – Heading for the Future (Hart 
Publishing, Oregon 2005) 272 (hereafter referred to as Thum, 2005). 
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The first is the right of attribution. Justification of this right was made clear by 
Desbois comments on the travaux preparatoires of the statute of 1895 which 
specifically dealt with this issue.  He noted that the objective was to assure the 
honesty of the art market rather than to protect the personal interest of the 
artist43. The author has the right to have his academic qualifications and title 
mentioned as well as his right to be titled as the author rather than some other 
participant in the work44.  
The second is the right of integrity. The right is similar in its scope to the 
integrity right as recognized in the BC45. Pouillet commented on this right in 
1879 as being a natural consequence of the right of attribution, as the author 
should be entitled to safeguard the accuracy of any creation attributed to his or 
her name. Hence, authors have the right to object to alterations of their works 
even if such alterations made the work better46. 
The third is the right of disclosure47. It gives the author the right to decide 
whether to publish his work or not. In relation to commissioned works, the right 
still applies. However, if the author refuses to release -for the first publication- 
the work he was commissioned for, substantial damages will be paid for the 
person who commissioned the work48. The French theory views this right as the 
most basic moral right of the author. The author's decision about when to reveal 
his work to the public is of a personal nature, it gives the author the right to 
                                                           
43
 Adeney, 2006, p 50. 
44
 Adeney, 2006, p 180. 
 
45
 Stamatoudi, 1997, I.P.Q. 478.  
 
46
 Adeney, 2006, p 54. For more details see Nicolas Bouche, Intellectual Property law in France 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2011) 80-82 (hereafter referred to as Bouche, 
2011). 
47
 The term disclosure is broader than the concept of publication. It can arise from the exhibition 
or public presentation of the works, Adeney, 2006, p 192. 
 
48
 Lauvaux, 1995, pp 75-79.  
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decide how and when exactly should his work enter the commercial market49.  
Bear in mind, that once the author has exercised his right of first disclosure, the 
right is exhausted50. 
The fourth right is the right of revocation or repentance. The right is seen as the 
other side of the right of divulgation as it entitles the author to withdraw his 
work from the market if he changes his mind. IP Code article L121.4 requires 
the author to compensate the transferee for all the expenses incurred including 
those for marketing the work, this usually prevent authors from exercising this 
right51. Authors of computer programs are not entitled to this right, the only way 
for an author of computer programs to put an end to its diffusion will be through 
                                                           
49
 Dietz, 1993, pp 57-60. 
 
50
 Bouche, 2011, 78. 
51
 Lauvaux, 1995, pp 75-79. The right to withdraw the work from the market is subject to certain 
qualifications which made this right rarely litigated. Moreover, this right is naturally subject to 
the general rule ‘abuse of right’, and the abuse is assumed if the author exercise this right based 
on monetary concerns. Hence, the divulgation right became -as described by Professor 
Rigamonti- 'largely an example of symbolic legislation', Cyrill P. Rigamonti, ‘Deconstructing 
Moral rights’ (2006) 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 363 (hereafter referred to as Rigamonti, 2006). One 
should also bear in mind that this right was not recognized by the Berne Convention, Peter K. 
Yu, 'Moral rights 2.0' in Christopher Heath and Anselm Kamperman Sanders (eds), Landmark 
Intellectual Property Cases and Their Legacy: IEEM International Intellectual Property 
Conferences (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2011) 30 (hereafter referred to as K. 
Yu, 2011). The right to withdraw the work is not supported in England: in Southey v Sherwood 
(1817) 2 Mer 435 (Ch) in this case, the plaintiff Robert Southey composed a poem titled 'Wat 
Tyler' in 1794 which he sent to a bookseller with the intention to publish it. However, Mr. 
Southey had changed his mind about publishing the poem which had already passed to the 
defendant, the court refused to grant the plaintiff injunction to restrain publication, printing or 
selling of his poem. On the same point see David Vaver, 'Does intellectual property have 
personality?' Chapter 8 in Reinhard Zimmerman & Niall R Whitty (eds), Rights of Personality in 
Scots law: A Comparative Perspective (University of Dundee Press, 2009), 403-432 available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879251> last accessed 30 Sep 2012, p 7 (hereafter referred to as 
Vaver, 2009). 
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entering into a contract which could give him control over the work after the 
transfer of the economic rights52. 
The fifth and final right is the right to access the work. The author can exercise 
this right to merely see and enjoy his work or to make reproduction53. 
 
B. Moral rights protection from national to international laws  
 
As a result of the ever-increasing cross-border transactions, the position of moral 
rights as an element of copyright moved from national to transnational level. The 
shift in the position of copyright is mainly attributed to the mechanical printing 
invented in the 15th century54. Books became part of cross-border transactions, 
which forced authors to take part in activities that were no longer confined to 
national borders.  
Today, the concept of cross-border transactions has not changed. However, the 
digital revolutions together with the internet have reshaped 'how' it is done. The 
international nature of the market brought attention to the real need for an 
international understanding of moral rights. Authors began to face serious 
disadvantages and difficulties when their works were distorted or misattributed 
abroad. The result was an international concern leading to a constant pressure 
which in turn was responsible for the international development of these rights.  
                                                           
52
 Adeney, 2006, p 196. 
53
 However, this right is restricted, for example, authors should not cause nuisance to the owner 
of the work, Stamatoudi, 1997, I.P.Q. 499. 
 
54
 The book industry developed rapidly and printers required legal protection against 
unauthorized copying of their books. The majority of commentators consider this to be the 
leading event to the emergence of copyright protection, generally see McQueen, Waelde and 
Laurie, 2008, pp 34-36; for detailed examination of the history of copyright see May and Sell, 
2006.  
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ALAI Congress had very important role in developing moral rights 
internationally55. In 1900, The Congress was working on a model law that 
proposed to protect moral rights. The protected rights under the proposition 
were: the right of attribution, the right to object to modifications of the work, 
and the right to object to public exhibition of the modified work. Those rights 
were to pass to authors’ heirs or a specially designated trustee56. 
The BC 188657 is recognized as the most important international instrument 
establishing the notion of non-transferable moral rights58. The early texts of the 
Convention did not contain moral right provisions. However, the 1928 Rome 
conference called for including provisions to ensure moral rights protection. The 
lobbying powers then were France, Poland, Italy, Romania and Belgium59. The 
Convention had introduced moral rights in article 6bis which entitled authors to 
the right of attribution and integrity. Moreover, those rights, unlike economic 
rights, were not to be transferred60. The article was drafted in broad terms to 
avoid causing any serious tension between common and civil law delegates and 
was finalized at the Rome Revision Conference61. 
                                                           
55
 Adeney, 2006, p 99. 
 
56
 Adeney, 2006, pp 99-100. 
 
57
 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) 
 
58
 McQueen, Waelde and Laurie, 2008, pp 97-98. 
 
59
 Gerald Dworkin, Moral rights in common law countries, published in Moral rights reports 
presented at the meeting of the International Association of Entertainment Lawyers MIDEM - 
Cees Van Rij (editor) Hubert Best (Survey editor) (MAKLU publishers, Cannes 1995) 38-42 
(hereafter referred to as Dworkin, 1995) note that the efforts of the Italian delegation in Rome 
were behind introducing moral rights into the legislations of copyright countries – see  Adeney, 
2006, p 105. 
  
60
 Berne Convention – Article 6bis.  
 
61
 Adeney, 2006, pp 112-114. Despite the fact that moral rights were well recognized under the 
Convention, the main focus of the Convention was on the economic rights of the author.  
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At a later stage, moral rights were associated with human rights on the 
international level. Art 27 (2) of UDHR 62 emphasized the perception of these 
rights as natural rights rather than property rights. The initial proposal was 
rejected by common law countries on the basis that copyright is not a human 
right matter, rather a legal one63. However, the clause was finally accepted and 
moral rights were eventually associated with human rights, a result of the 
support granted by the delegations of the civil law countries64. Article 27(2) of 
UDHR emphasizes the individualistic dimension of moral rights65 and marked 
the triumph of the individualist concept66. 
The Brussels Conference for the revision of the Berne Convention (1948) took 
place within the period when the negotiations of the UDHR were taking place. 
However, the attitude of the common law delegates this time was dramatically 
different. The UK specifically, expressed its desire not to include any provision 
for moral rights since the common law viewed the Convention as an economic 
                                                           
62
 UDHR (1948) does not have a binding force in a strict sense although it has a high moral 
authority. Hence, it is considered as an accepted standard of human rights today, Adolf Dietz, 
‘The artist’s right of integrity under copyright law – a comparative approach’ [1994] IIC 178 
(hereafter referred to as Dietz, 1994). 
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 Adeney,  2006, p 133. 
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 Adeney, 2006,  p 141. 
 
65
 Whereas debates preceding the adoption of the Declaration highlighted its social dimension, 
Zemer, 2012, p 128. 
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 The concept was strongly maintained by France for the previous two decades ; Adeney, 2006, 
pp 133-134. 
 
39 
 
agreement67. Yet, civil law view prevailed once again and the scope of article 
6bis was expanded68. 
 
During the next period, the situation was shifted in favor of the common law 
tradition starting with the Stockholm Conference of the Berne Convention 1967. 
The UK expressed its concerns regarding the confusing nature of moral rights 
and how an alliance with the US could hinder the expansion of those rights. As a 
result, article 6bis was adopted in its final version.  
 
The position of common law tradition was further strengthened in TRIPs. It was 
the first international instrument which clearly expressed the copyright 
dichotomy69. The issue of moral rights was controversial in the US at that time. 
As a result of the US dominance on the negotiations, there was an explicit 
exclusion for members from the obligation under article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention70. As some argue, the US had to exclude moral rights since it was 
not in compliance with BC and had those rights been incorporated into TRIPs, 
the US would have been subject to trade sanctions71. 
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 Adeney, 2006, p 133; Gillian Davis and Kevin Garnett, Moral rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2010) 48 (hereafter referred to as Davis and Garnett, 2010). 
68The expansion was in relation to the second paragraph of article 6bis; the article was first 
accepted at the Rome revision conference in 1928, it read: “….(2) The determination of the 
conditions under which these rights shall be exercised is reserved for the national legislation of 
the countries of the union. The means of redress for safeguarding these rights shall be regulated 
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed”, Adeney, 2006, p 114.  
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 i.e. copyright protects expressions not mere idea, Cornish and Llewelyn, 2007, p 394. 
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 TRIPs – article 9(1) this was an obvious indication that this agreement focused only on the 
economic rights, May and Sell , 2006, p 165 
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 Adeney, 2006, p 151. 
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C. Copyright and international treaties – exploring 'choice-of-law' issues: 
 
As copyright became more involved in cross-border disputes, it was no longer 
possible to ignore questions of PIL. The intersection between the two fields 
became an evident reality rather than a theoretical possibility.  
1. Brief note on characterization: 
 
Characterization is '... the allocation of the question raised by the factual 
situation before the court to its correct legal category, and its object is to reveal 
the relevant rule for the choice of law'.72 It is a decisive primary step in conflict-
of-laws73, a fundamental process that controls the final outcome of the conflict-
of-laws74. 
 
Characterization is also known as ‘qualification’75, ‘classification’ and 
'determination'76. Regardless of what term one decides to use, classification 
according to Graveson is: 
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 Anthony J. Bland, ‘Classification re-classified’ 6 (1957) Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 13 (hereafter 
referred to as Bland, 1957). 
 
73
 R. H. Graveson, Conflict of laws: Private International Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1974) 43 (hereafter referred to as Graveson, 1974). 
 
74
 Veronique Allarousse, ‘A comparative approach to the conflict of characterization in private 
international law’ 23 (1991) Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. p. 479 (hereafter referred to as Allorousse, 
1991).  Characterization could turn contract disputes to torts, it also could turn substantive law to 
procedural, hence, resulting in application of the law of the forum, see Lea Brilmayer & Raechel 
Anglin, 'Choice of law theory and the metaphysics of stand-alone trigger' 95 (2010) Iowa Law 
Review, p 1135 (hereafter referred to as Brilmayer and Anglin, 2010).  
 
75
 ‘Qualification’ is the commonly used term in Continental Europe ever since it’s been dealt 
with by Bartin who was unaware that the topic was discussed and published by Franz Kahn few 
years before him, Ernest G. Lorenzen, ‘The qualification, classification, or characterization 
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... a normal and necessary process of human thought. We identify and 
arrange facts, knowledge and experience into groups and classes in 
order to understand them better, a process which operates in law no less 
and no more than in other fields of knowledge77 
 
Hence, characterization is not peculiar to conflict-of-laws. The same have to be 
done with rules of torts, contracts or any other area of law78. Nevertheless an 
important difference is that on the domestic level the subject matter of domestic 
rules is facts, the question is whether these facts fall within the rule in question. 
In choice-of-law, the subject matter is not facts but rules of domestic law and 
whether the domestic rule in question falls within the scope of the choice-of-law 
rule79.  
What remains certain in relation to characterization is the fact that it is one of the 
richest topics in conflict-of-laws. Its goal, put in simple words, is to analyse the 
components of the legal relationship to decide under which category it falls: 
torts, contracts, marriage, divorce, legal capacity ...etc.  
                                                                                                                                                         
problem in the conflict of laws’ in Richard Fentiman (ed), Conflict of Laws (Dartmouth 
Publishing Co Ltd., England 1996) 743 (hereafter referred to as Lorenzen, 1996). 
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 Spiro prefers to call this process ‘determination’ as he explains that this term “… puts the 
problem in a better perspective by pointing to a process which always takes place whether there 
is a foreign element or not.” He also believes that Khan and Batin were not the first to consider 
the issue of characterization. Erwin Spiro, Conflict of laws (JUTA & Co. Ltd, Cape Town 1973) 
57 (hereafter referred to as Spiro, 1973). 
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 Graveson, 1974, p 43.  
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 Allarousse, 1991, Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 479.  
 
79
 C.M.V. Clarkson & Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2006) 463. (hereafter referred to as Clarkson and Hill, 2006). It is worth mentioning 
that characterization may arise even where the relevant legal systems have identical choice-of-
law rules because each legal system may interpret the identical choice-of-law rule differently, 
Christopher Forsyth, ‘Characterization revisited: an essay in the theory and practice of the 
English conflict of laws’ [1998] LQR 158 (hereafter referred to as Forsyth, 1998). 
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Therefore, courts will carry out their usual characterization procedure even if 
moral rights were the disputed subject matter in cross-border situation. For 
example, (John) an English music writer habitually resident in France brings a 
claim before English courts against (Julia) a French musician who is habitually 
resident in England, claiming that Julia has published his work in London and 
Paris without attribution to him as the composer of the piece. The court in this 
example must characterize Julia's actions to determine whether they fall under 
the category of tort or contract.  Once Julia's actions are classified as tort, 
choice-of-law rules applicable to non-contractual obligations will be applied (in 
this particular scenario, rules of Rome II Regulation).  
And thus, the issue of characterization of moral rights in conflict-of-laws is not 
seriously problematic80. The process will be limited to classifying the issue as 
either tort or contract, as there is no doubt that divorce, marriage and status are 
by default excluded categories. Yet, the real characterization problem is that 
concerned with the nature of moral rights. The essential question is whether 
moral rights are characterized as part of general personality rights, or copyright 
or falls somewhere in between. For choice-of-law purposes, deciding on the 
nature of these rights is significant as it determines the suitability of connecting 
factors and eventually the accurateness of the selected law.  
At this chapter, it suffices to say that there is no universal agreement on how the 
nature of moral rights should be characterized. However, this particular issue is 
analysed and researched in Parts 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
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 The majority of commentators believe that characterization is a highly important process. 
However, some commentators argue that its importance is overestimated. J. Morse in a leading 
article stated that what is called as characterization questions are in essence generally choice of 
law questions, Allorousse, 1991, p 508. Moreover, according to Lederman’s analysis, 
classification can never reveal the “essence” of a rule of law; as indicated in the writings of 
Roscoe Pound, classification is not an end: “Legal precepts are classified in order to make the 
material of the legal system effective for the ends of law”. Accordingly, supporters of this view 
conclude that considering classification as one of the most difficult problems in the conflict of 
laws is simply a myth because in every instance, classification is synonymous with ‘selection of 
the proper law’, Bland, 1957, Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 10, 12, 27. 
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2. Choice-of-law rules in the related international instruments: 
 
Commentators had to refer to the related international instruments to decide 
whether a choice-of-law rule is given in relation to copyright or not.  
 
The first question is whether there is a real need to have different rules for 
copyright at the first place or not. Several scholars found it problematic to depart 
from norms used for other IP rights. They argued that the subject matter for 
different IP regimes is converging and claims are normally based on two or more 
IP rights. In addition, following different approaches in relation to applicable 
law may reduce certainty and effect investments81. On the other hand, others 
understood IP rights to be different in important respects, most notably with 
regard to copyright which is acquired without registration82. Thus, the latter 
group was in favour of applying specifically designed choice-of-law rules to 
copyright.  
 
Number of international instruments need to be examined to determine whether 
there are choice-of-law rules applicable to copyright or not. The most important 
one to this discussion is the BC. The Convention laid down the widely 
acknowledged principle of lex protectionis. 
 
                                                           
81
 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘Conflicts and International Copyright Litigation: The Role of 
International Norms’ in Jurgen basedow, Josef Drexl, Annette Kur & Alex Metzger (eds), 
Intellectual Property in the Conflict of laws (Max Planck Institute, Germany 2005) 196-197 
(hereafter referred to as Dinwoodie, 2005). 
 
82
 In support of this view Dinwoodie, 2005, pp 196-197, whereas Gottschalk is not in favor of 
dividing IP rights into registered and unregistered in relation to questions of PIL see Eckart 
Gottschalk, ‘The law applicable to intellectual property rights:  is the lex loci protectionis a 
pertinent choice –of-law approach?’ in Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Ruhl and Jan 
Von Hein (eds), Conflict of laws in a globalized world (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 208 
(hereafter referred to as Gottschalk, 2007). In any case, one should keep in mind that the 
distinction is not too clear now with the existence of unregistered trademark rights throughout 
the EU and unregistered design rights. 
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i. Berne Convention – Art 5 
 
The BC was a departure from discrimination against foreign authors that 
dominated the pre 1886 copyright relations. It was a step to harmonize author’s 
rights on the international scale83.  
Art 3 BC points to the connecting factors that need to be considered when 
determining the eligibility of the work at hands. It first requires a work to come 
within its scope to qualify for its protection. Protection is granted to all authors 
who are nationals of one of the Member States of the Berne Union. Furthermore, 
protection is also granted to an author who is not a national of a Member State 
but is habitually resident in a Member State. Second connecting factor is first 
publication of the work in a Member State; no further requirement related to 
nationality of the author is mentioned84. 
 
However, what is essentially related to the present discussion is article 5 BC. 
Nevertheless, interpretation of this article was problematic and controversial. 
 
Art 5(1) BC introduces the principle of national treatment to authors. Mr. 
Fentiman argues that the national treatment rule has nothing to do with PIL 
questions85. He understands the rule as exclusion to the lex originis i.e. the law 
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 Dinwoodie, 2005, p 205 
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 As for which connecting factor prevails: 1- If a work has been published in a Member State. 2- 
If not published or published but not in a Member State then the nationality or habitual residence 
of the author; however, the two narrow connecting factors in art (4) prevail over this one if their 
requirements are met. The first publication link is easier to be established and provides legal 
certainty plus it facilitates exploitation of the work. See Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 464 -
465. 
 
 
85
 Supporting this view Nerina Boschiero: Nerina Boschiero, 'Intellectual property in the light of 
the European Conflict of laws' <http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/business/BoschieroNerina-
Italy.pdf> last accessed 3 Sep 2012 at no. 5 (hereafter referred to as Boschiero). There was a 
view to apply national treatment to jurisdiction, naturally this has been rejected. Cornish and 
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of the protecting country is to be applied to foreign right holders as much as to 
national ones86. Two main disadvantages of lex originis motivated attempts to 
drift away from its application. The first was the impracticality of lex originis 
rule as it requires the courts of one country to apply the law of another country 
according to where the work originated from. The second was the discriminatory 
effects resulting from its application. The foreign right holder will have stronger 
or weaker protection than that provided to the national right holder87. 
 
Others think of the national treatment principle as a choice-of- law rule in 
limited sense88. It requires a country to apply the same law to works of foreign 
origins as it does to works of its own nationals89. Dr Van Eechoud agrees with 
the interpretation of this principle but argues that it should not be considered a 
choice-of-law rule, rather it is a non – discrimination rule90. But does  non – 
discrimination mean that only substantial rules apply to local and foreign authors 
or does it also mean applying local choice-of-law rules to foreign authors? 
Applying choice-of-law rules to foreign authors means that the quality of 
treatment will depend on what the local choice-of-law rule is. For example: if 
the local choice-of-law rule states that the law of the country of infringement 
applies, then if infringement occurred in country (x) which is not the forum, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
others believe that the national treatment principle should only be relevant to the applicable law, 
cited in Johnson, DPhil thesis, 2005, pp 256-258; also see Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 12-
13. 
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 Richard Fentiman, ‘Choice of law and intellectual property’ in  Josef Drexl and Annette Kur 
(eds), International Property and Private International Law – Heading for the Future (Hart 
Publishing, Oregon 2005) 134 (hereafter referred to as Fentiman, 2005); also mentioned in 
Johnson, DPhil thesis, 2005, p 325. 
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 Fentiman, 2005, p 135. 
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  '… For the most part, commentators agree on a choice-of-law understanding  of the national 
treatment  principle, but they adopt diverging views on the final solution as to which law this 
principle requires the application of.'  Boschiero, no 5. 
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 Goldstein’s view cited in Eechoud, 2003, p 107. 
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 Eechoud, 2003, pp 109-110. 
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law of country (x) will apply whether infringement was related to local or 
foreign authors. However, if the choice-of-law rule of the forum states that the 
law of the country of origin applies, then local law determines infringement of 
local works and foreign law determines infringement of foreign works91. The 
result will be considerable unpredictability and denial of national treatment92. 
 
Art 5(2) BC is subject to intense discussion with regard to the question of 
applicable law to copyright. It states that '... the extent of protection, as well as 
the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be 
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed'. 
The crucial term ‘country where protection is claimed’ is left undefined in the 
convention and no assistance can be found in the preparatory materials93. 
Obviously the drafters of the convention assumed that the term will be 
understood by all those who read it. The term was introduced as a suggestion 
from the German administration as an attempt to remove emphasis from the law 
of the country of origin, no questions were raised in relation to the meaning of 
the newly introduced term94. 
 
To identify ‘where protection is claimed’ commentators adopted different 
opinions. Some argued that a literal interpretation refers to lex fori (the law of 
the forum) that is where the author is involved in legal proceedings95. Those in 
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 Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International copyright and neighbouring rights – the 
Berne Convention and beyond (Volume I, 2nd edn Oxford university press, Oxford 2006) 1298 
(hereafter referred to as Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006).  
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 Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006, p 1298. 
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 Adeney, 2006, p 632. 
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 Adeney, 2006, p 633. 
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 Those in support of this view are mentioned in Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 467-468. 
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favour of lex fori interpretation support their view by arguing that ‘means of 
redress’ is more consistent with lex fori, as the normal procedure is to have the 
law of the forum governing questions of which actions are available in the case 
of infringement and other procedural issues96. However, acceptance of this view 
proved to be unlikely as article 5 talks about the substantive level of protection 
for those – already- qualifying works97. Bear in mind however, that the forum is 
most probably where the defendant is domiciled or has assets, providing the best 
redress possible. It is also possible that the forum is where infringement has 
occurred98.  Nevertheless, most commentators agree that ‘where protection is 
claimed’ should be read ‘for which protection is claimed’ reflecting the 
application of the lex protectionis99. 
  
 
Agreeably, most authors today see the last sentence of the second paragraph of 
art 5(2) BC as an expressed lex protectionis rule. However, Dr. Van Eechoud 
argues that the whole confusion is caused because of the desire to read a conflict 
rule in art 5(2) ‘...it seems unlikely to me that the drafters meant it to lay down 
the lex protectionis but neglected to put it unequivocal language’100. Dr. Van 
Eechoud continues her argument by saying that if one insists on reading a 
conflict rule in art 5(2) one should acknowledge that it does not cover all 
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 This is Schack’s interpretation of art 5(2) BC cited in Eechoud, 2003, pp 108-109. 
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 In support of this view for example Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 467-468. 
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 Adeney, 2006, pp 633-634. 
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 Eechoud, 2003, pp 106-110, Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 467-468.  
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 Eechoud, 2003, p108. However, unlike Dr. Eechoud, Professors Rickeston and Ginsburg are 
of the opinion that the BC 'failed' to create a general structure for identifying applicable law, see 
Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006, p 1300. The use of the term ‘failed’ -in this writer's opinion- 
implies that Ginsburg and Rickeston considered identifying the applicable law as one of the 
Berne Convention goals. 
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copyright issues, especially not questions of initial ownership and transfer of 
copyright101.  
But what is lex protectionis? Some understands lex protectionis to be the law of 
the country where the work is used or where exploitation of the work takes 
place102. Others understand the reference here to be for the lex loci delicti (the 
law of the place where delicti ‘wrongful act’ was committed) that is the law of 
the place of infringement103. In practice, the lex loci delicti will most likely be 
the place where the work is exploited or used. However, it is impossible to 
determine whether an infringement has occurred or not before determining the 
law whose criteria for infringement are to be applied, thus is circular. It has to be 
read as the place where the infringement has allegedly occurred104. Although lex 
loci delicti governs infringement, it does not necessarily address issues of 
existence, ownership and transfer of IP because these situations do not meet the 
category (tort or infringement of copyright) which the lex loci traditionally 
address. On the other hand lex protectionis is not confined to torts, thus, can be 
used as a general conflict rule for copyright105. Therefore, it is inaccurate to use 
the term lex protectionis and lex loci delicti interchangeably. 
Another important point to keep in mind is that in the third paragraph of art 6bis 
BC, only means of redress for safeguarding moral rights are to be governed by 
the law of the country where protection is claimed. On the other hand, art 5(2) 
BC in relation to the economic rights states that the law of the country where 
protection is claimed is to govern ‘the extend of protection, as well as the means 
of redress’. Therefore, one wonders whether extend of protection for moral 
rights should be governed by lex loci protectionis.106 
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 Eechoud, 2003, p 109 also in support of this view Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006, p 1299. 
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 Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 467-468. 
 
103
 A. Lucas supports this view cited in Adeney, 2006, p 635. 
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 Eechoud, 2003, p 106. 
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 Davis and Garnett, 2010, pp 1022, 1027-1029. 
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What is clear in relation to the BC is the lack of explicit reference to any choice-
of-law rule other than the one mentioned in art 14bis (2) (a) concerning 
cinematographic works. It is likely that the contracting states assumed that 
actions will be brought in the country where infringement took place107. That is 
because infringement of copyright was actionable as delict. Hence, jurisdiction 
was confined to courts of the place of infringement. The result was that lex fori 
and lex loci delicti coincided108. 
 
Today, the conventional view is to subject existence and scope of copyright to 
lex protectionis. The rule is understood to refer to the law of the country for 
which protection is claimed109. It is based on the concept of territoriality of IP110, 
and the state's duty to grant foreign authors and foreign works the same rights of 
their nationals111.  
Still, questions of initial ownership and transfer of copyright, as Dr. Van 
Eechoud rightly argues, are not covered under art 5(2) BC. Furthermore, the 
ECJ's ruling in TOD's case is an invitation for commentators to revisit their 
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 Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006, p 1301 also Eechoud, 2003, p 108. 
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 Eechoud, 2003, p108. 
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 Ricketson and Ginsburg, 2006, p1301; Eechoud, 2003, pp 105-106; Charlotte Waelde and 
Lionel De Souza, ‘Moral rights and the Internet: squaring the circle’ [2002] IPQ 272 (hereafter 
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ownership of copyright’ in Josef Drexl and Annette Kur (eds), International Property and 
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opinions. The judgment has expressed the view that the purpose of the BC is not 
to determine the applicable law112. 
The view is approved by WIPO where it states that: 
   
... neither does the national treatment principle reflect a private 
international law approach, as it does not purport to designate the law of 
any particular country that is to govern an intellectual property issue 
involving a foreigner, but merely states that foreigners should not be 
treated differently than nationals with respect to intellectual property 
issues113 
 
ii. Rome Convention – Art 2114 
 
This convention deals with protection of performers, producers of phonograms 
and broadcasting organisations. The national treatment principle was drafted in a 
way similar to that provided by art 5 BC. Foreign performers will be treated like 
national ones if the performance takes place or broadcasted or first recorded or 
first published on the territory of that country, the same rule applies to foreign 
producers and broadcast organisations115. Hence, the law of the country where 
protection is claimed will be that of the country where the right in the 
performance is used. 
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 WIPO guidelines on Private International Law, Harmonization and Intellectual Property, 
available online at 
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Von Lewinski, International copyright law and policy (Oxford University Press, New York 
2008) 86-91 (hereafter referred to as Lewinski, 2008). 
 
115
 Rome convention 1961 art 2. 
 
51 
 
iii. TRIPs – Art 3 and 9116 
 
The major concern under TRIPs was the use of exclusive IP rights to undermine 
free trade117. The 1985 GATT report stated that existing IP regime did not 
provide sufficient means to face piracy. As a result, the Uruguay Round aimed at 
setting up a permanent World Trade Organization (WTO) which had to be 
equipped with efficient dispute resolution mechanism to face piracy118. 
The national treatment principle is recognized in art 3 of the Agreement. 
Protection was defined in the footnote of art 3119, thus, foreigners and nationals 
should enjoy the same protection for their substantial rights. This can be 
achieved through the application of the law of the protecting country120.  
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 Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights 1994 (TRIPs). The agreement applies to 
all WTO members, that is 157 members on 24 Aug 2012 published on WTO website 
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Therefore, any interpretation favouring the application of the law of the country 
of origin or the law of the forum is no longer acceptable because it is considered 
a breach of art 3 of the TRIPs agreement121. However, the law of the forum can 
still be applied to administrative and judicial procedural matters within firm 
limits122. Article 9(1) TRIPs excludes protection of moral rights conferred under 
art 6bis BC. Exclusion is not only limited to those rights expressly mentioned in 
art 6bis but also right derived from this article. Nevertheless, there are strong 
arguments that the divulgation right is derived from article 10 and 10bis and not 
from art 6bis123.  Thus, should not be excluded by art 9(1) TRIPs. 
Finally one should note that, unification of mandatory measures under TRIPs 
has restricted the scope of national policy124. 
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iv. WPPT – Art 4 and 5125 
 
Art 4(1) WPPT provides for the principle of national treatment. Moral rights 
were dealt with in art 5 of the Treaty. It was drafted based on art 6bis BC. 
According to paragraph (1), performers are granted the right to claim authorship 
and the right to object to derogatory treatment that would prejudice their 
reputation.  
Art 5(3) adopts lex loci protectionis rule. It requires application of the law of the 
Contracting Party 'where protection is claimed' to govern means of redress. 
Hence, raising the same concern that was raised in relation to art 6bis (3) BC. 
The law applicable to extend of protection is not clearly addressed126.  
 
v. WCT – Art 1127 
 
WCT aims at bringing international copyright to meet technological and 
economical developments and to harmonize substantive copyright law128. 
Principle of national treatment is not mentioned in this treaty, nor is there any 
choice-of-law rule. However, the Treaty expressly states in art 1(2) that none of 
its provisions derogate from existing obligations under BC. Accordingly, moral 
rights are to be protected – according to the substantive provisions of BC art 6bis 
- in the digital environment but without showing how129. 
                                                           
125
 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Geneva 1996 (WPPT) 
  
126
 See our previous discussion in relation to BC. 
 
127
 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Geneva 1996 (WCT). 
 
128
 See WCT preamble. 
129
 For more details see Smita Kheria, ‘Moral rights in the digital environment: Authors absence 
from Authors’ rights debate’ BILETA annual conference, (April 16-17 2007) 
<http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Moral%20rights%20in%20the%20Digital%20
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D.  Interim conclusions: 
 
Examination of the related international instruments showed that there was no 
explicit choice-of-law rule in any of them. The BC is the crucial instrument 
whose pattern was followed by subsequent treaties. Its goal in relation to moral 
rights was to ensure providing independent protection for these rights. Member 
States were allowed to establish their own ways for this protection by adhering 
to the minimum standards in the Convention130. And even if one agrees that the 
BC includes a choice-of-law rule, this arguable application can only be limited 
to infringement scenarios. Questions of validity, ownership and authorship of 
moral rights are clearly not regulated in BC.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
Environment%20-%20'Authors'%20absence%20from%20Authors'%20rights%20debate.pdf>last 
accessed 28 Sep 2009 (no longer available online) (hereafter referred to as Kheria, 2007); also J. 
A. L. Sterling, World Copyright Law (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 339 (hereafter 
referred to as Sterling, 2004). 
130
 Davis and Garnett, 2010, p 1028. 
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Chapter II 
Moral rights in cross-border contracts and the application of choice-of-law 
rules 
 
Choice-of-law rules within the European Union – except Denmark- are now 
governed by Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations131 (Rome I) and Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non – 
contractual obligations132 (Rome II).  
'National' choice-of-law rules only apply to the excluded subject matters from 
the scope of the Regulations. Moreover, non – Member States who are not 
subject to the Rome I and II Regulations, are expected to apply their domestic 
choice-of-law rules.  
Since the Rome Convention 1980, there has been common European ground 
regarding applicable law to contractual obligations. However, more clarification 
is needed when there is no clear choice-of-law in IP contracts133. To be exact, 
identification of the ‘characteristic performance’ is necessary to determine the 
applicable law to contracts involving moral rights134.  
This chapter will cover the position of moral rights in cross-border contracts as 
an element of copyright law.  Therefore, rules of Rome I Regulation must be 
studied. 
 
                                                           
131
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
132
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2008 on 
the law applicable to non - contractual obligations (Rome II). 
133
 Annette Kur, ‘Are there any common European principles of private international law with 
regard to intellectual property?’ in Stefan Leible and Ansgry Ohly (eds), Intellectual property 
and private international law (Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen 2009) 4 (hereafter referred to as Kur, 
2009). 
134
 Kur, 2009, p 4. 
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At the same time, CLIP135 and ALI136 Principles are significantly influential. 
Accordingly, the current examination will take into account how the three 
instruments (Rome I, CLIP and ALI) deal with each related issue.  
 
A. Copyright in cross-border contractual obligations: Examining choice-of-law 
rules 
 
Copyright contracts can take the form of license, assignment or waiver. 
Assistance in determining the applicable choice-of-law rules to copyright 
contracts can be found in the following:  
  
                                                           
135
 The European Max – Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) has 
prepared the final draft of these principles (The Draft) on March 25, 2011 < http://www.cl-
ip.eu/> last accessed 15 Sep 2012. 
  
136
 American Law Institute (ALI) was established in 1923 as a non-profit organization, when first 
established the ALI was wholly American in its members and aimed at simplifying the law and 
increasing its certainty within the national legal system. There is no mention in the early written 
records of ALI of profiting from the use of comparative method in terms of looking at the 
experience beyond American borders. This was reflected in the first 9 restatements completed by 
ALI before the end of the WWII. However, the influence of comparative law can be found in the 
‘revolutionary’ choice of law doctrine leading to the Second Restatement, the influence was 
from German émigrés including Rabel as well as from American comparative law scholars. 
More on ALI and unification of law see David S. Clark, ‘The stool’s third leg: unification of law 
in Berlin, Rome, and Washington from the 1920s to the 1940s’ in Jurgen Basedow and others, 
Aufbruch nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max - Planck - Institute fur Privatrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tubingen 2001) 45-49 (hereafter referred to as Clark, 2001). 
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1. Article 3 and 4 of Rome I Regulation137 
 
Rome I Regulation applies to conflict-of-laws situations in civil and commercial 
matters. There is no special reference in the Regulation to IP rights. However, 
the provisions of the Regulation should still be applied as IP rights are not 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation138. Accordingly, copyright contracts 
will be included under this broad heading. In relation to copyright, licence and 
assignment139are the most common types of contracts.  
Rome I Regulation views party autonomy or the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law as ‘one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules 
in matters of contractual obligations’140. The applicable law will govern 
interpretation of the contract, performance of contractual obligations, including 
assessment of damages if it is governed by rules of law141. 
                                                           
137
 The Rome convention has been incorporated into English law and brought into force by the 
contracts (applicable law) Act 1990 – The act applied to contracts made after 1 April 1991. The 
Rome I Regulation replaces the Rome Convention 1980 in the EU Member States, it applies to 
contracts concluded as from 17 December 2009. It was incorporated into England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland by the Statutory Instrument No. 3064 Private International Law – The Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations Regulations 2009. Generally see on contractual 
obligations Clarkson and Hill, 2006, ch 5. 
 
138
 Excluded subject matter from the scope of the regulation are listed in Art 1(2) Rome I.  Keep 
in mind that according to art 2 any law would apply whether or not it is the law of a Member 
State (universal application). This means if the court in question has jurisdiction and the contract 
falls within the scope of the Regulation, then rules of Rome I must be applied. See Svantesson, 
2007, pp 218-219. 
 
139
 Assignment is not similar to sale of the complete right, it can be limited in time and scope. 
For more details Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, p  572. 
140
 Rome I – recital 11. 
 
141
 Rome I – article 12. 
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If no express choice-of-law was made, then art 4 applies. The applicable law in 
this case becomes the law of the country which has the 'closest connection' with 
the contract. The closest connection presumption is determined according to the 
characteristic performer. The applicable law is the law of the country where the 
party carrying out the characteristic performance is habitually residence at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. 
 
 
2. Article 3:501 and 3:502 of CLIP  
 
According to art 3:501 and 3:502, party autonomy is the first rule in relation to 
IP contracts. In the absence of choice, the applicable law should be that of the 
state with the closest connection to the contract. When determining the state with 
the closest connection to the contract, several factors are listed to help decide 
whether the contract is most closely connected to the state of the transferor / 
licensor or transferee / licensee. However, if the contract was a transfer or a 
license of IP for multiple states, then the State presumed to be most closely 
connected with the contact will be that in which the creator, transferor or 
licensor has his habitual residence at the time of conclusion of the contract. 
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3. Article 315 of ALI Principles 
 
Art 315 of ALI Principles deals with ‘transfers of titles and grants of licenses’. 
According to this article, the first rule in relation to the law applicable to 
contractual obligations in relation to IP is the law chosen by the parties. 
However, in the absence of choice-of-law agreement, the law of the state with 
the closest connection to the contract applies. It is presumed that the state with 
the closest connection to the contract is that in which the assignor or the licensor 
resides at the time of the execution of the contract142.   
   
B. Validity of contractual waiver of moral rights: Exploring applicable choice-
of-law rules 
 
Assignment and license of copyright is common practice. Yet, the situation is 
more complicated in relation to moral rights. Legal systems which recognize 
moral rights, agree that these rights cannot be subject to licence or 
assignment.143 Any transfer of ownership of these rights contradicts with their 
nature. The special link or bond between the author and his work cannot be 
subject to transfer144.  Hence, there is almost a unanimous view that moral rights 
                                                           
142
 In relation to E-contract, Dr, Ala’a Aldeen Moh’d Ababnah opinion is that the traditional 
rules applicable to normal contracts can be sufficiently applied to E-contracts since –as he 
argues- E-contracts are usual contracts with one main difference that is concerning the form of 
expression for one’s will, Ala’a Aldeen Moh’d Ababnah, Conflict of laws in international E-
contract: comparative study in the Bahraini law (Applied Science University Press, Bahrain 
2008) 442 (hereafter referred to as Ababnah, 2008). In relation to copyright this means if 
copyright was the subject of an E-contract then traditional rules should be applied. 
 
143
 See for example: CDPA 1988 s 94, Bahraini Author’s Right Act 2006 art 5(1) and the French 
IP Code art L121-1. 
 
144
 The question of whether moral rights could be transferred or not was met by diverse opinions; 
for example, Pouillet in 1878 accepted the notion of authors giving up their rights contractually, 
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are not assignable145 and accordingly no choice-of-law problems arise in this 
respect146. 
However, waiver does not alienate or transfer rights, it simply makes them 
unenforceable. As a result, some common law jurisdictions allowed contractual 
waiver of moral rights147. This was criticised because it ignored the position of 
authors as the weaker party in contracts. The criticism is particularly relevant to 
authors' positions in industries that exploit copyright, such as music publishers 
and producers who usually insist on a complete waiver of moral right as a 
condition for publishing the work148. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
although an author who agrees to have his work misattributed to someone else would result in 
undertaking a fraud on the public. Gierke agreed to the possibility of an author expressly 
transferring his rights, where Morillot questioned such action on the basis of the intimate relation 
between an author and his work. See Adeney, 2006, p 64.  
 
145
 Taitano and Farb provide a table of international moral rights where moral rights are 
examined by country; the working document covers: Australia, Canada, Member States of the 
EU and the USA,  Melissa Taitano and Sharon Farb, 'International Moral rights:  Working 
document - Moral rights by country ' (2005) InterPARES 2 Project - Policy Cross-domain 
available online at 
<http://www.interpares.org/display_file.cfm?doc=ip2(policy)moral_rights.pdf> last accessed 5 
Aug 2012 (hereafter referred to as Taitano and Farb, 2005) however, for a table of world moral 
rights with wider coverage of jurisdictions see Adeney, 2006, pp 720-797.  
   
146
 For example CDPA1988 – s 94, for more details Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 515-517. 
 
147
 Waiver of moral rights is permitted in the UK under CDPA 1988 s 87 as well as in the USA 
under  art 106A known as the Visual Artistic Rights Act  (VARA) 1990  section e (1), Ciolino, 
1994, Tul. L. Rev. 944. However, the French Intellectual Property Code (IPC) article L121-1 
strictly stresses the inalienability of moral rights, Dietz, 1993, p 74. 
 
148
 Taitano and Farb, 2005, pp 162-163;  also See Bently and Sherman, 2004, pp 248-249. 
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As waiver is clearly permitted in common law tradition, it is not clearly so in 
civil law tradition. The general rule is that waiver of moral rights is unpermitted. 
Nevertheless, the criterion in the French system to decide on the validity of 
waiver is to consider its nature. A general waiver where authors sign on future 
modifications of their works without given the authority to ratify them149, is null 
and void.  
Professor Dietz believes that a consent given by the author to waive his right 
should not be ignored. Still, in the process of balance of interest, the judge 
should take into account that authors are usually the weaker party. Professor 
Dietz therefore suggests leaving the existence of consent and waiver to be 
decided by the judge, in the process of achieving balance of interests150. 
What is surely prohibited is the blanket wavier of the author’s right to protect the 
integrity of his work151. Advance consent to an open-ended list of modifications 
that is only subject to the discretion of the publisher, is a classical example of a 
void waiver152. 
In the Barbelivien case153, the authors and subject to a contract of assignment 
had provided the publisher with advance written consent to a list of 
modifications to their work, including using their songs in a second work and 
                                                           
149
 See Dietz, 1993, p 74. 
150
 Dietz, 1994, IIC186. 
 
151
 Edward J. Damich, ‘The right of personality: a common – law basis for the protection of the 
moral rights of authors’ 23 (1988) Ga. L. Rev. p 17 (hereafter referred to as Damich, 1988). 
 
152
 Continental Europe examine the scope of the waiver to make sure that the essence of the 
rights is not effected, whereas in the US courts care about the validity of the individual’s consent 
given at the time of the waiver, not the scope itself, Lucie M.C.R. Guibault, Copyright 
limitations and contracts: an analysis of the contractual overridability of limitations on 
copyright (Kluwer Law International, London 2002) 176 (hereafter referred to as Guibault, 
2002). 
 
153
 D Barbelivien v Sté Agence Business (2003) 196 R.I.D.A. 280. 
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changing the lyrics for the purpose of such adaption. The publisher (defendant) 
was an Italian company and the contract was subject to Italian law. The 
defendant (sub-licensed advertising agency) altered the lyrics, and the author 
subsequently brought an action for moral rights infringement arguing that 
contractual assignment of moral rights was invalid.  Paris court of Appeal agreed 
to apply French law because moral rights had a public policy character, 
however, found that the authors exercised their moral rights by giving advance 
written consent because the contract clauses were detailed i.e. it was not a case 
of invalid waiver. Nevertheless, the Cour de Cassation disagreed and reversed 
the ruling in 2003. It held that the right to respect for one's work is a public 
policy principle, hence, advance waiver of moral rights is not permitted154.  
Disagreement between the two legal traditions in relation to waiver of moral 
rights is probably supported by the vague language used in the BC.  
Commentators disagree on whether article 6bis of the BC permits impairing 
moral rights or not. And some suggest that art 6bis BC does not prohibit 
contractually impairing moral rights155. 
With regard to the Rome I Regulation, there is no illustration of how moral 
rights can be incorporated into contracts. This comes as no surprise as the 
Regulation is not designed to deal with substantive law. Surprisingly however, 
illustrative examples for license and assignment contracts in which moral rights 
are involved can be found in the ALI principles156.  
 
                                                           
154
 Case also discussed in Winston Maxwell, 'Moral rights clauses after Barbelivien' [2004] Ent 
L. R. 121 (hereafter referred to as Maxwell, 2004). 
 
155
 In favor of this view Paul Edward Geller ‘Conflict of laws in copyright cases: infringement 
and ownership issues: are laws of 200 different jurisdictions … applicable?’ WIPO World Forum 
(Oct 1995)<http://www.criticalcopyright.com/Geller-Copyright_Conflicts_Laws.pdf> last 
Accessed 20 Sep 2012, p 378 (hereafter referred to as Geller, 1995). 
 
156
 See illustrations of art 314 ALI principles. 
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1. Art 10 (1) of Rome I  
 
Art 10(1) of the Regulation subject 'existence and validity of a contract, or of 
any term of a contract' to 'the law which would govern it under this Regulation if 
the contract or term were valid.'  
In relation to moral rights, the law that determines the validity of waiver is the 
law chosen by the parties. If no choice has been made then, the law of the 
country where the party required to affect the characteristic performance of the 
contract is habitually resident.  
 
2. Art 3:301 of CLIP  
 
Art 3:301 of CLIP addresses the issue of transferability. According to this 
article, the law of the State for which protection is sought will determine 
whether the transfer or license can be invoked or not.  
In relation to moral rights, this means that the law of the country for which 
protection is sought will determine whether moral rights can be waived.  
Hence, if France is the country for which protection is sought, waiver of moral 
rights - as a general principle- will not be permitted. However, if England was 
the country for which protection is sought waiver of moral rights will most likely 
be considered valid.  
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3. Art 314 of ALI principles 
 
Art 314 states that the law of the State for which rights are transferred governs 
the extent of their transferability and determines any recordation rules relating to 
the transfer. In the illustrative examples following the article, it becomes clear 
that what is meant by the State for which rights are transferred is the State of 
exploitation i.e. the state for which protection is sought. Therefore, the ALI 
principles adopt the same rule adopted in CLIP.  
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C. Allocating the characteristic performance in moral rights contracts 
 
In relation to contracts, it is important to identify what the characteristic 
performance is in order to identify the law most closely connected to the 
contract. This task might be relatively straight forward in general contracts. 
However, it is more complicated in copyright contracts and especially in relation 
to moral rights.  
 
1. Art 4(2) of Rome I 
 
The objective connecting factor under art 4(2) of Rome I, is habitual residence, 
or respectively the central administration of the party who is to affect the 
performance that is characteristic to the contract.  
 
The closest connection presumption is determined according to the characteristic 
performer. The applicable law is the law of the country where the party carrying 
out the characteristic performance is habitually residence at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract157. The term ‘characteristic performance’ is derived 
from Swiss law and it refers to the performance which reflects what the contract 
is about158. Therefore, in sales contract the characteristic performance is selling 
                                                           
157
 According to the Giuliano-Lagarde Report, choosing the law of the place of the principle 
place of business of the characteristic performer over the law of the place of performance was a 
deliberate decision. This however raises another concern in relation to the Brussels Regulation 
where jurisdiction is permissible under art 5(1) in courts of the place of performance of the 
obligation, O’Brian Jr., 2004, p 13.  
 
158
 William E. O’Brian Jr., ‘The dancer or the dance: choice of law under the Rome Convention’ 
(2004) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1503960 > last accessed 7 Sep 
2012, p 4 (hereafter referred to as O’Brian Jr., 2004).  
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and delivering the goods, and in service contract it is providing the service. In 
general, if the contract is between two parties one of them pays money and the 
other is obliged to do something else, the characteristic performer is the latter 
party159. Note however that if it is difficult to identify a single characteristic 
performance–such as when there is an international exploitation of the right - or 
if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely 
connected with another country then the law of the country with the closest 
connection should be applied160. 
 
If copyright contracts grant rights to a single country, the closest connection will 
exist with that country where normally exploitation takes place (the country of 
protection). The situation however, is more confusing when books are printed in 
a third country. This is because printing, distribution and sale of books form part 
of exploitation. If copyright rights are granted in respect of more than one 
country, then the essential element is still exploitation of the work, and thus 
where the exploiter of the work is established161. 
In that case, the characteristic performer in a contract involving waiver of moral 
rights is the author who waives his moral rights. 
 
2. Art 3:502 of CLIP Principles 
 
Nothing in CLIP deals with characteristic performance. The term as such is not 
used because these are especially designed principles for IP rights. Nevertheless, 
the rules adopted in art 3:502 CLIP regarding determining the applicable law in 
the absence of choice adopts the same principle.  
                                                           
159
 O’Brian Jr., 2004, p 4.  
 
160
 Rome I – art 4(3) and 4(4). 
 
161
 For more details see Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 574-577. 
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The law presumed to be most closely connected to the contract, is the law of the 
State where the party affecting the contract is habitually resident. Hence, if the 
contract requires the licensee to exploit the work, he is the characteristic 
performer and the law of the State where he is habitually resident shall govern 
the contract. In relation to contracts concerning waiver of moral rights, the 
characteristic performer is the author, and hence the applicable law will be the 
law of the country where the author is habitually resident. 
 
3. Art 315 of ALI Principles 
 
The ALI principles also avoid using the term characteristic performance. Yet, 
the ALI principles are different from CLIP with regard to their adoption for a 
single rule. This is in relation to the applicable law to the contract in the absence 
of choice. Art 315 states that the law most closely connected in the absence of 
choice will be the law of the State in which the assignor or the licensor resided at 
the time of execution of the contract. This rule is an endorsement of the 
'characteristic performance' principle. However, it is different in the sense that an 
assignor or licensor is always presumed to be the characteristic performer162 of 
the contract. 
Accordingly, an author who waives his moral rights will always be the 
characteristic performer of the contract, and the law of the country where he 
resided at the time of the execution of the contract will be applied.  
  
                                                           
162
 See paragraph 2 of illustrations to art 315 ALI principles. 
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D. Moral rights of employees: identifying the applicable law  
 
The subject of moral rights of employees needs to be addressed separately 
because of its particularity. In general, there are three positions for employees' 
moral rights. The first is that an employee retains his title as the author and 
copyright owner of his creations, therefore, has the right to enforce his moral 
rights. The second is to have the employer as the first copyright owner, yet the 
employee maintains his authorship title along with his right to enforce his moral 
rights. The third and final position is to have the employer as the first copyright 
owner, while depriving the employee from his right to exercise his moral 
rights163.  
The issue at question is whether an employee – who is the actual creator of the 
work - is given the right to enforce his moral rights or not164. The question is 
naturally in relation to cross-border employment contracts. And the goal is to 
identify the applicable law according to choice-of-law rules in Rome I, CLIP and 
ALI Principles.  
  
                                                           
163
 Example: C.D.P.A 1988 – s 11(2) and s 79(3)(a). 
 
164
 Whether employees should be entitled to moral rights protection or not has been an ongoing 
problem. This writer agrees with those who differentiate between employees’ works based on the 
level of artistic freedom they enjoy when creating the work, however, this is a matter to be 
decided according to the substantive provisions of the applicable law and is therefore not to be 
decided according to PIL rules. For discussion on employees’ moral rights with a suggested 
solution see Orit Fischman Afori, ‘Employees’ moral rights: The Israeli solution to an ongoing 
dilemma’ [2008] E.I.P.R. 521-526 (hereafter referred to as Afori, 2008). 
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1. Art 8 of Rome I 
 
At the EU level, employment contracts are governed by art 8 Rome I Regulation. 
Preference is given to the law chosen by the parties. However, in the absence of 
expressed choice-of-law, the law applicable is the law of the country in which or 
from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the 
contract. And as a general rule, nothing in the Regulation restricts the 
application of the overriding mandatory rules of the forum165.  
 
2. Art 3:503 of CLIP Principles  
 
CLIP adopts the same principle adopted by Rome I. Art 3:503 provides for the 
application of the law chosen by the parties to determine the mutual obligations 
of the employee and employer, and the transfer or license of an IP right. The 
second paragraph of the same article states that if no law has been chosen by the 
parties, then the applicable law will be that of the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work. In any case, if “it appears from the circumstances 
as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a State other than 
that indicated in paragraph 2, the law of that other State shall apply”166 
  
                                                           
165
 Rome I - art 9(2). 
 
166
 Art 3:503 (CLIP). 
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3. Art 311 and 312 of ALI principles 
 
The ALI principles address contractual relationships in relation to IP rights only 
to determine the applicable law to initial title to registered rights and 
unregistered trademarks and trade-dress rights167. According to these principles, 
in the context of employment agreements, the law chosen by the parties should 
govern the relationship and hence determine who the initial owner of the 
registered right in question is or the unregistered trademark or trade-dress rights. 
If no choice-of-law has been made, then the law of the State with the closest 
connection with the parties and the subject matter should apply. However, 
nothing in these principles discusses the applicable law to any other issue 
besides initial title. In fact, questions of initial title in copyright and authorship 
are not addressed. Thus, no sufficient guidance is available under these 
principles. 
 
E. Interim analysis and conclusions: 
 
In practice, cross-border disputes concerning moral rights contracts can only be 
in relation to waiver of moral rights.  
It is important to point out that waiver of moral rights is a matter linked with the 
grant of the right. The law which determines existence and scope of the right 
should also determine whether the right can be waived or not. Thus, it is 
certainly not possible to leave this issue to be governed by the law of the 
contract. To do so means allowing the stronger party (usually not the author) to 
choose a law that permits waiver of moral rights. Therefore, in the light of the 
general rule, conditions of waiver are to be governed by the law of the contract, 
only if the law of the protecting country allows the principle of waiver of the 
                                                           
167
 ALI principles - Art 311 and 312. 
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right168.  This was followed by the French courts in Anne Bragance v Olivier 
Orban and Michel de Grece169 where Anne transferred all aspects of copyright 
to Michel by a contract which was governed by New York law. French law was 
the law of the protecting country -because the book was published in France. 
French courts decided that the law of the protecting country, being in this case 
France, is used to determine which rights were assignable. However, New York 
law as the law of the contract governs the validity and scope of the actual 
transfer. Since moral rights in France cannot be contractually assigned or 
transferred, French courts identified Anne as the author on every copy of the 
book published in France. Yet, she was not given any pecuniary compensation 
because assignment of those rights was effective170. 
Application of lex protectionis to determine conditions of transfer of copyright 
including moral rights does not appear to be the most suitable approach. For 
example, in Anne Bragance case the French court found itself obliged to 
separate issues of validity and scope from issues of assignability of the rights in 
question. Hence concluded, that the law governing the contract governs the first 
set of issues while the lex protectionis decides whether the subject matter of the 
right in question can be assigned or transferred or not. Because of such practical 
consideration and concerns, Professor Schack argues that the correct law to be 
applied is the law of the country of origin to determine whether the copyright or 
the exploitation right could be transferred in whole or in part171. To support his 
view he explains that in conflict-of- laws, distinction between obligation (causa) 
                                                           
168
 For general discussion regarding transferability of the right see Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, 
pp 515-517. 
 
169
 (1989) 142 RIDA 301 discussed in Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, pp 549-550. 
 
170
 Fawcett and Torremans, 1998, p 517. 
 
171
 Haimo Schack, ‘The law applicable to (unregistered) IP rights after Rome II’ in Stefan Leible 
and Ansgry Ohly (eds), Intellectual property and private international law (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tubingen 2009) 95 (hereafter referred to as Schack, 2009). 
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and disposition is accepted and there is no reason to ignore this achievement just 
for IP rights172. 
Clearly, in the context of employment contracts, question of initial ownership 
should not be governed by lex protectionis. To say otherwise means, employers 
can find themselves – in some jurisdictions- marketing a product they have no 
copyright ownership in173. The same problem applies if lex protectionis was to 
govern question of authorship since employers can face claims related to moral 
rights infringement brought by their employees in certain jurisdictions. 
However, some argue that if the applicable law is lex originis, then the 
advantage is that one single law applies to all issues of ownership174. Yet, there 
is another important factor that one needs to bear in mind in relation to works 
created by employees. It is the nature of the employee’s duties in the labour 
relationship in which he is engaged. These duties embody his intellectual 
creations, hence, it is probably best to have these subject to the law governing 
the employment contract175. This law will determine who the initial owner of the 
copyright is and whether employees are entitled to enforce their moral rights as 
authors or not. The lex contractus in this sense will provide legal certainty for 
the parties and will increase the level of predictability for exploiters176. 
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  Schack, 2009, p 95. 
 
173
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Chapter III 
 
Examining the choice-of-law rules applicable to moral rights in cross-
border torts 
 
This chapter is devoted to examining the applicable choice-of-law rules to moral 
rights in cross-border torts. The issue of moral rights infringement is probably 
the most significant of all. This is because cross-border infringement of moral 
rights is more likely to occur in comparison to any other issue.  In addition, 
questions of authorship and initial ownership will also be addressed in this 
chapter. This is necessary so one would have an adequate understanding of how 
the current situation is handled. 
Therefore, this chapter shall examinee the applicable choice-of-laws rules to: 
authorship, initial ownership, scope and cross-border infringements of moral 
rights. The chapter will follow the same pattern adopted in the previous chapter. 
Hence, examination for the currently applicable choice-of-law rules will cover: 
Rome II Regulation, CLIP and ALI principles.  
  
                                                                                                                                                         
– Washington Congress available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974124> last accessed 25 Oct 
2012, p 25 (hereafter referred to as Kono, 2010) 
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A. Authorship and initial ownership: Exploring the applicable law 
 
1. Initial ownership: 
The debate about initial ownership aims at achieving a balance between legal 
certainties and respecting the diversity in allocation regimes177. Furthermore, the 
adoption of a choice-of-law rule for copyright ownership should promote the 
international dissemination of works of authorship178.  
In order to fulfil these goals, States followed different approaches. Some are of 
the opinion that each Member state is free to apply its conflict rule to determine 
initial ownership of copyright.  The BC expressly states in art 14bis (2)(a) that 
lex protectionis is to be applied to initial ownership of copyright in 
cinematographic works. It is not clear whether Member States wanted to 
introduce an exception to the general rule in relation to cinematographic works 
or not, all that is clear is that Member States did not agree on who was the author 
of cinematographic works. Therefore, if the same rule was applicable to all other 
works why would the draftsman restrict the application to one category of 
works? 179. Note that, this provision covers moral rights as well:  
 
Contrary to the impression given by the English text, this provision 
covers all the authorial rights, including the moral rights. If, for 
example, UK law were the lex loci protectionis, the economic rights 
would be in the hands of the producer and director as authors but the 
moral rights in the hands of the director alone 180 
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On the other hand, some argue that it might seem logical to assume a link 
between the issue of copyright and to whom it is granted, thus apply the same 
law of the protecting country (lex loci protecitonis). Dr. Gottschalk is in favour 
of the application of lex protectionis to initial ownership as well as to 
infringement. He argues that until a truly worldwide agreement is reached, this 
rule needs to be supplemented with an escape close enabling courts to resort to 
the country with the closest connection to the dispute181. However, some believe 
that in practice this approach needs to be rejected because it will result in giving 
different ownerships to different persons in different countries182. In addition, as 
some argue, having initial ownership governed by lex loci protectionis means 
favouring the most protective regime183. Commentators like Dr. Van Eechoud 
called for alternatives to the lex protectionis to be applied to question of initial 
ownership of copyright. The attempt to drift away from lex protectionis finds its 
support in the legal uncertainty accompanied with this rule, many laws apply to 
the same work at the same time resulting in a simultaneous application184. So, if 
country A considers X the initial copyright owner of the work, he will be able to 
invoke his rights to prevent circulation of his work in the whole world, although 
country B might find that X is not the initial copyright holder185. 
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To solve the problem, scholars called for the application of the country of origin 
rule (lex originis) to determine initial ownership186. This rule is also called 
‘principle of universality’ because the ownership issue is decided according to 
only one national copyright law. According to this rule, ownership does not 
change when the work crosses borders187. As Professor Schack explains, initial 
ownership has to be answered once and for all according to the law of the 
country of origin, this country is the place where the work was first published. If 
the work was not published then the author’s nationality, and in relation to 
cinematographic works by the actual seat of the film producer188. This in turn 
secures international contracts and promotes international exchange of 
copyrighted works189. Therefore, lex originis is expected to better serve the 
efficiency goal190. Nevertheless, the forum may still disturb this application by 
applying the public policy exception for example191. Number of commentators 
criticise the country of origin rule.  This is because there is no clear definition of 
‘country of origin’ and ‘publication’. Terms used in the BC in art 3 and 4 were 
not defined for the purpose of serving as a connecting factor for a conflict 
rule192. Moreover, if the work was first published in the internet which country is 
the country of origin193? Another concern was in relation to the effect of 
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applying several copyright laws to different works within the same territory 
according to their country of origin. Some suggest that it will affect exploiters, 
as they will need to be aware of the provisions of the law of the country of origin 
of each work they exploit. Therefore, this interpretation carries great practical 
problems and as some scholars conclude is arguably a wrong interpretation of 
the BC194. Others understand the country of origin rule to favour the least 
protective regime195. Still, French courts apply the law of the country of origin to 
issues of existence, originality and initial ownership, whereas, lex protectionis is 
applied to determine the content of the right and scope of protection196. As for 
Rome II art 8(1) only deals with infringement issues, hence, it does not cover 
issues relating to ownership of intellectual property right197. 
 
Dr. Van Eechoud argues that IP rights try to strike a balance between the interest 
of the creator and that of the public. To maintain the locally achieved balance, 
application of lex protectionis is needed to determine the question of whether IP 
rights exist, if yes for how long and what their scope is. These matters are to be 
governed by the place of the use198. This does not apply to questions of initial 
ownership as the public has no interest in who created the work, rather their 
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interest is in what is protected199.  Ownership rules are about who benefit from 
the copyright in the work, these rules have less to do with the work’s availability 
to the public200. Moreover, Dr. Van Eechoud has a personal interpretation for the 
French Court’s decision in the Hutson201 case. Her opinion is that the lex 
protectionis is not applied by French courts to question of initial ownership. This 
is because the French courts had to find a way out to explain applying French 
law in the Hutson case by referring to public policy rules or priority rules. 
Meaning, the French law was not the default law to be applied202. Her view is 
that the law of the habitual residence of the author (the actual creator of the 
work) should be applied to determine ownership for authors as well as for 
performers203.  
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a. Rome II204 
 
Rome II Regulation was enacted on 11 July 2007 and came into force from 11 
Jan 2009. This Regulation governs non – contractual obligations205. Its objective 
is to increase legal certainty in the Union and to facilitate mutual recognition of 
judgments206.  
There is nothing in the Regulation that deals with initial ownership. ‘The law of 
the country for which protection is claimed’ is a rule that is adopted in art 8 of 
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the Regulation only in relation to IP infringement. The issue of initial ownership 
is therefore, not covered under the Regulation.  
 
b. Art 3:201 of CLIP Principles 
 
Art 3:201 deals with initial ownership. According to its first paragraph, the law 
applicable to initial ownership including authorship of a copyrighted work is the 
law of the country for which protection is sought. The second paragraph of the 
same article permits deviation from lex protectionis rule if the situation is more 
closely connected to another State207. 
 
c. Art 3:13 of ALI Principles 
 
The ALI Principles suggest in art 313 to apply the law of the creator’s residence 
at the time the subject matter was created to determine the initial title to IP rights 
that do not arise out of registration. Hence, the initial owner of a copyrighted 
work is to be determined according to the law of the creator’s residence at the 
time the subject matter was created, provided that the situation concerns a single 
creator. 
However, if there is more than one creator then the applicable law will be that 
designated by a contract concluded between the creators. If no such contract 
existed, then the applicable law will be the law of the country where the majority 
of creators resided at the time of creation of the subject matter. If none of the 
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above applied, then the law of the State with the closest connection to the first 
exploitation of the subject matter.208 
 
2. Authorship: 
 
None of the copyright treaties including the BC and TRIPs define the term 
‘author’209. Dr. Van Eechoud suggests replacing the term author with the term 
‘actual creator of the work’. Her justification is that the latter is a more factual 
definition whereas ‘author’ is a legal definition210. Some argue that authorship as 
a concept needs to be revisited, this is because the new means of technology and 
communicative development allow people to write stories together, interact and 
create a joint art works that are subject to copyright protection. The result is 
large number of potential “creators” and hence different understanding for the 
traditional concept of authors211.  
As a general rule, whoever creates the work holds its copyright ownership212. 
However, as one is entitled to dispose of his economic right through assignment 
and licence, the copyright owner could end up being different from the actual 
creator of the work. Only the author of a work has the right to enforce moral 
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rights, and since the author of the work and its copyright owner may differ, one 
can clearly see the importance of differentiating between the two.  
Generally, the nominated applicable laws to determine authorship are lex 
protectionis and lex originis.213 Those in favour of applying lex protectionis 
suggest doing so for purposes of consistency. This is true since the same law is 
applied for most other purposes214. 
Professor Torremans argues that although the application of the law of the 
protecting country to determine authorship allows taking the public policy issue 
into account, one should note that art 5(3) BC provides no clear choice-of-law 
rule in this case. There are other issues in relation to this point that need to be 
kept in mind besides the public policy consideration215. Professor Torremans 
argues that if one seeks to have a consistent definition of the term ‘author’ no 
matter how many borders the work crosses, one should apply the law of the 
country of origin (lex orignis)216. However, he clarifies that this might not be the 
best approach since there is difficulty in defining the term country of origin217. 
In addition, some argued that the application of lex originis should be rejected 
since this law is only referred to in exceptional cases218. 
Professor Torremans alternative solution is to apply the law of the centre of main 
interests to determine authorship for unpublished works. He refers to the ''centre 
of main interests'' of the person who created the work, and favours the use of this 
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connecting factor over the use of the habitual residence to avoid the legally 
defined concepts: 
 
... that require the application of the applicable law which one is trying 
to identify. Both first publication and the centre of main interests are 
more precise tools to identify a close or the closest connection between 
the work and its creation in terms of authorship on the one hand and the 
applicable law on the other hand. 219   
 
a. Rome II: 
 
Nothing in the Regulation deals with the issue of authorship. Hence, no guidance 
is provided when it comes to determining which law decides who the ‘author’ of 
the work is.  
 
b. Art 3:201 of CLIP Principles 
 
The issue of applicable law to authorship is dealt with in CLIP along with the 
issue of initial ownership. Art 3:201 adopts the rule of lex protectionis. Hence, 
the law applicable to ‘initial ownership including in particular authorship of a 
copyrighted work’ [emphasis added] is the law of the country for which 
protection is sought. 
 
c. ALI Principles  
 
ALI Principles do not cover question of authorship. Only question of initial 
ownership is addressed as discussed above. The rule adopted in relation to 
ownership cannot be assumed to have covered issues of authorship, this is 
because ownership and authorship are two different concepts that cannot be used 
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interchangeably. A copyright owner is not necessarily the author or the actual 
creator of the work.  
 
B. Determining the applicable law to the scope of moral rights: 
 
As the situation stands today, it appears that the application of the lex loci 
protectionis is a must in relation to the content, duration and exceptions to any 
IP right220. Only this law can tell how far IP rights can be respected in a territory 
so that the domestic and international IP users can be aware of permissible uses 
as well as prohibited ones221.  
In relation to moral rights, the situation is not any different. The general rule is 
that law of the protecting country will determine the scope and duration of these 
rights.  
On the other hand, some commentators argue that if moral rights are accepted as 
linked to the author’s personality right, not part of copyright, then the law of the 
country of which the author is a national should be applied to the issue of 
content of moral rights222. In other words, if moral rights can be seen as part of 
the personal law of the author, then in copyright terms this could lead to the 
application of the law of the country of origin because it is closely connected to 
the author223. Dorothee Thum suggests that such approach is a balanced 
compromise224. US courts apply French law if French directors are involved, and 
French courts apply US law if US directors are involved so that in the latter case 
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moral rights principles will not be applied225. She argues that this will be a 
simple rule that provides for a fair loss on both sides. Yet, she admits that it is 
difficult to imagine scholars of both sides accepting it226. Other writers suggest 
applying the law of the country of which the author is a national to unpublished 
works where no country of origin can be determined227. In any case, the reader 
should note that the common law tradition which is based on commercial 
exploitation, will most likely reject applying the author’s personal law to issues 
of moral rights228.  
 
1. Rome II 
 
Rome II adopts lex protectionis in relation to IP infringement. There is no 
explicit provision that deals with the applicable law in relation to the scope of an 
IP right. However, the law of the country for which protection is sought needs to 
identify the scope of protection for an IP right in order to decide whether an 
infringement has occurred or not. Hence, scope and infringement accordingly are 
determined according to the same law. This is what the majority of 
commentators and scholars agree on because the scope of an IP right is a matter 
that is considered of high importance to the society. Therefore, should be 
determined according to its laws.  
In relation to moral rights, this means that the scope of their protection including 
their duration will be decided according to the law of the country for which 
protection is sought.  
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2. Art 3:102 of CLIP Principles 
 
CLIP clearly adopts lex protectionis rule. As art 3:102 states that the law of the 
country for which protection is sough will determine existence, validity, 
registration, scope and duration of an IP right. Hence, the scope and duration of 
moral rights will be determined by the law for which protection is sought.  
   
3. Art 301 of ALI Principles 
 
Art 301 is titled ‘Territoriality’. It provides for the application for the law of the 
State for which protection is sought to determine existence, validity, duration, 
attributes, infringement and remedies for infringement of non-registered IP 
rights. Therefore, the scope and termination of moral rights is to be determined 
according to the law of the State for which protection is sought.  
 
C. Moral rights in cross-border infringement: identifying the applicable choice-
of-law rules 
 
Unquestionably, localizing the place of infringement of moral rights is important 
to identify the competent court. At the same time, the importance of this process 
is not limited to jurisdiction questions. Rather, localizing the place of 
infringement is also important to identify the applicable law. Therefore, the need 
to accurately carry out the localization process requires looking at the single act 
infringing the right at question. Normally, it will occur in one place that is the 
place where the tort occurred (loci delicti) which in most cases coincides with 
the place where protection is sought (loci protectionis). However, the wrongful 
act can sometimes be committed in one place while the damage is sustained in 
another. 
In many occasions, there is no enough guidance to help decide when it is 
accurate to say that a moral right infringement is complete. Dr. Adeney provides 
a list of the hurdles connected to localization of moral rights infringement. For 
example, although moral rights are listed under one title, yet they protect 
different authorial interests in different ways. Identifying the location of 
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infringement needs to be according to a certain applicable law since national 
laws differ in their identification of what the scope of each right is and therefore 
whether an infringement has occurred or not229. As a result, it is important to 
bear in mind that better and more precise approach would be to address each 
moral right on its own. 
Infringement of the attribution right occurs where the work was disseminated to 
the public without identification of the actual creator of the work. Before the 
work is disseminated to the public there is no infringement of the right230 
 
The integrity right is infringed in the place where the distorted work was 
communicated to the public231. The mere possibility of the public to view the 
work in its distorted form triggers this right even if the defendant was able to 
prove that no one actually viewed the work. 
 
Violation of the right of disclosure is quite clear. It occurs in the place where the 
work was disclosed or revealed without the author’s consent or where it was 
disclosed in a form different than that permitted by the author. The tort is not 
complete unless the work has been made available to the public232. 
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Taking this brief introduction into consideration, it is interesting to see how 
cross-border moral rights infringement233 has been dealt with in Rome II, CLIP 
and ALI Principles in traditional scenarios and in satellite and online scenarios. 
                                                                                                                                                         
require the user to download materials, the mere browsing of the website is sufficient to enable 
users to view the materials. In this writer's view, this in itself amounts to disclosure of the 
materials to the public. Limiting localization of the place of infringement to either the place of 
download or upload ignores the actual interest which the right of disclosure aims at protecting. 
Yet, the question remains whether the users' ability to access the materials on the internet reflects 
a real connection that would justify application of this place's law. 
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(Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen 2001) 521 (hereafter referred to as Stromholm, 2001). However, Prof. 
Morris calls for adopting the proper law of the tort doctrine similar to that applied in relation to 
contracts, see J.H.C. Morris, ‘The proper law of a tort’ 64 (1951) Harv. L. Rev. 881-895 
(hereafter referred to as Morris, 1951). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note what the German 
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lex loci delicti only refers to the place where the wrongful act was committed; this is because 
applying the traditional rule of lex loci delicti would break the unity of the copyright regime. 
This is because the fundamental questions which can be described as ‘preliminary’ questions 
relating to existence, validity, scope and content of copyright are governed by the principle of 
territoriality. Acts violating IP rights are connected with carrying out certain acts regardless of 
their consequences. Hence it is not possible to give the plaintiff such choice of applying either 
law because this will be incompatible with the specific character of infringements of such rights; 
Spielbankaffare case (2 October 1997, GRUR Int. 1998, p. 427) cited in Stromholm, 2001, pp 
523-524. 
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1. Traditional scenarios:  
 
Even if one understands moral rights to be independent from copyright, the fact 
remains that these rights only come into being through the creation of copyright. 
Moral rights can only be invoked in relation to copyrighted works and not as 
independent rights on their own. This fact led some commentators to conclude 
that the precise content of moral rights, which determines whether an 
infringement has occurred or not, have to be governed by the law governing the 
scope of copyright i.e. the law of the protecting country234. They argue that this 
application is important for reasons of uniformity so that copyright and moral 
rights will be subject to the same law235. In support of their argument, they refer 
to art 6bis (3) BC where it was stated that means of redress of moral rights are 
governed by the law of the protecting country. According to their opinion, this 
means that the law applicable to means of redress to moral rights also determines 
their content236.  
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a. Art 8(1) of Rome II 
 
One can argue that PIL rules concerning the applicable law in relation to IP 
infringement were common before the regulation of the Rome II Regulation. 
This is because as Professor Kur explains, an estimated 95% of pre Rome II law 
and practices in EU Member States were in line with applying lex loci 
protectionis to determine the applicable law237.  
Art 8(1) explicitly adopts lex protectionis as a choice-of-law rule. This in one 
way or another puts an end to the debate on whether lex protectionis is a choice-
of-law rule derived from the national treatment principle or is merely a pre-cited 
proviso in the BC238. 
Despite the arguments put in favour of Rome II Regulation justifying the need to 
have harmonized rules in relation to choice-of-law in non – contractual 
obligations, there were substantial concerns expressed by the witnesses of the 8th 
report of European Union Committee (HL)239. Rome II rules are not restricted to 
situations involving some cross-border or other connection with Union and 
Member States240.  The uniform conflict rules laid down in the Regulation could 
lead to the designation of the law of any country, including the law of a non-EU 
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country as the applicable law. This approach however, was not welcomed by the 
House of Lord’s report as clearly stated in paragraph 70:  
…We do not believe that the mere fact that a party may be sued in a 
Member State or that the circumstances of the case may involve an EU 
citizen is sufficient to give the Union legislative competence to 
determine the relevant conflict rule and, consequently, remove domestic 
legislative competence. Some connection or relationship between the 
matter and the functioning of the internal market must be established241.   
 
On the other hand, the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum suggests that 'a 
distinction between intra-Community and extra-Community cases is 
meaningless. There should be equal treatment for Community litigants ''even in 
situations that are not purely intra-Community'' '.242  Several arguments were put 
to challenge the universal scope, one of which is that not all cases effect the 
internal European market243. Others argued in favour of the universal scope of 
the Regulation, suggesting that it would be difficult on Member States to have 
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two regimes of conflict of laws, one to be applied on EU cases and the other on 
international cases244. 
Article 8 contains a special rule relating to the infringement of intellectual 
property rights245. It adopts the ‘universally acknowledged principle of the lex 
loci protectionis’246.  This rule – as the Commission explains – is derived from 
the 19th century version of the Berne and Paris Conventions247. The application 
of this rule allows each State to apply its own law to enforcement of IP rights 
which may be validly asserted there. 
 
Note that parties are not allowed to derogate from this rule by an agreement and 
therefore art 14 does not apply in relation to IP rights.  
 
The Commission stated in its Explanatory Memorandum that the treatment of IP 
was one that ‘came in for intense debate’ during the consultations248. Mr. 
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Fentiman was critical of Article 8249. He doubted whether the special rule being 
proposed was better that the general rules in Article 3. He argued that 
infringement of IP rights should not be addressed on their own. Issues of 
ownership and transfer of IP have to be addressed along with the issue of 
infringement. In his view, the adoption of the lex protectionis without 
qualification was not, as the Commission suggested, to take an unexceptionable 
position250. 
 
b. Art 3:601 of CLIP Principles 
 
In relation to the applicable law to IP infringement, CLIP adopts Lex 
protectionis (the law of each state for which protection is sought)251. Thus, 
adopting the same rule applied in art 8 of the Rome II Regualtion. 
 
c. Art 301 of ALI Principles 
 
These Principles follow the same rule adopted by Rome II and CLIP. The law of 
the state for which protection is sought will determine whether an infringement 
has occurred or not and will further determine the remedies for the 
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infringement252. As clearly stated by the title of the article along with its 
comments, this rule is based on the principle of territoriality.  
 
Hence, if England was the country for which protection is claimed, English law 
(CDPA1988) will determine whether moral rights are infringed or not. The same 
rule applies even if the country for which protection is claimed was not a 
Member State. Hence, Bahraini law will be applied according to art 8(1) of the 
Rome II Regulation if Bahrain was the country for which protection was 
claimed.  
 
2. Satellite and online scenarios: 
 
Infringement is no longer limited to its traditional sense. As a result of 
technological development and how the world is increasingly depending on 
online transactions, infringement over the internet along with cross-border 
satellite and media scenarios are very relevant.  
Question of applicable law becomes more problematic in Satellite and media 
situations. In these cases, infringement will most likely not be limited to a single 
country. For example, (A) is a composer who contractually waived all his moral 
rights. His work – the musical piece he composed- is broadcasted in the UK 
without identifying him as the author of the musical piece. The broadcast is not 
limited to the UK, rather is received in 6 European countries including France. 
In this case, which law applies to determine whether an infringement has 
occurred or not? Should the law of the country of emission be applied or that of 
the country of receipt? 
Interestingly, The Rome II Parliament Draft dealt with infringement committed 
over the internet or as a result of satellite or broadcast and advised for 
application of the law of the country of emission. However, Rome II in its final 
form did not include any particular provision to deal with infringement over the 
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internet or as a result of satellite or broadcast. Accordingly, lex loci protectionis 
as a general rule will apply. Commentators such as Mr. Sohn believed that this 
approach ignored the serious difficulties associated with identifying unlimited 
number of laws253.  
The effect of the digital age on copyright was the subject of many international 
treaties, one of the earliest was WCT (1996). As a consequence of the WCT, the 
Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) came into existence in 1998254. 
Recently in Europe, the European Parliament and Council Directive on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, the “Infosoc Directive” was enacted and implemented in 15 
Member States by Dec 22, 2002255. 
But what do these treaties do in relation to moral rights? In fact, no attention has 
been given to moral rights in any international instrument that is concerned with 
the digital era. WCT said nothing except that it required signatory states to abide 
by articles 2-6 of BC. WPPT required introducing moral rights for performers 
for their live aural performances and those fixed in phonograms. Moral rights 
were not mentioned in the DMCA 1998. Again there is no mention of these 
rights in the Infosoc Directive. The result was to leave moral rights for Member 
States to be considered on a national basis based on the assumption that moral 
rights will not distort the functioning of the internal market256.  
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In relation to online infringement, the situation reaches its highest level of 
complexity. This is true because the internet has been described as ‘an inherently 
cross-border medium’257. The main concern for copyright owners when it comes 
to the internet is its ‘mobility’. This mobility means that internet sites can easily 
be located and relocated in short time258. This particular nature raised serious 
debatable issues on PIL level. These concerns are intensified when one realizes 
that the internet allows immediate wide dissemination of copyrighted works in 
as many jurisdictions as the WWW covers. Thus, the relevance of the concept of 
territoriality in the internet context becomes questionable259. One can come up 
with an endless list of illustration for the complexity of the matter. For example, 
an Italian artist who is habitually resident in England, might find a modified 
version of his work available online with his name attached to it as the artist. 
The website where the modified version is available can be accessed in most of 
the countries in the world. 
Evidently, identification of the country with the closest connection in relation to 
online transactions is the ultimate complication. To solve the issue, authors such 
as Mr. Sohn suggests applying the lex loci protectionis combined with the 
infringer’s residence rule (for example where the publisher or broadcaster has 
his habitual residence or place of business)260. The infringer’s residence rule is 
considered to be consistent with the closer connection rule since his residence is 
one of the most important factors taken into account when determining the 
closest connection261. If the combination of lex loci protectionis and the 
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infringer’s residence was not enough, Mr. Sohn suggests applying the law of the 
country where the work, invention, or other subject of IP has originated from262. 
 
a. Rome II 
 
Nothing in the regulation deals with infringement over the internet. 
Nevertheless, online infringement is not excluded either hence, the chosen rule 
remains the same, and lex loci protectionis will be applied to internet scenarios. 
 
b. Art 3:603 of CLIP Principles  
 
Art 3:603 deals with ubiquitous infringement. It includes infringements carried 
out through ubiquitous media such as the internet. In such occasions the 
applicable law is the law of the state which has the closest connection with the 
infringement. To determine which state has the closest connection with the 
infringement, art 3:603 paragraph (2) CLIP lists several factors that should be 
taken into consideration, in particular: 
a. The infringer’s habitual residence 
b. The infringer’s principal place of business 
c. The place where substantial activities in furthering of the infringement 
in its entirety have been carried out 
d. The place where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety.   
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c. Art 321 of ALI Principles 
 
Art 321 deals with ubiquitous infringement. The article suggests applying the 
law of the State or States with close connections to the dispute263. An exemplary 
list of factors is provided which include the parties’ residence and place where 
their relationship –if any- is centred. Note however, that the term used is ‘close’ 
connections not the closest connection. Nevertheless, the subsequent comments 
on this article deal with it as searching for the law of the State or States with the 
‘most significant relationship to the dispute' or 'most closely connected..’264      
Keep in mind that the same article also allows parties to prove any different 
solution -provided by any of the states covered- from that given under the 
chosen applicable law to the case as a whole. In such occasion, the court should 
take into account these differences when determining remedies.   
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Chapter IV 
Evaluation and conclusion 
 
.. we must ask whether the past concepts of private international law, 
which originated in Europe and the United States, can meet the social 
needs of present-day world and the international life of its society, 
characterized by revo-lutionary changes in the political, economic and 
social spheres after the Second World War. These include primarily the 
internationalization of production and exchange of goods as well as of 
the whole life of society to an extent which only recently would have 
seemed unbelievable...  
Pavel Kalensky265 
 
 
As the situation stands today, moral rights as an element of copyright are subject 
to Rome I and Rome II Regulations. In relation to contracts, the applicable law 
according to Rome I Regulation is the law chosen by the parties. In the absence 
of choice, the law most closely connected to the contract will be applied. This 
law is presumed to be that of the country where the characteristic performer is 
habitually resident at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The explicit 
rules provided for under Rome II are only in relation to infringement. Issues of 
ownership, authorship and ubiquitous infringement are not clearly addressed in 
the Regulation.  
The influential nature of CLIP and ALI Proposals raise remarkable concerns 
concerning their proposed rules. These concerns are based on the following 
reasons266: 
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1. In relation to lex loci protectionis: Unfortunately, the proposed principles of 
both ALI and CLIP adopt lex loci protectionis rule in relation to IP infringement 
despite coming from different traditions (common and civil law). The Proposals 
do not provide solutions for the problems associated with lex loci protectionis. 
This comes as a surprise because both proposals were formulated in the time of 
globalization and harmonization for copyright laws267. 
 
2. The problematic case of ubiquitous infringement: The requirement of 
ubiquitous infringement could lead to excluding the application of this rule to 
websites of limited geographical access. These websites are not accessible 
worldwide, so the question here is whether these websites qualify as ubiquitous 
conduct? What is clear is that both ALI and CLIP in developing their ubiquitous 
rule, tried to achieve a balance between territoriality and universality. 
 
3. The equal treatment of IP rights in CLIP: CLIP does not differentiate between 
registered and non-registered rights. Accordingly, choice-of-law rules applicable 
to trademarks for example will also be applied to copyright. Furthermore, there 
is no mention of moral rights in the proposed rules despite coming from 
European Continental view. 
 
4. Both proposals (CLIP and ALI) suggest applying the law with the closest 
connection to the dispute. In fact, the ALI proposal uses the term ‘close 
connection’ not closest unlike the terminology used in CLIP proposal. In any 
case, the exemplary list of factors under ALI seems to be neutral as to the 
parties’ role as right holder or infringer. The list given under CLIP is more 
‘infringer – oriented’. 
 
5. The provisions of both proposals are very detailed as if they were tailored 
with a particular example or scenario in mind. This approach in itself avoids 
simplicity as a desirable quality in PIL rules. 
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With regard to moral rights, derogation from the existing choice-of-law rules in 
general, and lex loci protectionis in particular, should not be rejected. This is 
because moral rights are not specifically addressed in Rome I or Rome II 
Regulation at the first place. What is clearly available is an assumption that 
moral rights should be attached to copyright in conflict-of-law as a consequence 
of having them as an element of copyright.   
However, the vague present position of moral rights in conflict of laws, together 
with the special nature of moral rights and the link these rights share with both 
copyright and personality rights, inspired the research question of this thesis. It 
is therefore submitted that further exploration and investigation regarding the 
position of moral rights in conflict-of-laws is needed. Such investigation has to 
be carried out from alterative views to copyright.  
Surely, the task remains challenging. Departing from the territoriality principle 
and its ideological considerations268 is certainly a hurdle as 'Territoriality 
remains a powerful intuition...'269. Moreover, territoriality of IP rights was 
further supported by what is understood as the public character of IP rights. 
Countries have social, cultural and economical interests in protecting IP rights 
which make the application of a foreign law a matter of serious concern, more 
precisely there is a fear of misapplying any foreign law to this delicate area270.  
Therefore, scholars recognize and acknowledge the complications of departing 
from the territoriality principle, which casts its shadow on PIL issues. Professor 
Schack explains '... Devising adequate conflict rules for unregistered IP rights 
therefore remains an intellectual challenge for law professors, practitioners and 
the legislator...' 271 Yet, this writer believes that finding specifically designed 
choice-of-law rules to moral rights is possible  '...once the legal mind has been 
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freed from the compulsive idea of the exclusive application of the protecting 
countries’ laws'272.  
Therefore, Part 3 is intended to carry out this attempt and explore the possibility 
of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-of-laws.  
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Part 3 
 
Detaching Moral Rights from Copyright in Conflict-of-Laws: 
Exploring Alternatives to Copyright Perspective 
  
104 
 
 
The ignored position of moral rights in conflict-of-laws was clearly explored in 
Part 2. The present choice-of-law rules were designed with copyright in mind 
but not moral rights. As a result, application of the same choice-of-law rules to 
moral rights came with certain complications.   
Therefore, the theory of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-of-
laws is worthy of examination. This Part intends to investigate the validity of 
this theory. It will be divided into 4 chapters. Chapter I is an introduction, it aims 
at identifying the considerations that triggered the present investigation. Chapter 
II undertakes the search for stronger association with moral rights in conflict-of-
laws. As the theory of moral rights is based on the connection between these 
rights and general personality rights, Chapter II examines personality rights in 
conflict-of-laws and their intersection with moral rights from conflict-of-laws 
perspective. 
Subsequently, Chapter III explores the related judicial decisions to the subject. 
The goal is to cover the most important decisions in international moral rights 
cases to find out whether moral rights are taken beyond the scope of copyright 
law or not. Finally, Chapter IV is an assessment and concluding remarks for the 
findings of Part 3. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction: Identifying the considerations that triggered the present 
investigation 
 
This Chapter is an answer to why there is an argument for detachment at the first 
place. It attempts to identify the problems associated with application of lex loci 
protectionis to moral rights, and the difficulties affiliated with having no specific 
choice-of-law rule to questions of authorship and validity of contractual waiver 
of moral rights. As this chapter is an introduction it will merely touch on the 
related judicial decisions, which question the default position of moral rights as 
an element of copyright in conflict-of-laws. The question of whether courts take 
the matter beyond the scope of copyright or not will be examined in Chapter IV 
of this Part.  
It is to be noted that particular attention is paid to problems of moral rights in 
cross-border torts, and the application of lex loci protectionis accordingly. This 
however, does not mean that problems associated with moral rights in cross-
border contracts are less important. Yet, the significance of cross-border torts is 
attributed to the fact that infringement scenarios are more likely to occur. Hence, 
the number of cross-border infringement cases is expected to be higher and the 
complexity of these scenarios is expected to be greater. 
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A. The problematic application of lex loci protections to moral rights  
 
There are certain problems associated with the application of lex loci 
protectionis. Some of these problems are inherent in lex loci protectionis as a 
principle. However, other problems are triggered when this rule is combined 
with moral rights.  
The first problem is that lex loci protectionis as a rule based on the principle of 
territoriality, seems to be inconsiderably related to moral rights. From a general 
perspective, territoriality is an outdated273 and a substantive law principle274. 
Territoriality and comity are legal tools used to express the political concerns 
which form part of sovereignty275. During the territoriality period, IP rights were 
confined to the geographical borders of the granting country276, in fact, '... as far 
back as the late nineteenth century the vast majority of intellectual property 
disputes  were wholly domestic in nature: ownership or infringement issues 
hadn't the potential of reaching the whole world...'277. Each community lived by 
its own rules and laws, the law of each country identifies the rights and its effect 
is only limited to activities undertaken by others within the geographical 
territory for which it is granted. Some argue that territoriality is a universal 
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matter -inherent in the very nature of IP rights itself278. The territoriality of laws 
enables them to reflect historical, religious, ethnical, social, cultural and 
economic needs of every community279. Therefore, whether one accepts 
territoriality as a special characteristic of IP rights or not, territoriality has long 
been the applicable notion in relation to IP rights including copyright.   
Nevertheless, since the post-war, the importance of sovereignty and the principle 
of territoriality have declined. This is substantially attributed to three important 
factors. The first factor is the international and regional economic integration 
which affected the level of regulations from national to transnational. IP rights 
became part of the global trade relations, and with that came the difficulty for IP 
to meet the particular needs for every state. Hence, an international and 
systematic approach to the IP system crystallized in the TRIPs agreement 
1994280. 
 
The second factor is the decline in the importance of state's role against the 
development of the role of other parties such as multinational corporations and 
intermediaries281.  
The third and final factor is the ever increasing importance of the internet.   As a 
matter of fact, it is probably agreeable to say that the internet alone has changed 
the conventional understanding for geographical borders. At the same time, 
principles and rules that were formulated based on the notion of territoriality – 
such as copyright law- are also loosing this basis. Efforts to harmonize copyright 
law on the international level started with the BC.  The Convention established 
minimum standards of protection (types of works protected, duration of 
protection, scope of exceptions and limitations) as well as principles of 'national 
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treatment' and automatic protection for copyright. WCT also contributed to the 
international development by ensuring copyright protection to computer 
programs and databases. The importance of TRIPs as an enforcement tool for IP 
rights including copyright cannot be underestimated. Efforts to harmonize 
copyright at the European level crystallised  in the 2001 InfoSoc Directive which 
harmonized the rights of reproduction, distribution and communication to the 
public, as well as the legal protection of technical protection measures and rights 
management systems across European Union Member States. In addition, there 
is the 2004 Directive on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
(2004/48/EC) which adds extra measures on enforcement of digital copyright. 
These harmonization attempts, at the regional and international level (in addition 
to the exponential increase in conflicts involving trans-border elements) brings 
out the weakness and unsuitability of the principle of territoriality which does 
not go in harmony with the notion of globalization282, and the concept of 
borderless market is -by definition- in conflict with the old principle of 
territoriality in relation to copyright283. 
Nevertheless, art 8(3) Rome II gives priority to territoriality over efficiency and 
party autonomy by excluding IP rights from the application of rules relating to 
freedom of choice. The justification is found in recital 26 which explains that 
private parties should not be allowed to interfere with the sovereign power of the 
lawmakers to determine the existence, scope and limitation of IP rights 
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 Ansgar Ohly, ‘Choice of law in the digital environment – problems and possible solutions’ in  
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 Davis and Garnett, 2010, p 75. The effect of globalization on copyright stands as clear 
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For example a domestic injunction normally leads to shutting down the whole website; an 
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actual harm, see Matulionyte, The law applicable to online copyright, 2011, para 3-6. 
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according to the universally accepted principle of lex protectionis284. However, 
the situation in relation to moral rights does not necessarily fall within the scope 
of this justification. The reason is that moral rights are attached to the person of 
the author in relation to his work. Therefore, the balance States try to achieve 
between public and private interests in relation to IP rights in general is less 
triggered in relation to moral rights285. This is further supported by the fact that 
moral rights are unregistered IP rights. Hence, the national legislator only 
recognizes these rights and does not grant them286. Therefore, application of the 
principle of territoriality and whatever rules derived from it including lex loci 
protectionis rule should no longer be possible. This is because territoriality was 
justified in old times when the protecting country coincided with the forum state. 
However, this is no longer the case as copyright -and IP rights in general- are 
exploited on a worldwide basis287. 
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 Even though moral rights protection forms a restriction on the freedom of the public, this 
restriction is available in the conscious of the society even in the absence of moral rights 
legislation. This is likely to be true in any civilized society at least in relation to divulgation and 
integrity rights. Probably, the situation is best illustrated when one studies societies' attitude 
towards plagiarism; the verb plagiarize is defined according to the Oxford Dictionary as 'take 
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what is protected under the attribution right which is guaranteeing the authenticity of the origin 
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benefits. However, the situation is different when it comes to plagiarism as societies find false 
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The public and the private interest in this matter are very much balanced without the need for an 
intervention from the local authority. 
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The second problem concerns the imbalance of interests between authors and 
users in online copyright cases, as a result of the application of lex loci 
protectionis288. Today, materials uploaded online can be accessed worldwide 
(with very few exceptions). Lex loci protectionis rule gives the author the choice 
of claiming protection under the most protective law in the case. On the other 
hand, the defendant in an online case will be sued under any law where the work 
can be accessed and hence should accommodate his conduct to almost each law 
worldwide, which leads to legal uncertainty289. This uncertainty in having the 
defendant subject to as many laws as the www can reach, contradicts with one of 
the main objectives of conflict-of-laws which is promoting predictability through 
meeting the parties’ legitimate expectations. Consequently, conflict justice will 
not be achieved. 
 
The third problem is related to the impossibility of applying a single law to 
online infringements, if lex loci protectionis is applied. Rules of conflict-of-laws 
are created so that only one single law is to be applied out of several potentially 
applicable laws. Application of a single law to the right holder means that the 
author acquires worldwide remedies on the basis of a single law. For the 
defendant, it means eliminating the problem of multi-applicable laws, hence 
avoiding the danger of cumulative or conflicting remedies granted under 
different laws290. Application of lex loci protectionis prevents us from achieving 
these desirable results. 
 
For example, a composer (A) has licensed the copyright in his composed 
musical piece to (B). The licensee (B) authorizes a third party (C) to make major 
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modifications to the work. The modified version of the work is then uploaded on 
YouTube with attribution to (A). In this scenario, (A) being the author of the 
work, finds his integrity right infringed. Almost everyone in the world with 
internet access can listen to the modified version of work on YouTube. The 
license has no effect on the moral rights claim because it is only valid in relation 
to the author's economic rights. Application of lex loci protectionis means that 
the defendant (the licensee – B) is subject to laws of any jurisdiction where 
YouTube can be accessed.  
Another example is that in relation to the attribution and divulgation rights.  For 
example, (A) has been appointed by an organization to prepare a social study. 
He prepared the study through undertaking several social and economical studies 
in addition to translating plenty of reports. He then hands the study over to the 
organization. At a later stage, (A) found out that the study was published in two 
forms: hardcopy (book) in 3 European countries, and softcopy (as selected social 
studies) online. In both forms of publication, the author's name was omitted and 
the name of the manager of the organization was inserted as the name of the 
author of the work. The author, in his contract with the organization, has agreed 
on publishing the work in its hardcopy format, but not as selective social studies 
online.291.  
The organization has infringed the author's attribution right as well as his 
divulgation right. If the author was to bring a case against the organization, the 
applicable laws would be laws of 3 different European countries in relation to 
infringement of his attribution right, and laws of as many jurisdictions as the 
web can reach in relation to the selected social studies published online. 
 
B. Inadequate present discussion on authorship and validity of contractual 
waiver of moral rights in conflict-of-laws  
 
As explained earlier in Part 2, there is no clear choice-of-law rule applicable to 
questions of authorship and validity of contractual waiver of moral rights. The 
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 Facts are based on case called ' Theatre for life' which was brought before Khartoum court of 
summary justice / civilian case 1337 for the year 1998 on 16th Nov 1999. 
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absence of specifically designed choice-of-law rules to be applied to these two 
important questions, leads to complications. Application of lex loci protectionis 
rule to question of authorship cannot be accepted, as it leads to identification of a 
different author, each time the work crosses the border.  At the same time, lex 
originis does not solve the problem as there is no consensus regarding where the 
country of origin is, especially for woks that were first published online. 
    
As for the topic of contractual waiver of moral rights, the main issue is related to 
the validity of waiver. This is of particular importance because of the well 
known differences between the two legal traditions. As the situation stands 
today, the question is not specifically addressed. Moreover, if one was to apply 
the general choice-of-law rule under Rome I, the applicable law would be that of 
the contract if the clause or term at question was valid i.e. the law chosen by the 
parties or in absence of expressed choice, the law of the place of habitual 
residence of the characteristic performer of the contract.  This solution is 
generally refused because validity is a matter that is in essence related to 
existence of moral rights. 
 
Finally, the use of the internet and 'online' services today is more of a necessity 
than a luxury292. Litigations are therefore expected to increase, in their number 
and complexity. This expectation does not find a comforting reality in the light 
of the problematic application of lex loci protectionis, or the insufficient present 
discussion on authorship and validity of contractual waiver of moral rights in 
conflict-of-laws.  
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 In fact, the French Constitutional Council considered internet access to be 'fundamental 
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C. The judicial tendency towards attaching moral rights to general personality 
rights in conflict -of-laws 293  
 
There are limited, yet important judicial decisions in relation to moral rights in 
conflict-of-laws. Courts' decisions in cross-border moral rights cases gave rise to 
a new query as courts seem to bend the rules for reasons beyond the scope of 
copyright.  
 
The most famous example is John Huston case which has been heavily 
discussed and reviewed. In this case, the French Court de Cassation considered 
moral rights to be of 'mandatory application'. Laws that provide lower standard 
of moral rights protection will not be applied even if the infringement concerns 
moral rights of foreign authors and foreign works as long as the protection 
sought for is in France. The tendency found in the French court's ruling in the 
John Huston case, is also found in other judgments. This is not limited to civil 
law tradition. Rather, some decisions given by common law courts approve the 
link between moral rights and general personality rights in conflict-of-laws. 
Thus, courts seem to be taking moral rights, beyond the scope of 'copyright' in 
conflict-of-laws.  
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 Note that this is only an introduction to this issue which will be examined in details in chapter 
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in the right direction.   
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Chapter II 
The search for stronger association with moral rights in conflict-of-laws: 
General personality rights 
 
The development of moral rights was greatly influenced by the personalist ideas. 
This draws instant attention to general personality rights. From civil law 
perspective – more specifically French law- the personality character is 
obviously reflected in moral rights, this is because to meet the originality 
standard, one’s personality has to be reflected in his literary or artistic 
creation294. The individuality and the unique character each adds to his work, is a 
reflection of his own personality295. As Professor Kwall puts it: 'The essence of a 
moral rights injury lies in its assault upon the author's personality, as that 
personality is embodied in the fruits of her creation'296 
Therefore, there is strong supporting argument, that general personality rights 
and moral rights are purposely similar. Still, some might argue that, there is 
nothing titled as general personality rights in common law tradition. Yet, it does 
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not change the fact that the essence of general personality rights remains 
protected there.  This is true even with regard to the judicial decisions, from 
common law courts, on the subject.   
Therefore, the goal in this chapter is to understand personality rights as the field 
most closely connected to moral rights. Examination will be from conflict-of-
laws perspective to see how these rights are treated in cross-border disputes. 
Exploring general personality rights, as an alternative perspective, is expected to 
contribute to the process of evaluating the accuracy of the related choice-of-law 
rules.  
This chapter shall accordingly cover the following: 
- Definition and characteristics of personality rights 
- The position of general personality rights in Rome II Regulation and in 
the UK. 
- The intersection between moral rights and general personality rights with 
relation to their purpose and function. 
- Case law illustrating the difficulty in identifying a clear line between the 
two subjects.  
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A. Introduction: 
 
1. Introducing personality rights 
 
a. Definition and characteristics: 
 
The concept of personality rights is a civil law concept297. The German and the 
Swiss were the first to use the word ‘Personlichkeitsrecht’298 during the 19th and 
20th centuries. However, the current use of the term ‘personality rights’ has 
emerged in the middle of the 20th century. These rights came to form in 1954, 
since then all French law treaties and handbooks include a specific chapter on 
personality rights299. On the other hand, rights of personality remain undefined 
in common law tradition, yet considered as a subset of torts. These rights could 
include one’s right in privacy, one’s right against false statements to others and 
against misuse of one’s image. The difference between common and civil law 
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 The first law review on personality rights in France was in 1909 written by H.E. Perreau; see 
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traditions in relation to personality rights, is reflected in the EU tort law300 where 
there is no uniformity concerning personality rights301.  
Although scholars agree on the importance of personality rights, there is no 
consensus concerning the content of these rights302. Nevertheless, several 
definitions were proposed. The aim was to determine the content and scope of 
these rights.  
Under French law for example, personality rights are: '… fundamental rights 
attached to the persona of the human being, intended to protect non-patrimonial 
attributes or manifestations of the person.'303  
Perreau gave a comprehensive definition for the droits de la personnalite 
published in his famous article (1909). He defines these rights as:     
rights of the person as such, comprising the right to be recog-nized as a 
distinct individual – expressed, in positive law, by a per-son's exclusive 
right to his name and the actions pertaining thereto, the right to one's 
own likeness and the rights to honour and liberty, i.a. the liberty to 
organize one's private life. Secondly, there are rights inherent in the 
person as member of a family: rights concern-ing legitimacy, marital 
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status, etc. and rights to the family name. Finally, there are rights 
attached to the status of citizen: national-ity, right to vote, etc.304 
 
Others define it as:  
A right to personality is the exclusive intellectual property right of each 
person to use his or her own name, image, voice, signature, and any 
other distinguishing characteristics which would identify a specific 
person. Unlike a publicity right, a personality right is not a financial 
right but rather a personal intellectual property right which, strictly 
speaking, is not inheritable or assignable305. 
 
Whereas Professor Damich defines personality rights as 'those individualizing 
traits of a man which constitute his singularity and differentiate him from all 
other human beings: in this sense it is a reification of the concept of identity'306 
 
As for the characteristics of personality rights, scholars seem to agree that these 
rights are extra-patrimonial i.e. do not have economic value307, not transferable, 
may not be prescribed, exempt from seizure and cannot be renounced or 
abdicated because they are essential attributes of the person308. 
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b. Interests these rights aim at protecting: 
 
Personality rights are intended to provide the maximum level of protection to the 
attributes of the human person. A natural person automatically qualifies for 
protection under personality rights by the mere fact of his existence, no 
additional requirement is needed309. An interest that is characterized as an 
attribute of the human person is considered part of personality rights. Hence, 
such attributes certainly include one’s right in his life, honour, privacy310, 
reputation, name, expression… etc.  
 
French legal writers stress the impossibility of making an exhaustive list of the 
rights of personality. Nevertheless, they agree that personality rights are divided 
into 3 groups. The first group is rights to the constitutive elements of the person 
(bodily integrity, honour and reputation). The second group is rights to the 
means of identification or expression (one's name and likeness, the right of 
secrecy and moral rights of authors). The third group concerns rights to freedom 
of movement and work311.   
Therefore, the French classification of authors' moral rights as part of general 
personality rights is undisputed. The essence of what is protected under privacy, 
reputation, honour and name (as attributes of the human person) is also protected 
under paternity, integrity and divulgation rights (as part of author's moral 
rights)312.  
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c. The position of general personality rights in the UK: 
 
Historically, the notion of privacy – as an attribute of the human person- in the 
Anglo-American legal writings, finds its roots in the most significant law review 
article, and probably the most influential on the notion of privacy, which was 
written by Samuel D. Warren and Loiuse Brandeis (two American lawyers) in 
1890. This article was written as an action against the violation to Samuel D. 
Warren family life by what was known then as the 'yellow press'. The authors 
stressed the importance of protecting private life. They supported their argument 
by decisions given by American and English courts where intrusion on the 
private sphere of one's life was held actionable. The authors stated that if these 
decisions were to be analyzed properly, then we will find that what these 
decisions really protected was in essence a right of privacy and it was time to 
recognize it313. Yet, in a later stage in their article, they called for replacing the 
right to privacy with a general right to one's personality. Nevertheless, what they 
mean by the right of personality remained unclear314.  
Warren and Brandies referred in their article to the very famous English decision 
of Prince Albert v Strange (1849)315, understood to be the first ever ruling 
recognizing one's right in his own picture316 and where Vice Chancellor Knight 
Bruce clearly mentioned the term 'privacy'. Yet, the fact remains that it is very 
difficult in the English – as well as in the American- legal system to point out 
the exact moment or decision that gave birth to the right of privacy as distinct 
from other interest protected by actions. In other words, in English law there is 
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no story of birth '…of privacy as an element of positive law…'317.As for the 
theoretical basis for general personality rights in the UK, it is based on a mixture 
of property and human right principles318. 
 
The term 'general personality rights' is not recognized in the UK, nevertheless, 
protection is still provided for personality rights interests in piecemeal 
fashion319. Usually, reference is made to defamation320, breach of confidence321, 
passing off322 and liable as the torts used to protect these interests323. 
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Even this minimal and piecemeal level of protection for these interests is 
regarded by some commentators as sufficient to state that personality rights are 
now recognized in the UK. Mr. Gert Bruggemeier argues that personality rights 
do exist in the UK because Privacy and self – determination are now considered 
with no doubt a European feature, being part of the ECHR and part of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the established case law of the ECJ 'on 
community fundamental rights, which are already in force as general principles 
of EC law'324.  
 
Moreover, a larger group of commentators325 believe that '... the English 
Parliament in passing the Human Rights Act condoned a move towards a greater 
protection of privacy under the common law.' 326 Therefore, enforcement of the 
Human Rights Act in 1998 marks an explicit move into recognizing personality 
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rights in England. As a result, courts in the UK are ought to act in a manner that 
is compatible with the ECHR327.   
 
With regard to case law, Douglas v Hello!328 is significantly important in 
relation to the question of personality rights in the UK. The case has been 
described by Sedley LJ as marking the arrival of the right of privacy in England:  
'[W]e have reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the law 
recognizes and will appropriately protect a right of personal privacy' 329  
According to Stephen Boyd, Douglas v. Hello! marks the first step towards 
recognizing privacy right in the UK. Yet, the court's ruling in this case provides 
little support for recognizing general personality rights330. This is because the 
UK under ECHR was expected to develop the law of tort and delict to create 
new privacy right. However, the Lords have not taken this approach and instead, 
existing causes of action, in particular breach of confidence has been 
manipulated to protect privacy interests331. Another two recent decisions by the 
House of Lords also prove that courts in the UK are not yet ready to recognize 
new tort of privacy are Wainwright v. Home office332 and Campbell v. MGN 
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Ltd333 where award of damage was also based on breach of confidence, although 
the requirement of confidential relationship was not fulfilled. Thus, it appears as 
if breach of confidence as G. Howells puts it is the 'de facto tort of privacy'334 in 
English courts.  
 
These slow moves and piecemeal fashion of protection, could suggest that the 
UK is eventually moving towards a UK personality right. This is because 
different aspects of personality rights are already protected under different laws. 
However, for the meantime 'In spite of the wideness and vagueness of the 
French notion of "rights of the personality", it seems justifiable, therefore, to 
consider this breach of the law as corresponding to the Anglo – American law of 
privacy' 335.  
  
                                                                                                                                                         
 
333
 [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 at paras 43, 133.  
 
334
 Cited in Bruggemeier, 2010, p 28. 
 
335
 Stromholm, 1967, p 54. 
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2. Personality rights crossing borders: 
 
Today, personality rights are likely to be the subject of cross-border disputes. 
One can come up with several scenarios in which personality rights are the 
center of a transnational dispute. For example, if one finds his name published in 
a website of a racist nature, such publication will most likely be harmful to his 
reputation. The mere appearance of his name in such a website could be 
interpreted as an agreement from his side to the ideology or message behind the 
website. If someone finds his private family photos uploaded on YouTube as 
part of a video (slide show) composed by someone he does not know. The video 
infringes this person's right of privacy as it can be viewed by anyone with 
internet access.  
 
In these and similar scenarios, personality rights are infringed. Such 
infringement is not confined to one jurisdiction as personality rights can be 
subject to a wide range of online transactions. As a result, courts find themselves 
frequently encountering cases where personality rights intersect with conflict-of-
laws, and the question of applicable law is accordingly triggered. 
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a. Applicable choice-of-law rules to personality rights: 
 
In order to answer the question which law applies to personality rights in cross-
border disputes, the judge will need to apply the related choice-of-law rules.   
 
According to the provisions of Rome II Regulation, personality rights are 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation336. Therefore, each Member State will 
apply its own national choice-of-law rules to cross-border disputes involving 
personality rights.  
 
Personality rights were excluded from the scope of the Regulation because 
Member States failed to agree on the appropriate conflict rule to be applied to 
personality rights. As a result, personality rights had to be excluded:  
   
...there was a failure to arrive at a consensus over the appropriate 
conflict rule to deal with what in the proposal was termed obligations 
arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to the personality. 
This part of this proposal was therefore withdrawn by the Commission 
at a late stage with the commitment in the review clause to requisition a 
comprehensive study in this area of conflicts. 337 
 
The law of personality rights is mostly in case law. For that reason, it is not 
surprising that harmonization of national laws of Member States turned out to be 
difficult338. However, the role which the ECHR plays in providing a solution to 
                                                           
336
 Art 1(2)(g) Rome II Regulation. 
   
337
 Martin George, ‘Heiderhoff: privacy and personality rights in the Rome II Regime: Yes –Lex 
fori please!’ [2010] <http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/heiderhoff-privacy-and-personality-rights-in-
the-rome-ii-regime-yes-lex-fori-please/> last accessed 10 Sep 2012, p 1 (hereafter referred to as 
George, 2010) all the documents prepared in the co-decision procedure are available from the 
Legislative Observatory on the website of the European Parliament 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?id=23514>. 
  
338
 Engle, 2005, p4. 
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the problem of harmonization to the contents of the rights of personality339 
should not be overlooked. 
 
Those who expect the European Legislator to draft a new conflict rule for 
personality rights see that this rule must fit the doctrinal structure of the 
Regulation. Furthermore, a new conflict rule must fit the requirement under 
recital 7 of the Regulation which requires a consistent interpretation of Rome II 
and Brussels I, this is particularly important in the light of the ECJ’s judgment in 
Shevill case340. In November 2011, these expectations have been finally 
translated into actions. The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European 
Parliament has issued a new Draft Report to the commission on the amendment 
of Regulation (EC) No864/ 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II)341. The purpose of the amendment is to include personality 
rights in the scope of the Regulation.  
 
 
Nevertheless, until the recent proposal to include personality rights in the Rome 
II Regulation is adopted, each EU Member State is left with no option but to 
apply its national choice-of-law rules to cross-border personality rights. These 
conflict-of-laws rules are expected to differ from one jurisdiction to another. 
However, what is undisputed is the fact that infringement of general personality 
rights is classified as non-contractual liability (tort) in both legal traditions.  
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 Engle, 2005, p12. 
  
340
 [1996] 3 All E.R. 929; this case established the ‘mosaic’ principle, Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Von 
Hein on Rome II and defamation’ [2010] <http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/von-hein-on-rome-ii-
and-defamation/> last accessed 15 Sep 2012, p 1 (hereafter referred to as Cuniberti, 2010). 
 
341
 Will be discussed in details in Part 4 - Specifically designed choice-of-law rules for moral 
rights: A new proposal. 
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b. General personality rights and the related connecting factors: 
 
To ensure continuity and efficiency of legal relationships in the international 
dimension, parties should be allowed to go into cross-border legal relationships 
without fearing the application of unexpected law to their disputes. For some 
scholars, a connecting factor relating to the law most closely connected to the 
legal relationship would achieve this end342. This approach is supported by those 
in support of the allocation method343, according to which, a legislator needs to 
gather similar legal situations or positions under one category or one legal idea. 
Once these similar legal positions are identified, a connecting factor is 
designated and a conflict rule is attached to each category of legal issues344. 
  
A point of attachment or a connecting factor is drawn from the elements of the 
legal relationship. A legal relationship consists of subject, parties and cause. A 
point of attachment is drafted based on the most important element in the legal 
relationship which is evaluated '... with respect to the particular issue.'345 
Accordingly, this will differ from one legal relationship to another. For example, 
parties are the most important element in personal status cases, thus, conflict 
rules in most legal systems point towards one's personal law to be applied i.e. the 
law of one's nationality or domicile.  In matters related to rights in rem, the most 
important element is the subject of the legal relationship, hence, the location of 
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 Al'aal, 2007, p 22. 
 
343
 The allocation method is the applicable choice-of-law method in most countries, it will be 
further discussed in Part 4 – Chapter I. 
 
344
 Awad Alla Shaibat Alhamad Alsayed, Private international Law in the Kingdom of Bahrain: 
a comparative study (conflict of laws, international judicial competence and enforcement of 
foreign judgments (Bahrain University Press, Sukhair 2007) 25 (hereafter referred to as Alsayed, 
2007); also Okasha Mohamed A. Al'aal, Conflict of laws: a comparative study (Dar Aljame'ah 
Aljadeeda, Alexandria 2007) 23 (hereafter referred to as Al'aal, 2007) 18 (hereafter referred to as 
Al'aal, 2007). 
 
345
 Brilmayer and Anglin, 2010, p 1163. 
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the real property is the adopted criterion. As for contractual obligations, the 
'cause' of the legal relationship is the most significant element. Hence, the 
selected point of attachment is the parties' will in relation to contracts, and where 
the wrongful act or harm occurred in non-contractual obligations346.  
 
Yet, some commentators question the traditional approach which is established 
on the assumption that there is only one exceptionally strong contact with the 
dispute that justifies application of the law of that particular jurisdiction347. In 
their opinion, this approach is not preferable as it leads to what is known as 'a 
single factor theory'. These scholars argue that this approach could have been 
suitable for earlier historical periods, but not for a time where the development 
of technology and communication revolution made identification of one single 
factor an unrealistic task348. Therefore, these scholars call for a consideration 
that will take into account the context of the case rather than a single factor 
(trigger), hence, giving more importance to 'weighing or balancing'349.  
 
 
In any case, the general understanding for the role and function of connecting 
factors is to provide a link between the legal issue and the potentially applicable 
law. The link is drawn based on the assumption that the law which the 
connecting factor points at, is the one most strongly connected to the dispute. In 
relation to personality rights, the role played by points of attachment or 
connecting factors remains unchanged. The goal is to link personality rights with 
a potentially applicable law that has the closest connection with these rights. 
And since these rights -as their name suggests- are personal (clearly illustrated in 
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 Al'aal, 2007,  p 21-22; Alsayed, 2007, pp 26-27. 
  
347
 Brilmayer and Anglin, 2010, p 1127. 
 
348
 Brilmayer and Anglin, 2010, pp 1147-1148. 
 
349
 Brilmayer and Anglin, 2010, pp 1151-1152, 1128-1129. 
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relation to one's legal status and capacity350), connecting factors would naturally 
point to laws that are connected to one's personality. As a general rule, this is 
commonly interpreted as one's nationality (a civil law concept)351, or domicile (a 
common law concept), or habitual residence (a concept developed by the Hague 
Conference on PIL as a compromise between the concept of nationality and 
domicile.352) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
350
 Status is "… the condition of belonging to a particular class of persons to whom the law 
assigns certain peculiar legal capacities or incapacities or both." Whereas capacity is to decide 
whether a particular person is capable or incapable of going into a specific legal transaction; J.G. 
Castel, Conflict of laws: cases, notes and materials (4th edn Butterworths, Toronto 1978) 8-3 
(hereafter referred to as Castel, 1978). 
 
351
 For example, art 21(1) of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Act of Bahrain1971 (CCPA 
1971) clearly states that one's legal capacity and civil status is to be determined according to the 
law of his nationality. 
  
352
 To read more on nationality, domicile and habitual residence see Clarkson and Hill, 2006, pp 
20-51. 
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B. Examining the similarity between moral rights and general personality rights  
 
One needs to acknowledge the fact that considering moral rights part of 
personality rights can hardly be accepted in the Anglo- American tradition. This 
is because a different story took place under this tradition where the rational 
underlying the existence of copyright in general is socio-economic as clearly 
expressed in the Statute of Anne.353 The effect of such socio-economic approach 
is that it was difficult for this school to recognize moral rights in the same 
manner adopted by continental tradition. Moral rights were seen as forming 
restriction on contractual freedom which is an essential principle in the Anglo-
American tradition. Hence, it was difficult to see how moral rights could be 
classified as personality rights in the common law jurisdictions.  
This result is not surprising because looking back at the history we can see that 
when France was developing its civil code in the 19th century, it was undergoing 
political revolution seeking to improve the rights of man. During the same time 
the UK was undergoing an industrial revolution. In addition to that, when moral 
rights were developing in Europe, art was highly valued in some European 
countries as a cultural identity, where the situation in the UK and the US for 
example was different since the focus was more on the industrial culture rather 
than the artistic one, hence “The resulting intellectual property rights reflected 
that emphasis of industry and commercialism over a more European humanist 
viewpoint” 354. 
                                                           
353
 The socio-economic role is also stated in the U.S. constitution where the Congress may 
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Kamiel J. Koelman, 
‘Copyright law and economics in the EU Copyright Directive: is the droit d’auteur passé?’ 
[2004] IIC 603 (hereafter referred to as Koelman). The same applies to the justification provided 
for in the Statute of Anne which is “an Act for the encouragement of learning”, Teilmann, 2005, 
p 73. On the same point see Nocella, 2008, Ent. L.R. 153. 
 
 
354
 Robert C. Bird, ‘Moral right: Diagnosis and rehabilitation’ (2007) available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033021>   last accessed 2 Oct 2012, p 7 (hereafter referred to as Bird, 
2007)  
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In order to determine the actual scope of similarity between moral rights and 
general personality rights it is important to understand what is actually protected 
under moral rights. 
This examination starts from the very meaning of moral rights to the interests 
listed under its title. The term moral rights is a translation of the French term 
droit moral355, it is important not to overlook this factor because of the 
differences between the French and English terms. Many commentators think 
that the term ‘moral’ is not an accurate translation for the French term ‘moral’. 
Professor Kwall suggests translating the German term for moral rights instead of 
the French term since the German term means “rights of the author’s 
personality”. Although this term might not capture all aspects of protected rights 
under moral rights, it is better than associating the term ‘moral’ with ‘legal’356. 
In her opinion, the term ‘personal rights’ reflects the true theoretical basis behind 
this concept.357 Supporting this view is Professor Edward J. Damich who also 
believes that ‘personal rights’ is a closer translation to the French term droit 
moral358. 
It is believed that this inaccuracy in translation - as some commentators argue - 
has caused suspicion for English speakers. This is because: '... ''moral'' is 
commonly contrasted with ''legal'', one's first reaction to a ''moral right'' is that it 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
355
 Andre Morillot a French jurist was the first to use the term droit moral in a technical sense 
(1878): according to him, author’s right is of a dual nature; Damich, 1988, Ga. L. Rev. p 29. 
 
356
 Cited in Bird, 2007, p 13 
  
357
 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, ‘preserving personality and reputational interests of constructed 
persons through moral rights: a blueprint for the twenty first century’ [2001] University of 
Illinois Law Review 151-171 presented at the Symposium: Intellectual property challenges in the 
next century, p 3 para 158 (hereafter referred to as Kwall, ‘preserving personality', 2001).  
358
 Damich, 1988, Ga. L. Rev. p 6. 
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is something to which one has no legal entitlement—only a moral or (if one 
prefers polysyllables) deontological entitlement'359. 
 
American judges found moral rights to be alien to the American culture, the use 
of the term ‘moral’ played a significant rule in forming such view because 
‘moral’ obligations are not seen as legal requirements360. It was difficult to see 
how the two terms could be merged together, as H.L.A. Hart’s stated: 'law and 
morality are best kept separate'361 
 
On the other hand, some commentators like Mr. Bird, argue that moral rights 
should not have been named as such because these rights protect  
…an artist, her work, and the creative process in a fashion not 
radically different from most intellectual property rights. They also 
guard the non-morally embedded public interest in preserving artistic 
intention and cultural heritage...362 
 
 
Whether the currently used term is an accurate or inaccurate translation of the 
French term, it is the commonly used and accepted term today. The important 
factor is that these rights have nothing to do with morality, they simply deal with 
non-economical interests of authors. Hence, moral rights can be defined as '... 
                                                           
359
 David Vaver, ‘Moral rights yesterday, today and tomorrow’ IJL&IT (Presented to a meeting 
of the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association (BLACA) at the offices of Theodore 
Goddard, London on July 8, 1999) 2 (hereafter referred to as Vaver, 1999);  Lauriane Nocella 
gives a similar supporting argument: '... moral right comes from the French expression droit 
moral, but its translation suggests that there is an element of morality which makes this right 
suspect and difficult for English speakers. Since the word “moral” is commonly contrasted with 
“legal”, one's first reaction to a “moral right” is that it is something to which one has no legal 
entitlement” Lauriane Nocella, ‘copyright and moral rights versus author’s right and droit moral: 
convergence or divergence?’ [2008] Ent. L.R. 152 (hereafter referred to as Nocella, 2008). 
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 Bird, 2007, p 12. 
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 Bird, 2007, p 12. 
 
362
 Bird, 2007, p 13. 
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the legal expression of the link uniting the authors and their work, giving them 
some control over it...'363 or as put by Professor Al-Shaikh: 'it is one of the 
personal rights that intends to guarantee protection for the personality of the 
author only through his creation not the absolute personality of the author in its 
general sense'364. Bear in mind, that there is a significant element in these 
definitions which one should not overlook. This is the fact that moral rights only 
come into being when a copyrighted work is created365. This is why moral rights 
are considered to be an element of copyright366. Accordingly, what is protected 
under moral rights is the author's personal interest only in relation to his 
copyrighted work.   
  
                                                           
363
 Nocella, 2008, Ent. L.R. 152. 
 
364
 Ramzi Rashad Al-shaikh, Neighboring rights to the author’s right (Dar Algame’a Aljadeeda, 
Alexandria 2005) 440 (hereafter referred to as Al-shaikh, 2005). 
 
365
 In addition, this work must not be excluded from moral rights protection. According to CDPA 
1988 a computer program, the design of a type face and any computer – generated work are 
excluded from moral rights protection; CDPA 1988 Sec 79 and 81.  
 
366
 Rigamonti, 2006, Harv. Int’l L.J. at p 360. 
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1. Moral rights protecting the author’s name: the attribution right 
 
The attribution right is also known as ‘the right of paternity’, can be defined as 
'the right of an author to be associated and identified with his own work'367. The 
French sees this right as the author's right to respect for his name and 
authorship.368  
The right to attribute the work to its actual creator was recognized in the 
antiquity as well as Middle Ages369. The right protects the author’s right in 
having his work rightly attributed to him, this includes correctly spelling the 
author’s name and attaching whatever titles related to it (Dr. Prof. ...etc) 370. The 
attribution right as an author's moral right does not exist on its own. Existence of 
this right -like all other moral rights- is subject to the existence of the 
copyrighted work.  
 
In France, when the question concerns one’s right in his name and biography 
(which is considered a personality right), disparate laws might be applied in 
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  Davis and Garnett, 2010, p 5.  
 
368
 Ciolino, 1994, Tul. L. Rev. 940. 
 
369
 Adeney, 2006, pp 10-11. In Islamic law, the role played by the Prophet's companions was 
responsible for development of the attribution right as they had to scrutinize the accuracy of 
attributing certain sayings to the Prophet. The science of scrutinizing the narrated sayings of the 
Prophet became an independent science referred to as ‘Esnad’ which in Arabic means 
‘predication: affirmation of something about another’. Several highly important scholars in Islam 
were specialized in this field. They authored compilations which helped Muslims tell the 
difference whether a certain saying of the prophet was accurately or falsely attributed to him. 
The system of attribution continued its development and it evolved to include principles of 
forbidding literary piracy. They also had depositing system which was known as “Takhleed” 
which in Arabic means perpetuation referring to perpetuation of intellectual works; Alnajar, 
2000, pp 25-27. 
 
370
 Adeney, 2006, p 180. 
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addition to laws relating to the protection of privacy. One of these numerous 
laws is the French IP Code (art L 121.1) regarding author’s moral rights, in 
particular the attribution right371. The attribution right and the right to protect 
one's name and bibliography (as a general personality right) would not have 
been listed under the same umbrella if the attribution right was not seen to 
appropriately fit under general personality rights.    
 
However, the situation in common law jurisdictions is not the same. There is 
nothing titled as 'personality rights' to say that one can list the attribution right 
under the same umbrella. As explained earlier, in common law traditions, 
personality rights are protected through different methods. Hence, protecting 
one's name is probably best achieved through passing off372.  
 
It is worth noting that, the legal means used to protect what is traditionally 
considered as 'general personality rights' are the same as those that were once 
used to protect author's moral rights. These common law tools include 
defamation, liable, breach of confidence and passing off. If moral rights and 
general personality rights (in their conventional senses), are not purposely 
similar, they would not have been protected under the same common law tools.  
 
Hence, it is difficult to try and draw a decisive line between the interests 
protected by the attribution right and those protected by the right in one's name 
as a general personality right. The essence of both rights is the same. There is 
one goal both rights aim at protecting which is one’s right in having his actual 
name attributed to him. The person entitled to use the right however differs from 
one situation to another. Accordingly, an author is able to protect his right under 
general personality rights as a natural person, as well as under moral rights as an 
                                                           
371
 Charles de Haas, ‘France: International privacy, publicity and personality laws’ in Michael 
Henry (ed), International privacy, publicity and personality laws (Butterworths, London 2001) 
144 (hereafter referred to as Haas, 2001).  
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 Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Misattribution and misrepresentation – the claim for reverse passing off 
as “paternity” right’ [2006] IPQ 34-54 (hereafter referred to as Griffiths, 2006). 
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author. Obviously, he can only exercise his attribution right if his name was the 
subject of an attack in relation to his work. 
 
Thus, the attribution right is concerned with the author's name, a personality 
related interest. At the same time, such personality related interest is attached to 
the author's work, hence, suggesting that the attribution right is a general 
personality right, however, with private nature.    
  
2. Moral rights protecting the author’s honour, integrity and reputation: the 
integrity right 
 
The integrity right is:  
…the right to respect for the integrity of a work; this enables the author 
to object to any distortion; mutilation or other unauthorized 
modification of the work, and to any other derogatory action in relation 
to the work, so as to preserve the work in the form in which it was 
created 373. 
  
In a simple phrase, the right of integrity gives the author 'the right to respect for 
… his work'374.  This right is considered to be the heart of author’s moral right375 
and is arguably the most important component of droit moral376. 
 
The goal is to keep the work in its ‘original’ form just as created by the author, 
and to protect what the author intended to create by preserving his original 
intention in his work377. As described by Treiger-Bar-Am:  '…The integrity right 
                                                           
373
 Davis and Garnett, 2010, p 6. 
374
 Ciolino, 1994, Tul. L. Rev. 941. 
 
375
 Zemer, 2012, p. 140. 
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 Best illustrated in the French case Buffet c. Fersing, (Cour d'appel, Paris, 1962 Dalloz, 
Jurisprudence 570) also see Ciolino, 1994, Tul. L. Rev. 941.  
 
377
 Adler, 2009,  p 7 para 277. 
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safeguards not the meaning of a work, which is in the eye of the beholder. 
Rather, the right protects the author's message, which is determined by the 
sender'378. In this sense, the integrity right has an important role to the public as 
it maintains the authenticity and originality of the artistic message and provides 
a common reference point379. 
The integrity right –as an author's moral right- is based on the notion of personal 
connection between the author and his work. This very principle justifies why 
there is no integrity right in inventions, as Hansmann and Santilli argue: '[a] 
plausible justification for this distinction between inventors and artists is that the 
marketability of an invention has little relationship to the personal identity of the 
inventor and, in particular, to the other items that the inventor has patented.'380  
 
The scope of protection for the integrity right greatly differs between common 
and civil law traditions, the latter grants it wider and stronger protection than the 
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 Leslie Kim Treiger – Bar – Am, ‘Christo's Gates and the meaning of art: lessons for the law’ 
(2005) E.I.P.R. 390 (hereafter referred to as Treiger, 2005). 
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 Zemer, 2012, p. 137. The public function of moral rights in general and the integrity right in 
particular is an interesting topic, some commentators argue that the power given to the author 
under the integrity right might not always be in the benefit of the public. There are several 
situations where artists for example exercised this right in conflict with the public interest. 
Authors do not necessarily know whether their works are good or bad and whether it deserves to 
be preserved or not. This is in addition to how common law countries see their film and record 
industry handicapped by moral rights. These and other arguments are used by those not in favor 
of moral rights, several articles have been published on the case against moral rights especially 
by American commentators. To read how moral rights do not fit into the modern artistic world in 
general and into the American legal system in particular see Jon A Baumgarten, ‘On the case 
against moral rights’ in Peter Anderson & David Saunders (eds), Moral rights Protection in a 
Copyright System (Institute for Cultural Policy Studies, Griffith University 1992) (hereafter 
referred to as Baumgarten, 1992) , also Amy M. Adler, ‘Against moral rights' (2009) New York 
University school of law – Public law and legal theory research paper series – working paper No. 
09-14 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365437> last accessed 2 Oct 2012 (hereafter referred to as 
Adler, 2009), also Julien, 2002, pp 6-14. 
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 Michael Rushton, ‘An economic approach to copyright in works of artistic craftsmanship’ 
[2001] IPQ  258 (hereafter referred to as Rushton, 2001). 
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earlier381. Moreover, in civil law jurisdictions this right continues to exist even 
after the expiry of the protection for the economic rights, the justification is to 
protect the author’s personality reflected in his work as long as the work is 
capable of being disseminated382. As explained earlier, civil law traditions 
require certain level of 'originality' so that the work enjoys copyright protection. 
Originality requires that the personality of the author be present in his work383. 
In common law traditions, one’s personality does not need to be reflected in his 
work to qualify as ‘original’384, nevertheless, the same interests (honor and 
reputation) are still protected even if to a lesser degree.  
                                                           
381
 It goes without saying that the integrity right – like all other rights- is not absolute. Limitation 
to exercising any right is essential to avoid misusing or abusing the right, Zemer, 2012, p 137. 
This applies to exercise of moral rights as well as of personality rights. In theory under French 
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Maxwell, 2004, Ent. L. R. 125. 
 
382
 Sylvie Nerisson, ‘perpetual moral rights: a troubling justification for a fair result’ [2005] IIC 
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 It is worth noting that there is a recent update regarding the originality test at the EU level, as 
the reader may already know that question of originality has been discussed by the ECJ in 
Infopaq (Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08). The court stated in 
para 35 that copyright subsists in photographs only '… if they are original in the sense that they 
are their author's own intellectual creation.' Nevertheless, in Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v 
Meltwater Holding BV [2011] EWCA Civ 890 the English Court of Appeal did not find the 
originality standard set by Infopaq to be binding as para 20 of the decision reads: 'Although the 
Court refers to an ‘intellectual creation’ it does so in the context of paragraph 35 which clearly 
relates such creation to the question of origin not novelty or merit. Accordingly, I do not 
understand the decision of the European Court of Justice in Infopaq to have qualified the long 
standing test established by the authorities referred to in paragraph 19 above'  However, this 
understanding for Infopaq by English courts as not setting a substantive creative requirement for 
copyright to apply can no longer be sustained in the light of the ECJ recent judgment in Painer v 
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The message which is embodied in the creator's work reflects the author's 
personality, thus, un-permitted acts done in relation to the author’s work impair 
the ability of his work to accurately reflect his message i.e. his personality.385  
 
The integrity right aims at protecting the reputation, honor and message of the 
actual creator of the work, thus, only attacks on these interests will result in 
infringement of the integrity right386: 
 
a. Integrity 
 
According to Oxford Dictionary there are 2 possible definitions for integrity: 1. 
Honesty; moral strength 2. Wholeness; soundness.  
In the light of this definition, the author's integrity right was probably named as 
such because its purpose is to maintain the honesty and wholeness of the 
message the work conveys to the public.  
 
b. Reputation 
 
'Reputation' is defined in its first sense in the Oxford Dictionary as 'what is gen-
erally said or believed about character of person or thing'. Injury to reputation 
                                                                                                                                                         
Standard Verlags GmbH (C-145/10) where the ECJ explained in paragraphs 87-90 that 
intellectual creation is an author's own if it reflects the author's personality.  Therefore, it seems 
that the ECJ wanted to send a message to the courts in the UK saying that paragraph 35 of 
Infopaq intended to set out a substantive creative requirement for copyright to apply. 
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could take the form of economic loss and loss of self-esteem, hence, reputation 
is interest in substance and personality387. 
 
Therefore, the integrity right protects the author's reputation by preserving his 
image and how he is generally perceived in relation to his work in the eyes of 
the public.  
 
c. Honour 
 
'Honour' has different meanings in English language. It has 12 meanings in the 
Oxford Dictionary some of which include: high respect, public regard and 
reputation. However, considering the use of the term in the treaty, honour is 
most likely a combination of two concepts. The first concept is close to the 
concept of reputation which is the respect one holds by others. The second 
concept is the sense of self worth or dignity that is undermined or challenged by 
contemptuous treatment (how the author values himself based on how others 
perceive him)388. Dr. Adeney believes that both meanings are consistent with the 
use of the terms in the Convention389. 
So, does the term ‘honour’390 add anything more to the concept of ‘reputation’? 
In the UK it is regarded as adding nothing391. However, what the delegates 
suggested in the process of drafting art 6bis BC in relation to ‘honour’ indicates 
that ‘honour’ has more into it than the author’s reputation392. Bear in mind, that 
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the words 'honour and reputation' were included as a needed compromise in 
order to draft art 6bis BC. The two notions reflected personal interests that were 
protected by common law actions (defamation and passing off) and hence could 
be understood and accepted by the UK393. 
 
Interpretation of the meaning of the author's integrity right and its components 
suggests that this right seem to be understood in a general personality rights 
sense. The integrity right aims at protecting the author's integrity, reputation and 
honour in relation to his work.  
Again, it seems difficult to differentiate between what is intended to be protected 
under author's integrity right as a moral right and what is intended to be 
protected under integrity right as a general personality right. The obvious 
difference is that one is attached to the mere existence of a natural person and 
the other is attached to a natural person but only in relation to his copyrighted 
work. Again the examined factors suggest that this right is a general personality 
right with private nature.  
 
3. Moral rights protecting the author’s privacy: the divulgation right 
 
Privacy '... is an aspect of the broader right of personality which, in turn, derives 
from the notion of individuality embedded in the institutions of western 
civilization.'394 Defined in the Oxford Dictionary as: '1. (right to) being private 2. 
freedom from intrusion or publicity ' Or simply explained as '… the right to be 
let alone by strangers with no public interest to pursue'395 
On the other hand, the divulgation right -also known as the right to disclosure- is 
defined as: 'the right to decide when, by whom, whether, in what form and on 
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what terms, a work will be made available to the public for the first time'396. This 
right empowers the author with the authority to decide when and how to publish 
his work. Dr. Khater Lutfi considers this right to be the most important right for 
the author because there is nothing more important to the author than to decide 
when his work is intellectually complete and ready to face the external world. As 
he argues, this is an absolute right that can only be exercised by the author of the 
work. The author’s exercise of this particular right marks the start point for the 
existence of all his other moral rights397. Therefore, the author under this right 
can defend his right to refuse presenting the work to the public to keep it for his 
private or personal access away from the public attention. From an economical 
point of view398, the divulgation right is certainly the first step an author takes to 
financially benefit from his work. 
The divulgation right is not a recognized moral right in common law tradition. 
However, it is seen in civil law tradition as a principal moral right that cannot be 
relinquished. If one goes back in time, according to Roman law, the right of 
ownership in a property is fortified when the owner abandon the property. Yet, 
the divulgation right was established by French courts against this principle. An 
early French case clarified the idea. The plaintiff was an artist who was not 
satisfied by a number of paintings, he torn them and threw them in the rubbish. 
However, a rag picker found the pieces and sold them to an art collector. Eleven 
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years later, in 1925 the plaintiff found out that the paintings he torn and threw 
were actually restored and sold to the defendant Francis Carco who owned an art 
collection. The plaintiff’s main objection was that the work was disclosed 
without his consent despite the fact that he had abandoned the physical 
ownership in the paintings when he threw them in the rubbish. The court found 
that the special connection between the author and his work justifies superseding 
the Roman law principle concerning ownership, the court thus concluded that 
allowing the disclosure of an author’s work without his consent means allowing 
violation of the author’s personality399. As the Supreme Court stated that an 
author’s work is ‘the expression of his thoughts, his personality, his talent, his 
art, and in philosophical terms, of his individual self’400. 
In relation to the CDPA 1988, the right to disclosure is not recognized as such 
under the Act. The owner of the economic right is not necessarily the author of 
the work, yet, can prevent publication of copies of a work under the 
CDPA1988401. Preventing publication of the contents of unpublished works can 
be practiced under the law of confidential information, according to which 
publication of such unpublished works will constitute breach of confidence402. 
Interestingly however, one finds the right of privacy conferred under CDPA 
1988 as part of chapter IV (moral rights). Section 85 of the Act provides that if a 
person commissions someone to take photos or film for private purposes, then he 
has the right not to have this work communicated to the public by any means 
without his permission. 
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The author of a photograph is the person who takes the photo, in case of a 
commissioned work, the commissioner is the copyright owner and therefore the 
only person entitled to invoke section 85. If the photo is taken without the 
permission of its subject, then the person who is the subject of the photo cannot 
rely on section 85 of CDPA1988, rather will have to try achieving protection 
under passing off, defamation, breach of confidence or Data Protection Act 1998 
and will most likely have a better chance to succeed under the latter. If the 
copyright owner in the photograph decided to publish it while the subject of the 
photo rejects the publication, the priority is for privacy unless it contradicts with 
a public interest. Thus, the moral right of the author of the photograph does not 
prevail over the right of privacy of individuals unless there is a public interest in 
publishing the photograph. It is also worth pointing out that this right is not 
categorized as a moral right in other legal systems or in the BC403.  
Generally one can say that authors in common law tradition are able to protect 
the essence of the divulgation right (although it is not recognized as a moral 
right) under the CDPA1988 in relation to published works and under common 
law (breach of confidence) in relation to unpublished works. Therefore, it 
appears that the core and essence of the divulgation right is derived from the 
right of privacy, and privacy is an interest that is part of the right of 
personality404. The divulgation right can be protected by the same means used to 
protect the right of privacy both under civil law tradition where personality 
rights are recognized, and under common law tradition where the essence of 
personality rights is protected although not yet recognized as such. 
 
C.  Moral rights intersecting with general personality rights in case law 
 
Generally speaking, the line between author's moral rights and general 
personality rights appears to be vague. Both sets of rights aim to protect interests 
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of similar nature, nevertheless, there are two obvious differences that 
differentiate general personality rights from moral rights. The first is with regard 
to the scope of both rights, general personality rights have wider scope of 
protection and contain rights that are not part of moral rights. The second 
difference is in relation to the person entitled to exercise the right, general 
personality rights can be exercised by any natural person, however, moral rights 
are limited to authors (and performers) in relation to their protected works. 
 
These important differences are why moral rights cannot be considered identical 
to general personality rights, but rather can only be seen as special form of 
general personality rights. The following examples should help clarify how the 
line between the two rights can be hard to identify: 
 
Example 1: 
Publication of Adam's novel online without his permission, is an infringement of 
Adam's divulgation right as an author. Whereas an article published in English 
speaking newspaper (circulating in most of Europe and Asia) revealing 
information of intimate or private nature about Adam, is an infringement of 
Adam's personality right (privacy right). 
 
In both scenarios, an infringement occurs because an act is done without 
authorization revealing information which the person entitled to do so (Adam) 
does not want it (yet or ever) to be revealed to the public. In both scenarios, the 
act was done against the entitled person's judgment regarding when and how to 
share his work with others. The goal under both rights is similar, and both rights 
-in terms of their objectives- could be interchangeable.   
 
 
Example 2: 
(James) is a famous author who agreed to have his novel adapted in a movie, 
however, the novel was modified and altered in a significant way shifting the 
focus of the story to a different angle. The movie was played in movie theaters 
of 4 European countries, constituting an infringement to James's integrity right. 
In a different situation, Paul (who has over 5000 followers on Twitter) shared an 
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edited private photo on Twitter where (James) was made to look as if he was 
participating in a racist behavior. Such act is therefore an infringement to 
James's personality right (reputation right).  
 
Once again, in both scenarios, the act is classified as an infringement because it 
results in harming James's reputation. Modification to James's work without his 
permission is an attack on the integrity of his work which could eventually harm 
his reputation as an author. On the other hand, attack on James's personality on 
Twitter will likely harm his personal reputation.  
The goal in both situations is similar, protecting reputation in its general and 
particular sense. 
  
Thus, moral rights appear to have similar function to general personality rights. 
Existing case law from common law courts will illustrate how the heart of what 
is traditionally recognized as personality rights is protected in common law. At 
the same time, other cases will show how the interests of moral rights were also 
protected in common law, in fact these cases have been used to support the long-
standing assertion by common law that it had provided authors with protection 
equivalent to that given under moral rights. 
 
1. Reputation as a general personality right and an element of the author's 
integrity right: Archbold, Esq v Sweet (1832)405 
 
In this case, the defendant published a third edition of the author's (plaintiff) 
book, which contained many errors and mistakes. The jury found that these 
errors and mistakes with the author's name attached to the book injured his 
reputation. Accordingly, the court ruled in his favour406. 
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Protection of one's reputation certainly shows that common law does recognise 
personality rights. Moreover, the facts of this particular case can almost be 
identical to the definition of the integrity right.  
 
 
2. Using 'passing off' to protect against 'false attribution': Samuelson v 
Producers Distributing (1932)407:  
 
The Plaintiff was the owner of the copyright in a dramatic sketch titled 'The New 
Car', the sketch had great success and made her Majesty the Queen laugh408. The 
defendant put out a film called 'His First Car' wrongly claiming it to be a film 
version of the sketch. The court protected the plaintiff's interest through passing 
off. 
In this case, protection was granted to guarantee accuracy of the source so that 
one cannot pass himself as another. Therefore, passing off is purposely similar to 
the attribution right, more precisely, to false attribution.  
 
3. Protecting the author's integrity right via other means: Frisby v BBC 
(1967)409:  
 
A contract was concluded between two parties, the plaintiff was commissioned 
by the BBC to write a television play called 'And Some Have Greatness Thrust 
Upon Them’. The contract contained a clause which prevented the BBC from 
making any structural alterations without the writer's consent, when the BBC 
deleted a sexually explicit line, the author claimed that it was important to his 
play. The court accordingly decided that the contract was a licence of the 
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copyright only not an assignment. The plaintiff succeeded because the BBC did 
not have right of adaptation.410  
Despite the fact that protection was not granted under moral rights, the reality is 
that it is difficult to overlook the strong link between facts of this case and the 
integrity right. Alteration to author's work is a classical example of moral rights 
infringement, and in particular the integrity right.  
 
4. Achieving protection to the attribution right through liable and passing off: 
Dorothy Squires case (1972)411: 
 
This case was brought by Mrs. Edna May Moore, professionally known as 
Dorothy Squires against The National Sunday Newspaper. The National Sunday 
newspaper (the defendant) published an article on the front page titled: "The Girl 
Who Lost The Saint. When Love Turns Sour By Dorothy Squires", and on an 
inner page a big headline: "How my love for the Saint went sour by Dorothy 
Squires", followed by "talking to Weston Taylor." in smaller letters. The article 
was about the plaintiff's private life with her ex-husband, the nature of the article 
-as the plaintiff argued- suggested that Dorothy Squires was the kind of person 
who did not mind to uncover the faults and sins in her life in return of money. 
Accordingly, Dorothy Squires main claim was damages for liable contained in 
the article, and as a subsidiary claim for damages for breach of sec 43 of the 
Copyright Act 1956 i.e. the defendant falsely attributed authorship of the article 
to the plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded the plaintiff damages for 
liable. In addition to that, the court found that the article falsely attributed 
authorship to Dorothy Squires. In constructing sec 43 of the Copyright Act 1956, 
Lord Denning stated that the: 
 … plaintiff was "a person" who could bring an action for damages for 
unlicensed attribution of authorship, for the right of action given by the 
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section was not limited to professional authors; and where the claim for 
the statutory offence was linked with another cause of action, a separate 
award of damages might be given for the statutory offence if the other 
cause of action did not cover the injury caused by false attribution of 
authorship...412 
 
Lord Denning’s decision in Dorothy Squires case clearly shows that the interest 
moral rights protect are the same as those protected under liable or passing off, 
the latter was used regularly in the context of false attribution and breaches for the 
integrity interest of the creator413.  
 
In Dorothy Squires case, Lord Denning awarded damages for false attribution of 
authorship. However, Lord Denning clarified that the injury caused by false 
attribution could be covered under another cause of action (as can be imagined 
this includes liable and passing off), to say otherwise means the claimant could 
obtain damages in liable or passing off as well as in moral rights for the same 
complaint, a situation which could not be allowed. Hence, if one obtained 
damages in liable he will not be entitled to damages in moral rights for the same 
complaint.414 This shows that what is protected under moral rights (at least in the 
clear case of false attribution) is understood by English courts to be equally 
protected under passing off or liable.  
 
Today, the CDPA1988 provides protection for author's moral rights, however 
this does not change the fact that an author is still entitled to resort to protection 
under liable and passing off. What needs to be highlighted here is that passing 
off and liable are used to protect interests that are protected under general 
personality rights, at the same time, the same legal tools can be used to protect 
the same interests protected under authors' moral rights. This illustrates that 
English courts recognize the existence of common factors between moral rights 
and general personality rights. 
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5. Association of the integrity right with art 10 ECHR: Confetti records & others 
v Warner Music UK Ltd (2003)415:  
 
In 1995, Mr. Andrew Alcee (the third claimant) composed a track of garage 
music named 'Burnin', he assigned his copyright in the track to Confetti Records 
in June 2002.  The Defendant issued to the public a sound recording containing 
"Burnin" with additional rap line (string dem up one by one). Mr. Andrew Alcee 
as the actual creator of the track "Burnin" brought a claim for infringement for 
his integrity right as an author under sec 80 CDPA 1988. 
The court found that there was no infringement for the author's integrity right 
because there was no evidence for any prejudice to the author's reputation or 
honour, nevertheless, it concluded the following important points: 
1. The author's assignment for his copyright does not affect his authorship.416  
2. Derogatory treatment to the author's work has to prejudice his honour or 
reputation, or else there will be no infringement for the integrity right417.  
3. Sec 80 CDPA 1988 is designed to protect the reputation of others and 
therefore is a basis for restricting art 10 of the ECHR on the exercise of the right 
of free expression418.  
 
The court found that there was treatment to the work, however, this treatment 
did not prejudice the author's reputation or honour, hence concluded that there 
was no infringement for the author's integrity right.  
Despite this conclusion, the court made a very important point, it admitted that 
the integrity right is intended to protect the reputation of others and thus could 
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restrict art 10 ECHR. This conclusion reflects the court's general interpretation 
of the integrity right, as the right seems to be evaluated against the primary 
source from which its existence was derived at the first place, that is the right of 
reputation as a general personality right. As a result, the court found the integrity 
right to be restricting art 10 ECHR. Hence, clearly associating author's moral 
rights with what is commonly understood as general personality rights.  
 
D. Interim conclusions: 
  
This chapter examined moral rights and general personality rights in conflict-of-
laws through addressing important issues and considerations. The chapter 
illustrated great deal of similarity concerning the essential function of general 
personality rights and moral rights including the fact that both rights are 
recognized but not created by law. The philosophy behind legislating moral 
rights at the first place suggests that moral rights ought to be attached to the 
personality of the author. Thus, protection of moral rights through personality 
rights –at least in civil law tradition- is undisputed419. However, as moral rights 
cannot exist independently from the copyrighted work, they cannot be classified 
as general personality rights. Hence, moral rights are general personality rights 
with private nature. 
The attribution right as an example, has a goal of protecting the author's name 
and guaranteeing identifying him as the creator of his work. The essence of the 
right of one's name is therefore similar, yet, limited in its scope to copyrighted 
works. The same applies to the integrity right which provides protection for the 
author's honour, integrity and reputation. Interests that are already defined and 
recognized under general personality rights, however, once again, limited to 
copyrighted works. The divulgation right is not different. It protects the author 
against unpermitted communication of his work to the public, hence, respecting 
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the author's privacy. Therefore, the right is clearly derived from the right of 
privacy as a general personality right. 
Finally one can say that what have been examined in this chapter suggests that 
author's moral rights are closely connected to the personality of the author. The 
connection reflects the true nature of these rights as derived from general 
personality rights. An evident proof to the personal nature of moral rights is their 
inability to be transferred. Moreover, although protection and recognition to both 
rights is expected to be minimum in common law courts, yet, the similarity 
between the two rights was surprisingly approved by English courts.  
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Chapter III 
International moral rights cases: analysing courts' application to choice-of-
law rules  
 
The previous examination to moral rights and general personality rights in 
conflict-of- laws suggests that moral rights and general personality rights are 
purposely similar.  
 
At the current stage of this research, it is important to study the most important 
judicial decisions in transnational moral rights cases to date. The goal is to study 
and analyze the relevant cross-border moral rights cases to determine whether 
courts tend to take the matter beyond the scope of copyright or not. With regard 
to applicable law, the similarity between the two rights could have an effect on 
courts' treatment for these rights. 
It is expected to see courts dealing with moral rights based on the historical 
development of copyright in each jurisdiction. For example, in the 19th century, 
development of personality rights on the international level was closely 
connected with the emergence of intellectual property rights. The French 
copyright doctrine recognized moral rights of authors and artists from as early as 
the 1900420 as a reflection for personality rights. Yet, in the UK, the historical 
development did not take the same pattern. Personality rights were not 
recognized and hence were not reflected in copyright. Interests were protected 
through common law i.e. defamation, passing off and breach of confidence, and 
at a later stage the term 'privacy' was explicitly used.  
 
In any case, one needs to bear in mind that there is limited number of reported 
international moral rights cases, and that 'Moral rights cases are highly fact 
specific, making it difficult to extract hard-and-fast rules from the case law'421. 
As a result, the analytical task is expected to be complex. 
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A. Examining cross-border moral rights cases: 
 
1. Shostakovich case422: 
 
a. Summary of facts423: 
 
In 1948 Twentieth Century Fox in the US released The Iron Curtain. The credits 
at the end of the movie included a statement which read 'Music from selected 
works of the Soviet Com-posers, Dimtry Shostakovich, Serge Prokofieffe, Aram 
Katchatutian, Nicolai Miashovsky, conducted by Alfred Newman'. The film was 
in 87 minutes, however, a total of 45 minutes were of the Russian composers' 
music reproduced during the duration of the film. 
 
The Russian composers brought an action before the court of New York, they 
claimed that the use of their music in this film could falsely indicate their 
approval or participation in the film. They argued that their association with the 
film could be interpreted as being disloyal to their country. 
 
b. First instance and Court of Appeal: 
 
The Court of New York ruled that the case was clearly related to the moral rights 
of the authors. Existence of these rights was not clear in the current state of law, 
thus, the court found that there was no grounds to grant the plaintiffs any relief. 
The judgment of the Court of New York was approved on the same grounds. 
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c. When the film was released in France: 
 
The film was released in France in 1949 under its French name Le Rideau de 
Fer. This time the case was brought before French courts by the French 
company Le Chant du Monde which enjoyed the exclusive rights to their 
musical works in France. This is why this case is usually referred to in French 
textbooks as Fox Europa and Twentieth Century Fox v. Le Chant du Monde424. 
 
The judgment of the 1st Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris is the one often 
quoted, it stated that foreign authors should enjoy copyright protection in France 
if there is no legislation that states otherwise. Accordingly, the Russian 
composers could not only benefit from moral rights protection in France, but any 
use of their music without their consent would amount to copyright 
infringement. This judgment took matters beyond what was expected, Russian 
authors were not to be deprived from copyright and moral rights protection in 
France even though the Soviet Union was not part of any copyright convention 
then. Russian authors would be treated in France as French authors and this is 
regardless of the condition of reciprocity. 
 
d. The situation of foreign authors changed in France425: 
 
In 1964 the French president Charles De Gaulle visited the Soviet Union on an 
official state visit, he was presented with a Russian translated version of his 
memoirs (without his permission). Few weeks later, Charles De Gaulle 
requested a law which would apply the principle of reciprocity to foreign works. 
Therefore, a law was voted in France on 8 July 1964, according to which foreign 
authors would enjoy copyright protection in France only if the country of the 
origin of the work grants French works protection there. However, art L.111-4 of 
the Code of IP provided that no impairment maybe made to the integrity or 
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paternity of the foreign work, this means that moral rights protection was 
maintained untouched even in relation to foreign works. The scope of the ruling 
rendered in Shostakovich case was reduced to moral rights only. It is worth 
noting that reciprocity is hardly an issue before French courts because adherence 
to BC and UCC fulfils this condition.  
 
e. Interim Analysis: 
 
In general, the outcomes of this case in both scenarios are not surprising. It is 
quite interesting to see how the wide scope of Shostakovich case was reduced to 
moral rights, and therefore, the integrity and paternity of the foreign work would 
still be protected regardless of the principle of reciprocity. 
Reduction in the scope of protection along with such explicit exclusion makes 
one wonder about the reason behind it. Is it because moral rights are considered 
to be special form of personality rights that the notion of reciprocity does not 
apply to it? Is there any other justification or explanation to this exclusion? It 
appears that moral rights are considered to be of great importance to the French 
society, hence, their protection becomes priority even in the absence of 
reciprocity. This in itself is very similar to the situation of general personality 
rights, were these rights are mostly protected by national constitutions and hence 
lower level of protection is not accepted even if reciprocity is not applicable. For 
example, if a case containing a foreign element is brought before French courts 
concerning one's right to choose his religion, it is expected that French courts 
would not pay much attention to the scope of the right granted to the party 
claiming protection in the country of origin (country of his nationality). This is 
because, the French society and accordingly its legislator, understands one's 
right to choose his religion to be part of the order public.  
 
On the other hand, American legal tradition at that time did not recognize moral 
rights – not even in a limited sense like the case with VARA426. Therefore, New 
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York courts did not find any grounds to support the plaintiffs and grant a relief. 
However, would the plaintiffs have had a better chance in succeeding if their 
case was brought under alternative common law tools that are used to achieve 
the same result? Theoretically, the answer would most likely be 'yes'. Meaning, 
if the act in question qualified to be brought under passing off for example, 
courts in the US would have granted a judgment in support of the plaintiff if the 
requirements for passing off were met. This is regardless of the nature of what is 
protected i.e. author's right or non-author's rights. Accordingly, it is possible to 
see courts in the US protecting author's interests under common law tools if 
these interests fit under the latter category. Therefore, the essence of moral rights 
could have been protected even by courts in the US. 
 
2. The Kid  427 
 
a. Summary of facts: 
 
In this 1959 case, Charles Chaplin (was the actor and author of the film) brought 
an action before French courts to prevent distribution in France of a version of 
his silent masterpiece The Kid that had been 'enhanced' through addition of a 
musical accompaniment. Charlie Chaplin was granted the same moral rights 
enjoyed by French authors. This is despite that Chaplin had no claim to moral 
rights in the country of origin (the US). Reciprocity was again not taken into 
consideration for granting such rights to foreign authors. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
law, defamation, unfair competition, passing off and breach of contract; later when the US joined 
Berne an Ad Hoc working group in the US concluded that moral rights needed to be protected; 
Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Moral rights in a common law system' [1990] Ent. L. R 123 (hereafter 
referred to as Ginsburg, 1990); therefore '… Congress adopted the VARA to signal to the 
international community that it recognizes the personal dimension of the creative process' Zemer, 
2012, p 129. 
 
427
 Richebe v. Charlie Chaplin (1960) 28 RIDA 133, discussed in Bertrand, 2011, p 5. 
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b. Interim Analysis: 
 
Once again, the outcome of the case is expected as French courts certainly see a 
personal link between the author and his intellectual creation. Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that French courts ignored the level of protection granted in 
the country of origin and protected the author's moral rights in cross-border 
dispute.  
  
 
3. The Aristocats428  
 
a. Summary of facts: 
 
The plaintiff had agreed to write a story about aristocrat family of cats living in 
Paris, the story would then be made into a film. The plaintiff agreed to grant 
Disney the right to make revisions, changes and adaptations to the screenplay. 
Nevertheless, when Disney decided to make a film based on the plaintiff's story 
using cartoon cats, it did not attribute the story to the plaintiff429.  
 
The plaintiff brought an action before French courts for moral rights 
infringement. The court of first instance found that Disney was responsible for 
infringing the plaintiff's attribution right, however, the Cour d'Appel ruled: 
 
... considerations of French public policy could only be applied with the 
greatest caution to contracts the subject of foreign laws. The legal 
certainty of contracts would be destroyed if a party who had contracted 
according to the law of one state were to seek to avail himself of the 
contracting law of another state. It was well established that the law of 
the country in which contracts are signed becomes the law of the 
parties. Thus, neither the Universal Copyright Convention, nor any 
other provisions of international law, would permit the plaintiff to 
                                                           
428
 Rowe v Walt Disney [1987] F.S.R. 36. 
 
429Case is also discussedd in Maree Sainsbury, Moral rights and their application in Australia 
(Federation Press, Sydney 2003) 177 (hereafter referred to as Sainsbury, 2003). 
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invoke the moral rights afforded by the French Act which were denied 
to him by the law of the contract …430.  
 
 
 
b. Interim Analysis: 
 
The outcome of this case was surprising as it was 2 years prior to the famous 
John Huston case. French courts which are expected to provide the maximum 
level of protection to moral rights, refused to do so on the basis of respecting the 
law of country of origin. If the country of origin does not recognize moral rights, 
then it should not be granted to the plaintiff by French courts.  
Refusal to grant the American author protection under French moral rights, was 
derived by its desire to guarantee legal certainty. The surprising element in this 
case was the fact that the French ruling in this case was contrary to the previous 
French rulings regarding the same issue. However, as this case is not the latest 
authority in the field, it loses its importance in the light of the coming judgment.  
 
  
                                                           
430
 [1987] F.S.R. 36 at 5, also cited in Bertrand, 2011, p 9.  
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4. John Huston 431 
 
a. Summary of facts 
 
John Huston was an American film director who directed the film Asphalt 
Jungle. Huston directed his film in black and white and renounced his rights in 
the US to The Turner Entertainment Co (TEC). The latter merged with Metro 
Goldwyn Meyer (MGM) and accordingly, acquired the rights to Asphalt Jungle. 
As the owner of the rights in the film, (TEC) colorized the motion picture and 
broadcasted it in its colorized version432, colorization of the film in the US was 
in accordance to US law. However, the heirs of John Huston objected to the 
colorization and filed an action against La Cinq (French TV channel), the goal 
was to prevent broadcasting the colorized version of Asphalt Jungle in France. 
They argued that it was an infringement of the moral rights of the author 
(director) of the work433. 
  
                                                           
431
 Turner Entertainment Company v Huston (1991) 149 RIDA 197. This particular case has 
been heavily addressed by most commentators dealing with the issue of applicable law to moral 
rights, examples include: Philippe Matignon, ‘Case comment: France film- author’s moral rights 
in his work’ [1995] Ent. L.R. 124-125 (hereafter referred to as Matignon, 1995); Maxwell, 2004, 
Ent. L.R. 124; Hellstadius and Meier-Ewert, 2005, IIC 333-334; Waelde and De Souza, 2002, 
IPQ 278-279, Bertrand, 2011, pp 6-11; Mary LaFrance, Global issues in Copyright Law 
(Thomson Reuters, USA 2009) 98-108 (hereafter referred to as LaFrance, 2009). On the 
particular issue of moral rights in relation to colorization of films see Claudia Roggero, 
'colourisation and the right to preserve the integrity of a film: a comparative study between civil 
and common law' [2011] Ent. L.R. 25-30 (hereafter referred to as Roggero, 2011). 
 
432
 Colorization of black and white films was a technology used by NASA in 1986, Bertrand, 
2011, p 6. 
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 Colorization was refused by authors although it appeared to be favored by the public, for 
example, Woody Allen described colorization of films as it 'insults artists and society', Bertrand, 
2011, p 7. 
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b. Court's decision434 
 
The Court of First Instance of Paris held that the author's moral rights prevailed 
over the exploitation right. Despite that under US law, exploitation belonged to 
the producer, La Cinq was still prevented from showing the colorized film.  
 
The Court of Appeal of Paris in 6 July 1989 overturned the first judgment and 
held that Huston's heirs had no moral rights in the film and that the rights in the 
film were vested in (TEC). The court of Appeal limited the author's (the 
director) right to a mere announcement at the beginning of the movie advising 
the audience that the movie is originally recorded in black and white. The court's 
view was that it was not possible to invoke moral rights against the legally 
obtained adaptation rights by Turner Entertainment. 
 
In 28 May 1991, the court de cassation overturned the court of Appeal's decision 
and crushed all previous principles including that concluded in The Aristocats 
case. The court stated:  
 
According to the first of these texts, the integrity of a literary or art 
work cannot be affected in France, regardless of the State in whose 
territory the said work was made public for the first time. The person 
who is its author, by its creation alone, enjoys the moral right stipulated 
in his favor by the second of the aforesaid texts; these are laws of 
mandatory application.435 
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 Turner Entertainment Co v Huston, CA Versailles, civ. ch., December 19, 1994, translated in 
(March 1995) Ent. L. Rep. available at <http://www.unclaw.com/chin/teaching/iip/turner.pdf> 
last accessed 3 Oct 2012, p 2. See Philippe Matignon, ‘Case comment: France film- author’s 
moral rights in his work’ [1995] Ent. L.R. 124-125 (hereafter referred to as Matignon, 1995); 
also Bertrand, 2011, pp 7-8. 
 
435
 LaFrance, 2009, p 102. 
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The Court de Cassation referred the case to the Court of Appeal for rehearing. 
The Court of Appeal of Versailles gave judgment on the issues of the case on 19 
December 1994 in adherence with the principles put by the Court de Cassation. 
The court held that under French law, moral rights are non-assignable, therefore, 
the heirs of the estate of John Huston are entitled to exercise his moral rights. It 
does not matter whether the author was French or a foreign national. 
 
c. Interim Analysis 
 
The ruling in John Huston case made the French position towards moral rights in 
cross-border disputes quite clear. The case is considered to be a landmark for 
several reasons. Although the author in the case was not French national436, the 
French Cour de Cassation nevertheless found it important to protect author's 
moral rights in France. It appears that moral rights were all that mattered to the 
French Cour de Cassation. The importance of these rights is high enough for 
French courts to consider these rights to be of mandatory application. 
 
What was approved in the Aristocats case was similar to what was adopted by 
French court of Appeal in Huston case, yet was later smashed by the Court de 
Cassation. Thus, the outstanding principle to date is the one adopted in the 
Huston case.  
 
  
                                                           
436
 The court of first instance of Paris, relied when it gave its judgment on the UCC signed in 
Geneva 1952. The convention was ratifies by the US, and the main point was that citizens of 
member states were to enjoy the benefit of the 11 March 1957 Law in France, including section 
6 which provided for the protection for moral rights, LaFrance, 2009, p 101. 
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B. Moral rights as an element of copyright in cross-border disputes: increase 
lenience towards personality rights? 
 
The previously examined international moral rights cases were mostly brought 
before French courts, except for Shostakovich case which was before New York 
courts. Based on these cases, French courts seem to be taking the matter beyond 
the scope of copyright. Yet, one needs to keep in mind that French courts are not 
expected to invoke French level of moral rights protection if exploitation is 
taking place in another country. This is because works exploited in other 
jurisdictions would not have an effect on French territory as long as the work is 
not exploited in France, and accordingly, France will not be affected if this 
particular work is subject to weaker moral rights protection. Hence, the 
applicable law would be that of the jurisdiction wherever the work is 
exploited437. 
   
However, it is important to mention that there are no French cases to support this 
'assumption'. In Beineix v StudioCanal Image438, a case was brought against a 
French director who sued in a French court to complain about distribution of a 
DVD version (that allegedly contained a modified soundtrack) of Diva in the 
United States. Here the court dismissed the case on other grounds without 
solving the applicable law question439. The situation remained unaddressed in 
French case law even in subsequent cases, in Martinelli v Gallimard440 the case 
involved an Italian author and a contract governed by English law. The French 
Court applied English law to the issues involving the author's “economic” rights 
and French law to issues involving the author's “moral” rights. This was possible 
because the work was exploited in France. 
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 Maxwell, 2004, Ent. L. R. 125. 
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 Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance, Référé, December 4, [2002].  
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 Maxwell, 2004, Ent. L. R. 125. 
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 (2003) 198 R.I.D.A. 413.  
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Author's moral rights in France are clearly considered part of personality rights, 
this background justifies why application of moral rights is raised to 'mandatory 
level'. French courts could not accept a lower level of protection. A similar 
position would be taken if the matter concerned any clearly categorized 
personality right, the French courts' approach is that we might not be able to 
control the situation in other jurisdictions, however, we cannot allow it to take 
place in ours.  
It is hard to see how this approach could have been applied if moral rights were 
purely seen as part of copyright. It is only because the nature of moral rights in 
France is considered part of personality rights that 'mandatory application' was 
attached to it. As Ginsburg & Sirinelli described the wording used by the court 
de cassation to be:  
puzzling because it was unusual, if not new under French international 
private law, but it means that any description of an 'author' other than 
the one given by French law and any contractual provision implying a 
failure to recognize moral rights were inapplicable in France, whatever 
the system under which the work originated or the contract was 
signed441 
 
However, for one to be able to draw a conclusion as to whether courts take the 
matter beyond the scope of copyright when it comes to cross-border moral rights 
disputes, the examination should not be confined to how French courts deal with 
the subject. Nevertheless, the absence of decisions given by common law courts 
in cross-border moral rights cases leave one with limited options. Hence, the 
only way left to deal with the matter is by studying the 'expected' behaviour of 
courts in common law tradition if put in a similar position. 'Expectation' will be 
based on the similarity already established between the essence of what is 
protected under general personality rights and moral rights in both legal systems. 
 
The paternity and integrity rights, as the two internationally recognized moral 
rights, enjoy the minimum level of protection provided for under the BC. This is 
true even in relation to common law jurisdictions, including the US yet limited 
to works of visual arts. It is also a given fact that case law proved that the 
essence of moral rights can be protected using the same common law tools used 
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for protecting general personality rights. The use of the term 'general personality 
rights' is not used in common law traditions, yet, it does not change the fact that 
the interests protected are related to one's personality, and so, one should not 
overestimate the importance of terminology. 
 
If one was to imagine that application of English choice-of-law rules will lead to 
application of law of country (X) which does not recognize one's right in fair 
trial for example, would English courts still apply this law? The answer is 
certainly in the negative, since to do so would be a breach of the ECHR and 
English public policy. One might argue that the situation in relation to moral 
rights might not go as far as this, still, it would be interesting to see how English 
courts will react towards application of any law that does not recognize moral 
rights at all. Would English courts in such case apply this law? Or would it state 
that lower level of protection than that provided under CDPA 1988 is not 
accepted? One can only speculate as there is no available case law to date. 
  
So, did courts take the matter beyond the scope of copyright? This writer 
believes that it is quite hard to answer this question as the current state of related 
case law only reflects civil law tradition. The lack of one's ability to examine 
common law approach to this question means that a generalised answer will 
likely provide inaccurate evaluation of the issue. Yet, one should remember that 
common law tradition approves and recognizes the similarity between moral 
rights and general personality rights on the substantive level.  
Therefore, one could be uncertain that there is increase lenience towards 
personality rights in common law courts. Nevertheless, the recognized similarity 
between moral rights and general personality rights in common law system, 
supports one's expectation that common law courts would refuse application of 
any law that does not recognize moral rights at all of example.  
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Chapter V 
Evaluation and summation 
 
This part explored the possibility of detaching moral rights from copyright in 
conflict-of-laws. The outcomes of this part can be summed up in several 
important points. 
There are serious problems associated with application of lex loci protectionis to 
moral rights infringements. At the same time, personality rights in conflict-of-
laws proved to be problematic on the EU level. However, there is a new 
proposal to include personality rights in the Rome II Regulation, thus, the 
present situation is expected to change soon. 
 
Moreover, moral rights seem to protect interests that are essentially similar to 
general personality rights. As a result, courts from the civil law tradition – in 
particular France- seem to be taking author's moral rights beyond the scope of 
copyright by refusing application of any lower level of protection within their 
jurisdiction. Still, it is difficult to reach a general conclusion, because one can 
hardly find cross-border moral rights cases that are brought before common law 
courts at the first place.  
 
In addition to that, there are important considerations that one should not forget, 
most important of which is the difference between moral rights and copyright. 
This distinct nature encouraged some commentators to argue that the only way 
to give moral rights real status is by making them independent from copyright:  
Perhaps the conclusion is that for moral rights to be given any real 
status, they must exist independently of copyright. Undoubtedly in 
certain respects they are comparable, but in order to give life to Article 
6bis of Berne, it appears to be necessary to create an autonomous set of 
rights with a conceptual basis of their own442 
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However, the main problem one faces in relation to calls for making moral rights 
independent from copyright, is that existence of moral rights depends on the 
creation of the copyrighted work, and therefore, it is hard to see how moral 
rights can be separated or independent from copyright. Nevertheless, once moral 
rights come into existence, their unique and different nature from copyright 
stands in the way of treating them equally.  
 
Therefore, in order to provide an accurate evaluation for this part, one should 
take into account the above mentioned results and considerations. As a result, 
one can state that the lack of judicial decisions from common law tradition is a 
significant factor, yet, the door for speculations and suggestions remains open.  
The crucial factor that should not be underestimated when it comes to evaluating 
the position of moral rights in conflict-of-laws is the similar function of what is 
traditionally recognized as general personality rights and at least the 
universally recognized moral rights i.e. paternity and integrity rights. The 
similarity between both rights on the substantive level is expected to have an 
effect on the applicable choice-of-law rules accordingly. In fact, such 
interrelation should be consistent with theories and goals of choice-of-law. Thus, 
not only the problems associated with lex loci protectionis call for searching for 
an alternative choice-of law-rule, but most crucial of all is not to list two 
different rights in nature (copyright and moral rights) under one category for 
choice-of-law purposes. If the current choice-of-law rules are designed for 
copyright, it is hard to see how these rules can be suitable for moral rights cases.  
In choice-of-law terms, applying copyright choice-of-law rules to moral rights 
will not lead to the application of the most appropriate law. 
For these reasons, this Part concludes that there needs to be a call for detaching 
moral rights from copyright in conflict-of-laws. The process of allocating the 
appropriate applicable law to moral rights should take into consideration the 
strong link moral rights have with general personality rights, a link that is no less 
important than the link moral rights share with copyright. 
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Part 4 
 
Specifically Designed Choice-of-Law Rules for Moral Rights: 
 A New Proposal 
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The investigation undertaken in Part 3 clearly showed that moral rights and 
copyright are different in nature. Each right aims at protecting different interests 
and thus its goal is different. Furthermore, moral rights in transnational cases -in 
particular those brought before courts of civil law tradition- have been listed as 
an exception to the country of origin rule and to the lex protectionis principle443.  
These considerations and arguments need to be kept in mind when addressing 
choice-of-law question. Choice-of-law rules are not created in a vacuum, these 
rules are designed with substantial law in mind. Moreover, a choice-of-law rule 
points to law of country (x) rather than law of country (y) because the former 
law is seen as the law most closely connected to the dispute, and hence the most 
suitable to govern the legal relationship. Several theories were presented to 
justify such selection, most important of which is the allocation method, the 
method searches for the 'seat' of the legal relationship and applies the law 
presumed to be most closely connected to that seat.  
As moral rights and copyright do not share the same important elements in a 
legal relationship, it is difficult to see how a common 'seat' can be presumed. As 
a matter of fact, such presumption is expected to lead to inaccurate results, and 
therefore, opening doors for suggestions to detach moral rights from copyright in 
conflict-of-laws.   
However, a suggestion to detach moral rights from copyright in conflict-of-laws 
needs to be completed with a proposal that identifies the applicable law to moral 
rights, this time as independent set of rights in conflict-of-laws.   
So, is there a need for specifically designed choice-of-law rules? Is the link 
between moral rights and general personality rights strong enough to call for 
attaching moral rights to general personality rights in conflict-of-laws? Part 4 – 
the final part of this thesis- proposes a new solution. This writer's new proposal 
is principally driven by her recognition to the importance of the connection 
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 Some argue that if moral rights are seen to be linked to the author's personality then these 
rights should be part of the personal law of the author. Moreover, some suggest listing moral 
rights as fundamental human rights; Boschiero, no 6.  
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moral rights share with both copyright and general personality rights in conflict-
of-laws.  
Therefore, the first chapter of this Part is of an essential need, it examines the 
preliminary factors that play crucial role in the formulation of the new proposal. 
Hence, chapter I is divided into 3 sections: A. choice-of-law theories, objectives 
and the relationship with substantive law, B. Identifying common elements 
between moral rights, copyright and general personality rights in conflict-of-
laws, C. Recent important developments of personality rights in conflict-of-laws 
at the EU level. The second chapter presents this writer's new proposal. The new 
proposal addresses moral rights in cross-border torts and contracts. Finally, the 
principal connecting factor adopted by the new proposal is evaluated against 
other connecting factors. 
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Chapter I 
Preliminary factors 
 
Choice-of-law rules can be described as '... a technique which enables the courts 
to reach a solution by applying the domes-tic law of a particular legal unit to the 
facts of the case.'444 Hence, conflict rules do not provide substantive protection 
to the disputed issue because PIL 'is a technique and not a system of substantive 
rule'445. This particular nature made influence from abroad to these rules not 
easily welcomed446. The guidance these rules provide to the judge regarding the 
law to be applied in a dispute with a foreign element, is steered by the aim to 
achieve just and effective solutions in cross-border situations where there is 
more than one applicable law to the dispute447.  
This understanding for choice-of-law rules means that there are certain 
preliminary factors that need to be taken into account for one to propose a new 
choice-of-law rule. The first is theories and objectives of choice-of-law rules and 
their relationship with substantive law. The second is the significant elements 
connecting moral rights with both copyright and general personality rights in 
conflict-of-laws. And the third is the recent important developments at the EU 
level regarding personality rights and Rome II Regulation. 
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A. Choice-of-law rules: theories, objectives and the relationship with substantive 
law: 
 
1. Theories on choice-of-law rules 
 
Existence and development of PIL448  has always been based on co-operation 
between members of the international community449. In international relations, a 
minimum order is needed, and this can only be done by application of PIL rules. 
These rules are intended to offer some degree of justice, certainty and 
convenience to the parties involved in a cross-border transaction. In addition to 
that, if a court was to only apply its national law and internal rules, the result 
will likely be:  
 
…. distortion of the intended obligations under contracts entered into in 
reliance on foreign law; the imposition of tort liability for conduct 
which the defendant was required by the law of the place where he 
acted to perform; the invalidation of marriages celebrated abroad on 
account of non-compliance with formalities specified by the lex fori, but 
imposs-ible to comply with outside its territory; the abduction of 
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 In England 'conflict of laws' and 'private international law' are used indifferently referring to 
the same thing. The two terms however, are not used to refer to the same thing in other 
jurisdictions, for example in France PIL refers to rules of French nationality as well as the legal 
position of foreigners in France, while conflict of laws in France refers only to the choice-of-law; 
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the used terminology. Hence, PIL is of wider scope than conflict-of-laws. What is worth pointing 
out however, is the fact that there is no separate code for PIL in the Bahraini legal system, 
provisions of PIL are stipulated in the Civil and Commercial Procedures Act of Bahrain1971 
(CCPA 1971). Articles 21 and 22 of the CCPA 1971 deal with issues of applicable law; article 
21 consists of 6 paragraphs and deals merely with applicable law to personal status, more 
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22 simply states that the applicable law must not contradict with the order public in Bahrain. 
Bearing in mind the very basic rules concerning applicable law, it is not surprising to say that 
there are no special provisions in relation to IP rights.  
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children across borders with impunity; and automatic changes in the 
ownership of goods when they crossed a border.450 
 
Principles of international coexistence particularly on the commercial sphere 
played great role as the motivating force in PIL451. At the same time, political 
and ideological conditions had an impact on the initial concepts and formation of 
PIL. As Kalensky argues, these political conditions made PIL a ‘political 
matter’, and naturally, they had and still have an effect on its development 
process452.  Moreover, principles of mandatory co-operation of states in 
economic, social and cultural matters as required in the UN Charter453 are very 
important factors for the development of PIL.  
R. Neuner words best illustrate the importance of PIL: 
As long as men live under different laws private international law has a 
vital function. It has to coordinate many often conflicting interests. As in 
any other field of the law real progress can be achieved only by constant 
reflection on the policies to be pursued and the means to be applied.454 
 
Therefore, societies need PIL rules to coordinate the conflicting interests in 
cross-border situations, at the same time, the development of PIL rules is 
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the desire to do justice in cases with a foreign element, at the same time we should not forget that 
the motivating force of law in general is the need to establish order so that social life can exist 
and continue,  Graveson, 1974, p 7. 
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Collier, Conflict of laws (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001) 384 (hereafter 
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essential for the growth of relationships and contacts between non-sovereign 
subjects surrounded by different legal systems and living in different states455. 
 
The significant importance of conflict-of-laws draws attention to its theories 
which can be traced far back in history456. Generally, these theories were 
influenced by many countries, Italy from the 12 to the 14th centuries, France 
from the 14 to the16th centuries, the Netherlands in the 17th century, the USA in 
the first half of the 19th century and second half of the 20th, while France, Italy, 
Germany and England had great influence in the second half of the 19th 
century457.  
 
Applicable law theories and methods can be listed as the following: 1. The 
theory of comity 2. The theory of vested rights 3. The local law theory 4. 
Statutist theory 5.The allocation method 6. Policy evaluation methods (where 
courts look for the legislative policy behind a specific rule of law to determine 
the 'better law') 7. The theory of justice458.   
Examination of these theories and methods should help understand how conflict 
rules are drafted. Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind that this thesis is 
not of a historical nature, moreover, it addresses choice-of-law rules only in 
relation to author's moral rights. Therefore, examination shall only be limited to 
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the related modern theories on conflict-of-laws459, followed by a brief comment 
on the other theories.  
 
The two related modern theories are Statutist theory and the allocation method. 
 
a. Statutist theory 460 
 
This theory seeks to determine disputes by allocating any issue to its category by 
either categorizing it as real or personal461. If categorized as real it will be 
governed by the law of the territorial situation of the act or thing, if categorized 
as personal it will be governed by the personal law of the party462. This theory 
consists of methods and solutions that were developed between the 5th -17th 
century in Italy, France and the Netherlands463. The Italian commerce back then 
and the transfer of goods and persons, forced Italian scholars to look into 
questions of when did an Italian legal rule have an application abroad and when 
did it have an application on foreigners within its territory. Hence, the question 
is over which cross-border legal situations does the legal rule have an 
application?  Important rules such as, the law of the forum (lex fori) governs 
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rules of procedure464 and that the applicable law to objects is the law where the 
object is situated i.e. lex rei sitae were developed by Italian scholars465. The 
French466 and the Dutch subsequent theories were based on the Italians’ 
achievements. The French developed the well known French doctrine which 
classifies rules of private law into three categories: real statutes, personal statutes 
and mixed statutes.467 Dutch scholars based their theory on the principle of 
sovereignty as the general rule468, they were more concerned with the question 
which the French and Italians did not ask before which is why would a local 
court apply a foreign law at the first place? 469. This question led to the 
establishment of the Doctrine of comity. According to Huber -who is credited 
with the presentation of the new doctrine of comity- the doctrine states that there 
is nothing in the nature of foreign PIL that force national courts to apply it, 
however, the reason why national courts do so is based on the duty established 
by customary international law470 
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b. The Allocation Method 
 
The Statutist theory began to lose its importance and by the late 19th century the 
dominance was for Savigny’s ideas471. Savigny broke territorialism by declaring 
that every legal relationship should be judged according to the legal system with 
which it has the closest connection472. The goal is to have the same substantive 
solution applied to the case in question regardless where the case is brought473. 
Hence, each legal relationship must have a 'seat' which is defined as: 'a legal 
territory to which in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject'474, this seat is 
simply the 'center of gravity' of the legal relationship. 
Therefore, legal relationships are divided into categories, such as issues relating 
to property of immovable, or succession or contractual obligations, then, a 
connecting factor is designated to every category according to its 'seat'. For 
example, the seat of a marriage relationship is the husband's domicile as he is 
considered the head of the family, the seat of immovable property is the location 
of the property, and so on.  
Savigny’s rules are abstract because the ‘centre of gravity’ of cases is decided 
objectively in advance. It is irrelevant that the case is actually connected to the 
law indicated by the connecting factors. The rules are neutral because they can 
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result in the application of any law regardless of its continent, so what matters is 
the jurisdiction not the content of laws475.  
 
 
c. Other theories:  
 
The 2nd half of the 19th century and the early half of the 20th century, codification 
of PIL in Europe -except in common law countries- was influenced by 
sociological approach of Mancini476. It centered on a particular nucleus such as 
territory, race, language, custom, history, laws and religion, the connection 
between an individual and nuclei was based on nationality477. Other theories 
developed in the 20th century in the USA such as the vested rights theory and the 
governmental interest analysis478, however both were criticized for inflexibility 
of their rules479.  
 
Today, the dominant choice-of-law method in most countries remains the 
allocation method480. In the EU, the Rome II Regulation follows the European 
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tradition and relies on Savigny's methodology481 with some influence from 
American theories on conflict-of-laws. 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
system's adoption for the allocation method; where legal relationships are divided into categories 
and a connecting factor is designated to every category. As for the applicable law to contractual 
and non-contractual obligations, courts apply the internationally recognized rules, for example 
the Bahraini court of cassation adopted the well known principle of lex loci delicti in relation to 
torts despite absence of legal regulation in Bahraini CCPA 1971, for more details see Alsayed, 
2007, p 260. 
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 Xandra E. Kramer, 'The Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations: The European private international law tradition continued' [2008] available online 
at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314749> last accessed 2 Oct 2012, p 12 
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181 
 
 
2. Choice-of-law rules: objectives and the relationship with substantive law482 
 
Clearly, one can say that identifying the applicable law in a cross-border dispute 
is the raison d'être for choice-of-law rules. Choice-of-law rules are there to 
guide national courts, in cases involving foreign elements, to the law which is 
presumed to be most closely connected to the dispute. This law is not necessarily 
the law of the forum, hence, choice-of-law rules could lead to the application of 
a foreign law. There are two main reasons behind applying a foreign law. The 
first is to serve the interests of the parties in the case, and the second is to protect 
or advance the interest of a foreign country483. National courts prefer standards 
of justice of country (x) rather than its own, because surrounding circumstances 
in a dispute support the presumption that law of country (x) rather than law of 
country (y) is more closely connected to the dispute. Therefore, one can say that 
choice-of-law rules involve public and private dimension. The public dimension 
or aspect concerns serving the interest of the countries involved, while the 
private aspect concerns the interest of the parties and the justice of the case484. 
While choice-of-law rules undertake their primary task in identifying the 
applicable law, these rules fulfil other goals which might not be as obvious and 
straight forward as the primary objective. New Zealand law Commission485 
discussed the objectives of PIL in general and referred in its discussion to the 
goals of conflict rules as to:  
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… avoid multiple hearing of the same dispute, to ensure the system of 
the chosen law does not depend on where the case is heard; so if choice 
of law rules even though in different jurisdiction referred to the same 
law we will no longer have forum shopping 486 
 
Therefore, as conflict rules carry out their primary function in determining the 
applicable law, they also guarantee application of a single law regardless of 
where the case is brought and accordingly prevent forum shopping. This comes 
in conformity with the main goal of choice-of-law as Savigny and Beale see it, 
which is uniformity of decisions487. Moreover, conflict-of-laws as a branch of 
private law, aim at promoting interests of the private persons and achieving legal 
certainty.488  
Other objectives of conflict rules also include '...the fulfillment of the underlying 
policies behind the substantive law'489, fulfillment of interests and aims the 
national legislator wishes to achieve490, and promoting fulfillment of public 
policy considerations that motivate the substantive law they relate to491. 
Thus, the link between choice-of-law rules and substantive law is evident. This 
link is translated in employing conflict rules as a tool or a medium to achieve the 
underlying policies of substantive law. This was made clear in New Zealand 
Law commission report: 'As for New Zeland; its PIL rules aim at ensuring 
efficient resolution for cross-border disputes and protecting Newzeland’s 
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interests in the domestic and international level as part of the international 
community'492.  
As a matter of fact, several commentators embrace this approach. Wengler for 
example lists 6 general principles that one needs to keep in mind when forming 
PIL rules, the forth of which is '...(4) use of the choice – of – law reference that 
best serves the purpose of the substantive law...'493 
Moreover, 'false conflict' as a result to uniformity of substantive laws is another 
evidence of how the function of choice-of-law rules is affected by substantive 
law. Attempts to harmonize copyright law for example, on the substantive level, 
should eventually lead, at some point in the future, to the same result regardless 
of which law applies. Hence, reflecting what is known as false conflict of laws, 
where there is no actual conflict between the potentially applicable laws because 
they all lead to the same substantive result494.  
This active interaction between choice-of-law and substantive law means that 
the similar purpose or objective author's moral rights share with general 
personality rights on the substantive level cannot be overlooked in conflict-of-
laws. When the function of two rights is similar, purpose of substantive law of 
both rights is also expected to be similar. As a result, the 'seat' in both sets of 
rights should not be different.  
Hence, drafting specifically designed choice-of-law rules to moral rights should 
take into account the link these rights share with personality rights on the 
substantive level. Furthermore, there are certain desired qualities which one 
needs to keep in mind in order to fulfil particular functions495. This includes 
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meeting the parties’ legitimate expectations. The importance of bearing this 
principle in mind as a desirable quality when drafting a choice-of-law rule is 
obvious. If this interest is taken into account, it should lead to fair results and 
justice. When addressing legitimate party expectation, special attention should 
be given to the '... position of the parties in an international situation and on their 
justified expectation, especially when exposed to an unexpected choice of law in 
an unforeseeable forum' 496. Choice-of-law rules also need to be flexible, to 
ensure that the rule can adapt to the facts of the case in question, and hence 
achieve fair, reasonable and just results497. In addition, these rules should 
promote efficiency. Efficiency can be measured in several ways, most basic of 
which is considering time and cost as well as convenience of the parties498. And 
as the case with any legal rule, choice-of-law rules must be as simple as possible 
drafted in clear and understandable language. 499 
 
Arrangements of these considerations may differ from one commentator to 
another, for Leflar the most important considerations that influence formulating 
a choice-of- law rule are 'A. predictability of results B. Maintenance of interstate 
and international order C. simplification of judicial task D. advancement of the 
forum’s governmental interests E. application of the better rule of law'500 
As for Wengler, there are 6 general principles that one needs to keep in mind 
when drafting PIL rules:  
 (1) Public policy; (2) the forum’s ‘political’ (governmental) interest; 
(3) sub-stantive ‘harmony’ [...]; (4) use of the choice – of – law 
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reference that best serves the purpose of the substantive law; (5) 
enforceability of the decision; and (6) the principle that conflicts should 
be minimized (harmony of decision amongst states) 501 
 
Nevertheless, what it is important to bear in mind is that these qualities differ 
from one situation to another. This is particularly true in relation to predictability 
and flexibility as the two qualities should not be equally treated in cross-border 
contracts and torts. 
In relation to contracts, sophisticated contracts like the ones concluded between 
multi-billion dollars industry require higher level of predictability and low level 
of flexibility because these contracts are planned and legally reviewed by 
lawyers. In relation to unsophisticated contracts, what is required is high level of 
flexibility and low level of predictability. The same rule applies if a contract is 
concluded between a sophisticated party and unsophisticated party. This is 
because if priority is given to predictability then we will be serving the 
expectations of the sophisticated (usually stronger) party of the contract502. 
In relation to torts, predictability is important to the defendant and flexibility is 
important to the plaintiff. In torts where predictability and flexibility clash, 
priority must be given to predictability. Fuller’s observation can be recalled here 
where he described failure to meet the affected party's legitimate expectation as 
'a route to disaster'503  
 
 
3. Interim conclusions 
 
A certain law is presumed to be the most suitable to govern the issue at question 
for several reasons, these reasons are extracted based on a certain theory. Hence, 
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theories on conflict-of-laws are important so that one could understand how 
choice-of-law rules are drafted. The most commonly used method today is the 
'allocation method', therefore, any suggested rule should take this theory into 
consideration.  
 
In a cross-border dispute there are two or more potentially applicable laws, the 
primary and most obvious objective of a choice-of-law rule is to select a single 
law out of all these laws to be applied to the dispute at question. Yet, one would 
be mistaken to believe that the importance of choice-of-law rules to the national 
legislator is limited to this primary objective. These rules are used by the 
legislator as a tool to achieve the policies of substantive law, thus, resulting in an 
interactive relationship between substantive law and conflict-of-laws. 
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B. Moral rights, copyright and general personality rights: identifying common 
elements in conflict-of-laws  
 
It is important to keep in mind that the general right of personality of the author 
will not be protected under the traditional concept of moral rights, this is because 
the latter set of rights only apply when the interests involved are in relation to a 
copyrighted work504. And for that very particular reason, moral rights could only 
be considered as special category of general personality rights. Therefore, 
personality rights are to be divided into general personality rights that apply to 
all natural persons (authors and non – authors) and special personality rights that 
only apply to authors and performers505.   
 
As explained earlier, most countries in the world -including the EU- apply the 
allocation method, according to which legal issues are assigned to certain 
categories. Each category applies a certain choice-of-law rule, this rule is 
expected to select the law which should be most closely connected to legal 
issues falling within this particular category. Therefore, moral rights' link with 
both copyright and general personality rights should –accordingly- be taken into 
account. The theoretical justification for the allocation method, together with its 
already existing international acceptance, encouraged the current writer to follow 
the international direction and adopt the allocation method as the theoretical 
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considered.  
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basis for her new proposal. Hence, it is important to identify the common 
elements that moral rights share with copyright and personality rights. This 
identification should help determine the category under which moral rights 
should be listed and accordingly the suitable choice-of-law rules. 
 
1. Elements connecting moral rights with copyright in conflict-of-laws 
 
The fact that the birth point of moral rights is determined by the existence of the 
copyrighted work cannot be underestimated. Thus, a conflict rule that is to be 
applied to moral rights should take this factor into consideration. Any legal issue 
that is related to the question of existence of moral rights should logically be 
governed by the same law applicable to existence of copyright. Here, the 
connection between moral rights and copyright is very strong because existence 
of moral rights depends on the existence of the copyrighted work. Therefore, if 
one theoretically accepts that existence of copyright is determined by lex 
originis, then the same law should also determine existence of moral rights. 
Furthermore, it is not to be forgotten that the conventional approach is to have 
existence and scope governed by the same law.  
 
2. Elements connecting moral rights with general personality rights in conflict-
of-laws 
 
The connection between moral rights and general personality rights is in relation 
to the 'functionality' of both rights. 'Functionality' is derived from function, the 
latter term is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as 'Aim, job, purpose, use or role' 
therefore, moral rights and general personality rights are purposely similar.  
Thus, issues related to the functionality or the aim and objective of moral right 
are closely related to general personality rights. In this particular regard, the law 
applicable to both should be similar or at least derived from a similar choice-of-
law rule.  
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In general, all issues related to moral rights are part of the functionality of these 
rights. However, this should not mean that all legal aspects and issues in a cross-
border moral rights dispute are only connected to general personality rights. To 
clarify this further, imagine the following: (A) is a French composer who agrees 
to contractually waive all his moral rights in relation to his musical piece to an 
English producer (B). The contract is governed by English law, and the work 
(being the musical piece) is broadcasted in France, Spain and England. (B) 
makes some changes to the work without consulting (A) because the latter has 
sold his economic and moral rights in the work to (B).  (A) brings an action 
before French courts arguing that these changes infringe his integrity right and 
that the general waiver is null and void, thus requesting the prevention of 
broadcasting the musical piece in its amended form. 
In this case, the contractual waiver (general waiver) of moral rights is a 
contractual issue rather than an issue of functionality. Nevertheless, the answer 
is far from being either black or white, this is because one should differentiate 
between validity of the contract from a formality point of view, and validity of 
the subject matter of the contract. If the issue concerns formal validity of the 
contract then it is purely a contractual issue and the functionality and purpose of 
moral rights play no role, however, if the issue concerns the validity of the 
protected subject matter as illustrated in the example above, then the issue is 
once again intersecting with functionality and purpose of moral rights which will 
eventually lead to general personality rights. 
In relation to infringement scenarios, the issue is related to functionality and 
purpose of moral rights, for example, cross-border infringement of the 
attribution right is by definition an attack on the author's name. Protection of this 
interest – in addition to other moral interests- is the purpose or aim of moral 
rights and the whole point behind its existence. Again, the function or purpose of 
moral rights in this sense intersects with that of general personality rights. 
 
Hence, only in relation to cross-border infringements 'functionality' becomes an 
evident element that should not be overlooked in conflict-of-laws. Thus, the 
connection between moral rights and general personality rights must be 
recognized when dealing with moral rights infringements. As for moral rights in 
cross-border contracts, it is important to differentiate between disputes related to 
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the formality of the contract (in which case it is purely a contractual matter), and 
disputes related to the protected subject matter in a contract (in which case 
functionality of moral rights is involved).   
 
Moreover, as infringement falls under the category of 'non-contractual' 
obligations, the place where damage was suffered is considered to be a 
significant factor. The result could therefore be application of the universally 
acknowledged principle of lex loci delicti506. Thus, moral rights infringements 
shall also be evaluated against its general categorization as a non-contractual 
obligation.  
 
At this stage, detailed examination for each moral right should be helpful. The 
attribution right protects author's name in relation to his work. Infringement 
occurs when the work is communicated to the public with false or no attribution 
to the actual creator of the work. The right is 'personality – related', hence it is 
assumed to be very closely connected to the author's personality. Thus, the 
applicable law should not ignore this important factor.  In addition, where the 
work was communicated to the public in its infringing form marks the decisive 
point regarding infringement or breach of moral rights. 
The integrity right protects author's honor and reputation in relation to his work. 
The protected interest i.e. author's integrity is related to his personality, this is 
true although 'integrity' is only limited to his work.  When this work is 
communicated to the public in its derogatory form, it is expected to harm the 
author's reputation and honour. Where this harm takes place together with the 
personality related nature of the protected interests, are two significant factors 
that should not to be ignored.  
The divulgation right is not different from the attribution or integrity rights in 
terms of its connection with general personality rights. The right protects the 
author's privacy right in relation to his work, so that the author can control when 
and how to publish his work to the public. Thus, the divulgation right is derived 
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from the privacy right, infringement therefore takes place when the work is 
communicated to the public without the author's consent.  
 
Analysis of the common factors moral rights share with general personality 
rights shows that, the author and where the infringing act takes place, are two 
significant factors when it comes to determining the applicable law in cross-
border moral rights infringement.  
 
3. Interim conclusions: 
 
Choice-of-law rules are not carelessly drafted. According to the 'allocation 
method', legislators must first thoroughly examine all elements of the legal 
relationship, as a second step, these elements are evaluated and compared to 
determine the one element that is most significant. Once this element is located, 
the connecting factor is drafted and the applicable law would be that which is 
connected to the element most significant in the legal relationship. 
As moral rights are connected to both copyright and general personality rights, 
this connection should be reflected on choice-of-law rules. The connection with 
copyright is most significant in relation to the question of existence, and 
therefore, the law applicable to determine whether copyright exists or not should 
also determine existence of moral rights.   
 
At the same time, the common significant element that general personality rights 
share with moral rights is related to its functionality, a matter that is clearly 
reflected in infringement situations. Importance of the author as a factor in moral 
rights infringement cases comes from the fact that what is infringed or violated 
is related to the author's personality. The 'author's personality' as a factor, is of 
crucial importance and should not be overlooked. The place where the author 
suffered damages is another crucial factor derived from the fact that 
infringement of author's moral rights falls within the category of non-contractual 
obligations. Accordingly, the place of the event either giving rise to the damage 
or where the damage was suffered counts as considerable factors. 
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C. Personality rights and conflict-of-laws: Critique of the recent EU proposals  
 
The recent developments concerning personality rights in conflict-of-laws at the 
EU level are important to moral rights. This is because the link moral rights have 
with general personality rights should be reflected in choice-of-law rules.  
Therefore, a reminder of the present situation regarding applicable choice-of-law 
rules to general personality rights is needed, followed by a critique to the recent 
EU proposals concerning the applicable choice-of-law rules to general 
personality rights.  
 
1. The status Quo:  
Personality rights are excluded from the scope of Rome II. The issue proved to 
be too controversial to reach an agreement and therefore was explicitly excluded 
from the Regulation. Some commentators like Mr. Iain Christie believes that it is 
not of great importance that a choice-of-law rule regarding personality rights 
was not included in the Rome II Regulation. His acceptance to the situation is 
based on his belief that eventually there will be a unified European standard for 
defamation and privacy laws in all Member States:  
The impetus for both these adjustments has been the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  As the Convention standards impact 
across Europe the divergence between the defamation and privacy laws 
of all member states will reduce. In time it will matter less which law 
applies and decisions on where to sue are likely to be influenced more 
by practical considerations such as the location of witnesses and likely 
costs of the action.  The absence of specific clauses dealing with the 
violation of personality rights in the latest draft of Rome II (and the 
retention of the status quo for the time being) is not, from a 
practitioner’s perspective, therefore of paramount importance 507  
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Nevertheless, the majority sees the exclusion as a disadvantage and a weak point 
in the Rome II Regulation. This is attributed to the un-unified position of general 
personality rights in conflict-of-laws, which as a result, leaves each country to 
deal with the matter according to its own national rules. 
Accordingly, in England for example, The Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 looks at the place where the events 
constituting the tort occurred508. The Act provides that in any case (other than 
damage to property) the applicable law is the law of the country in which the 
most significant element or elements of the events occurred509. Nevertheless, 
defamation is excluded from Part III of the Act510, the reason behind this 
exclusion from the scope of the Act is the lobbying power of the media. 
Publishers and broadcasters argued that if defamation was under the scope of the 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 then the 'double actionability' rule will not 
apply, which means that publishers or broadcasters established in the United 
Kingdom would be subject to defamation proceedings under a foreign law that 
provided them with weak protection. The subject seemed to be very problematic 
and therefore defamation was excluded from the scope of the 1995 Act, hence, 
the 'double actionability' rule still applies with regard to defamation511. 
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2. The applicable choice-of-law rules to general personality rights: Recent EU 
proposals 
 
Most scholars criticize exclusion of general personality rights from the scope of 
Rome II Regulation. As this approach is understood to weaken the Regulation, 
scholars tried to come up with suggestions and proposals that would bring 
general personality rights into the scope of the Regulation. The following are 
important proposals that contributed to the recent EU developments regarding 
personality rights in conflict-of-laws. 
a. Suggested choice-of-law rules to be applied to personality rights at the EU 
level:  
As explained above, exclusion of personality rights from the scope of Rome II 
Regulation is considered by many commentators to be one of the Regulation's 
main weak points. Yet, one should not forget that attempts to include personality 
rights in the scope of the Regulation proved to be a very difficult matter. The 
first draft commission proposal for Rome II Regulation suggested applying the 
law of the place where the victim was domiciled at the time of the tort or delict. 
However, the proposal was rejected because of the lobbying power played by the 
media refusing to have broadcast and print media subject to a foreign law. In 
short, it was impossible to reach a compromise, and accordingly the only way 
was to leave the issue outside the scope of the Regulation512. 
Despite these difficulties, most commentators believe that inclusion of 
personality rights in the scope of the Regulation is important513. Several 
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 For more details see Kuipers, 2011, p 1692. 
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 The Mainstrat Study (a comparative study on the situation in the twenty‐seven Member States 
as regards the law applicable to non‐contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy 
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proposed solutions to the situation were presented, these include the 
following514: 
i. Wallis working paper and Von Hein's paper: 
Both call for providing a specific regulation that is designed to deal with breach 
of privacy and defamation in Rome II. Both papers suggest that the applicable 
law to privacy and personality right should be the location of the injured party’s 
habitual residence515 as primarily decisive and this is then combined with a 
foreseeability rule. 
 
ii. Boscovic: 
Professor Boscovic also supports including personality rights under Rome II.  
However, she suggests deleting the exception in Rome II art 1 (2) (g) and simply 
applying art 4 of Rome II. 
 
iii. Dickinson and Harley: 
 Suggest leaving the situation as it is for the time being. 
 
iv. Professor Heiderhoff: 
 Suggests application of lex fori, she argues that application of shevill solution to 
choice-of-law is not possible because we will end up giving the plaintiff the right 
to choose the forum and the law516. The best solution in her view is to apply lex 
                                                                                                                                                         
applicable to defamation: 85% of the persons consulted, mainly legal practitioners supported 
adopting uniform conflict of laws rule; see Kuipers,  2011, p 1696. 
 
514
 George, 2010, p 1 under pt 1. 
 
515
 For a detailed examination of habitual residence compared to domicile see Pippa Rogerson, 
'Habitaul residence: the new domicile?' [2000] ICLQ 86-107 (hereafter referred to as Rogerson, 
2000).  
516
 However, the French court in Gordon & Breach Inc. (1998) 175 RIDA 268, ruled that the law 
of the place where the harmful event occurred is to be understood to be both the place where the 
harm was suffered and where the event generating the harm took place, cited in (2002) 193 
R.I.D.A. 340. 
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fori, in this way she argues '… the application of foreign law in a legal field, 
where cultural differences truly exist, is completely proscribed' 517 Professor 
Heiderhoff explains that countries with fundamentally different approach to the 
subject like France and England should not be forced into parallel standards518.  
 
v. Dr. Kuipers: 
 
Suggests the application of the closest connection principle to cross-border 
defamation cases. Dr. Kuipers believes that flexibility and giving more room to 
courts should be given more importance than predictability519. The principle of 
closest connection was used in Rome Convention (art 4), however, it was 
criticized because it was considered a source of uncertainty. Yet, Dr. Kuipers 
understands this uncertainty not to be related to the principle as such but to the 
way courts interpreted it520. Factors to be taken into account when determining 
the country with the closest connection to the dispute include: the place of 
establishment of the publisher, the place of establishment of the victim, the place 
where most of the damage materialized, place where most publications were put 
into circulation, the international or local nature of the publication, the language 
of the publication, the audience for which the publication was written, and in 
cases of defamation via the internet, importance should be given to the domain 
name of the internet site521. 
 
Dr. Kuipers draws attention to the benefits of applying the principle of closest 
connection. These benefits include application of a single law to a 
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 George, 2010,  p 2 under  pt III. 
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 George, 2011, p3 under pt IV. 
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 Kuipers,  2011,   pp 1701-1702. 
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 Kuipers,  2011,  p 1702. 
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 Kuipers,  2011,  p 1704. 
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publication, and application of the same rule to traditional and online 
defamation scenarios. Moreover, the closest connection principle is expected 
to strike the needed balance in disputes involving laws of non Member States, 
accordingly EU laws and values will only be applicable when the defamation 
has the closest connection with one of the Member States522. Therefore, Dr. 
Kuipers suggests the inclusion of the following rule into the Rome II 
Regulation: 'The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, 
shall be the law of the country with which it is most closely connected.'523 
 
In this writer's opinion, Dr. Kuipres view is probably the most favoured out of 
the above mentioned proposals. 'The closest connection' principle is general and 
flexible enough to give room for courts to deal with cases on individual basis. 
Uncertainty can be avoided when the rule is supported with a list of certain 
factors that would help the court in its determination process. Moreover, the 
place 'where the most significant element of the loss or damage occur' should 
certainly be taken into consideration when determining 'the closest connection'. 
And as a result, the place with the closest connection could be the same as that 
of the place where the most significant element of the loss or damage occur or 
likely to occur. In addition, Dr. Kuipers proposed rule is general enough to be 
applied to traditional scenarios and online (ubiquitous) infringement scenarios.  
Nevertheless, in this writer's opinion, the proposed rule under the Final Report of 
the European Parliament (discussed directly below) is preferable over Dr. 
Kuipers' proposal. This is because the rule under the Final Report takes into 
consideration the positive factors in Dr. Kuipers' proposal, while providing 
higher level of precision and certainty.   
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 Needless to say, the Public policy exception can always be used to refuse the application of 
foreign law if it was contrary to the fundamental principle of the forum. Kuipers, 2011, p 1704. 
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 Kuipers, 2011,  p1705. 
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b. Reports of European Parliament on Future choice-of-law rule for privacy and 
personality rights:  
 
As explained earlier, the majority of commentators believed that it was 
necessary to include personality rights within the scope of Rome II. The Draft 
Report of European Parliament was of significant importance as it was followed 
by the Final Report on future choice-of-law rule for privacy and personality 
rights.   
 
i. Draft Report of European Parliament on Future choice-of-law rule for privacy 
and personality rights524: 
 
The Draft Report was a working document prepared by Diana Wallis525. The 
initiative for this working document was mainly a consideration for the current 
situation  
...because the Council was unable to agree on the original Commission 
proposal or on the compromise solution put forward by Parliament in 
the course of the co-decision procedure on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights 
relating to personality. 526  
Diana Wallis argued that a conflict rule concerning personality right is necessary 
and that Prof Jan Von Hein proposal was the most interesting. In fact, the Draft 
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 Draft report (2009/2170(INI)) to the commission on the amendment of Regulation (EC) 
No864/ 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) dated 2/12/2011 
Available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/pr/885/885652/885652en.
pdf> 
 accessed 27 Nov 2011; also reported on <http://conflictoflaws.net/2011/new-draft-report-of-
european-parliament-on-future-choice-of-law-rule-for-privacy-and-personality-rights/> accessed 
1 Dec 2011 (hereafter referred to as Draft Report). 
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 Diana Wallis (rapporteur), ‘Working document DT\836983EN.doc on the amendment of 
Regulation (EC) NO 864/2007 on the law applicable to non – contractual obligations (Rome II) – 
Work in Progress’ [2011] (hereafter referred to as Wallis, 2011). 
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Report clearly adopted Prof Von Hein's proposal. Thus, the proposed article was 
titled 'Article 5a-Privacy and rights relating to personality', it provides for the 
following: 
(1) Without prejudice to Article 4(2) and (3), the law applicable to a 
non-contractual obligation arising out of violations of privacy and rights 
relating to personality, including defamation, shall be the law of the 
country where the rights of the person seeking compensation for 
damage are, or are likely to be, directly and substantially affected. 
However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which 
the person claimed to be liable is habitually resident if he or she could 
not reasonably foresee substantial consequences of his or her act 
occurring in the country designated by the first sentence. 
(2) When the rights of the person seeking compensation for damage are, 
or are likely to be, affected in more than one country, and this person 
sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, the claimant may 
instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised.  
(3) The law applicable to the right of reply or equivalent measures shall 
be the law of the country in which the broadcaster or publisher has its 
habitual residence. 
(4) The law applicable under this Article may be derogated from by an 
agreement pursuant to Article 14. 
 
Diana Wallis commented on this proposal saying:  
This proposal couples the basic principle that the law of the place where 
the damage occurs is paramount, but couples it with a foreseeability 
clause to take the legitimate interests of publishers into account ... There 
is also provision for party autonomy and the option of electing to apply 
the lex fori where the claimant elects to sue in the publisher's courts for 
damage sustained in more than one Member State. 527 
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 Wallis, 2011, p 5.  
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ii. Final Report of European Parliament on Future choice-of-law rule for privacy 
and personality rights528: 
 
In May 2nd, 2012, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
has issued its Final Report with recommendations to the Commission on the 
amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II). When the Final Report was published in May 
2012, there was re-consideration for the terminology used in the Draft Report. 
The Final Report proposes the inclusion of the following article: 
 
Article 5a: Privacy and rights relating to personality 
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a violation of 
privacy or rights relating to the personality, including defamation, shall be the 
law of the country in which the most significant element or elements of the loss 
or damage occur or are likely to occur. 
2. However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which the 
defendant is habitually resident if he or she could not reasonably have foreseen 
substantial consequences of his or her act occurring in the country designated by 
paragraph 1. 
3. Where the violation is caused by the publication of printed matter or by a 
broadcast, the country in which the most significant element or elements of the 
damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed to be the country to which 
the publication or broadcasting service is principally directed or, if this is not 
apparent, the country in which editorial control is exercised, and that country’s 
law shall be applicable. The country to which the publication or broadcast is 
directed shall be determined in particular by the language of the publication or 
broadcast or by sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of total 
sales or audience size or by a combination of those factors. 
4. The law applicable to the right of reply or equivalent measures and to any 
preventive measures or prohibitory injunctions against a publisher or broadcaster 
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regarding the content of a publication or broadcast and regarding the violation of 
privacy or of rights relating to the personality resulting from the handling of 
personal data shall be the law of the country in which the publisher, broadcaster 
or handler has its habitual residence. 
 
iii. Draft Report vs. Final Report: comparison and analysis 
 
The difference between the Draft Report and the Final Report calls for a 
comparison between the two proposed articles.  
In relation to infringement of privacy and rights related to personality, the   
general rule in the Draft Report is application of the law of the country where the 
rights of the person seeking compensation for damage are, or are likely to be, 
directly and substantially affected. In the Final Report, the general rule is 
application of the law of the country in which the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur.  
In relation to infringement of privacy and rights related to personality taking 
place in more than one country, the general rule in the Draft Report is to allow 
the claimant to base his claim on the law of defendant's domicile (if he decides 
to sue him there), or to base his claim on the law of the court seised. However, 
according to the Final Report, where the violation is caused by the publication of 
printed matter or by a broadcast, the country in which the most significant 
element or elements of the damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed 
to be the country to which the publication or broadcasting service is principally 
directed or, if this is not apparent, the country in which editorial control is 
exercised, and that country’s law shall be applicable. The country to which the 
publication or broadcast is directed shall be determined in particular by the 
language of the publication or broadcast or by sales or audience size in a given 
country as a proportion of total sales or audience size or by a combination of 
those factors. 
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As for the possibility of derogation from the proposed applicable rule, the Draft 
Report allows derogation by an agreement between the parties pursuant to art 14. 
However, the Final Report does not allow derogation from its rule.  
The common factor between the Draft Report and Final Report is the use of 
flexible general rule that is suitable for application to infringement scenarios 
taking place in one country and infringement scenarios taking place in more than 
one country.   
The Draft Report calls for application of the law of the country where the rights 
of the person seeking compensation for damage are, or are likely to be, directly 
and substantially affected. On the other hand, the Final Report calls for the 
application of the law of the country in which the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur. In this writer's 
opinion, the rule in both proposals is expected to eventually lead to the 
application of the same law. This is because the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage is likely to occur where the rights are directly and 
substantially affected. For example, if (A) brings an action against (B) because 
the latter published a private family photo of (A) in London hence violating his 
privacy right, the most significant element of the loss occur or is likely to occur 
in London where the photo was published and this is where the right (being the 
privacy right) is directly and substantially affected. If (A) proves that his interest 
was directly and substantially affected in France not in London, then, France is 
the place where the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage 
occur or are likely to occur, and accordingly French law should be applied.  
Despite the potentiality of application of the same law under the two proposed 
articles, the terminology used in the Final Draft gives the court wider 
discretionary power. Moreover, application of the law of the country in which 
the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur or are 
likely to occur, gives more flexibility in relation to infringement taking place in 
more than one country. In such case, the place where the most significant 
element of the loss is considered to be that of the country to which the 
publication or broadcasting service is principally directed or, if this is not 
apparent, the country in which editorial control is exercised, and that country’s 
law shall be applicable. The country to which the publication or broadcast is 
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directed shall be determined in particular by the language of the publication or 
broadcast or by sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of total 
sales or audience size or by a combination of those factors. Nevertheless, and 
despite the advantages of this rule, it could be criticised on the ground that it is 
more favourable for the media industry. This is because the place where the 
most significant element of the damage or loss would be that which the 
broadcast was directed at, or where the editorial control was exercised, thus, 
putting the media in a controlling position. 
Yet, a closer look at the current proposal under the Final Draft, shows great deal 
of similarity to Dr. Eechoud's ‘effective places of use’529 rule, a rule which she 
proposes to apply to simultaneous infringement scenarios. 
 
3. Interim conclusions: 
 
The internet and other means of technology made personality rights – just like 
other rights and interests- subject to cross-border disputes. The question of 
applicable law to personality rights caused great deal of distress and 
disagreement among Member States, the result was its exclusion from the scope 
of the Regulation. 
However, ignoring personality rights in conflict-of-laws is no longer possible. 
Consequently, several proposals were presented to include personality rights 
within the scope of the Regulation. These proposals along with the Final Draft 
Report of European Parliament on Future choice-of-law rule for privacy and 
personality rights are very important and relevant to this writer's new proposal, 
as she intends to propose choice-of-law rules that recognize the connection 
moral rights share with both copyright and personality rights accordingly. 
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Chapter II 
A New Proposal 
 
The particular nature of moral rights, the interests these rights aim at protecting, 
the similar functionality moral rights share with general personality rights and 
the problems associated with lex loci protectionis, are all significant factors that 
support the argument in favour of having particularly designed rules for moral 
rights.  
As this chapter is the final chapter of the thesis, the research has been completed 
and a 'new proposal' is to be presented. The 'new proposal' intends to take all 
research results into consideration, as the ultimate and final goal is to allocate 
the most suitable choice-of-law rule to moral rights in cross-border torts and in 
cross-border contractual obligations. 
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A. Moral rights in cross-border torts 
 
1. Proposed rules: 
 
Firstly, the applicable law to authorship and initial ownership should be the law 
of the place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when the 
work was created. Sine authorship and initial ownership should be determined 
according to one single law, it makes no difference whether the issue is raised in 
the context of infringement or not. 
Secondly, the applicable law to existence of moral rights, their scope and 
duration, raised in non-infringement scenarios, should be the law of the place of 
habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when the work was created. 
It is worth pointing out that the proposition to apply law of the place of habitual 
residence of the actual creator of the work to determine existence of moral 
rights, is also suggested be applied to determine existence of copyright. In this 
case, existence of copyright and moral rights will be subject to the same rule.  
Thirdly, the law applicable to infringement of moral rights, including questions 
of existence, scope and duration that are raised during the process, should be the 
law of the country in which the most significant element or elements of the loss 
or damage occur or are likely to occur.  However, the law applicable shall be the 
law of the country in which the defendant is habitually resident if he or she could 
not reasonably have foreseen substantial consequences of his or her act 
occurring in the country designated by paragraph. 
Fourthly, if infringement of moral rights took place in more than one country by 
the publication of printed matter or by a broadcast, including ubiquitous 
infringement of moral rights, then, the country in which the most significant 
element or elements of the damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed 
to be the country to which the publication or broadcasting service is principally 
directed or, if this is not apparent, the country in which editorial control is 
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exercised, and that country’s law shall be applicable. The country to which the 
publication or broadcast is directed shall be determined in particular by the 
language of the publication or broadcast or by sales or audience size in a given 
country as a proportion of total sales or audience size or by a combination of 
those factors. 
Therefore, this writer is in favour of including article 5a (in its final proposed 
form) in the Rome II Regulation as a first step. Moreover, she proposes drafting 
a particularly designed choice-of-law rule that is similar to article (5a)530 in 
relation to infringement of moral rights. 
 
2. Analysis: 
 
There are two important principles that need to be highlighted. The first is that as 
a general rule, the actual creator of the work is its copyright owner. The second 
is that identification of the author of the work and its copyright owner should be 
according to one single law. Hence, it makes perfect sense to reject application 
of lex protectionis to define authorship, as its application leads to the possibility 
of having different authors for the same work whenever it crosses borders. The 
new proposal, calls for application of the law of the place of habitual residence 
of the actual creator of the work when the work was created to determine 
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 Note that attachment of moral rights to the characterization model of  general personality 
right in conflict-of-laws is expected to have an effect on choice of court agreement under the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements (2005). This is because art 2(1) excludes 
from the scope of its application natural persons acting primarily for personal purposes. 
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parties one of which is an author, with regard to the latter's moral rights in his work, would such 
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differs depending on whether moral rights are understood to be for personal purposes or not. If 
moral rights were not considered personality rights, then The Hague convention is applicable and 
a clearly chosen court will have jurisdiction to hear the case based on art 5(1). Any other court 
besides the nominated court seized of the case has to decline jurisdiction (art 6).  General 
examination of the Hague convention see Thalia Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction rules of the EU and 
their impact on third states (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 45-47 (hereafter referred to 
as Kruger).                                                                                                                                                                    
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authorship and initial ownership. For example, let us imagine the following 
scenario: the work in question is a novel and the author is a Canadian national 
who was habitually resident in Canada when the novel was written, however, he 
was habitually resident in England when he brought his case against the 
defendant. According to the proposed rule, the law applicable to determine 
authorship and initial ownership should be Canadian law not English law.  
The main advantage in applying the law of the place of the creator’s habitual 
residence at the time the work was created is that it applies equally to published 
and unpublished works. In addition, habitual residence – as will be explained 
below- is a compromise between the concept of domicile adopted by common 
law traditions and the notion of nationality adopted by civil law traditions, in 
that sense habitual residence reduces the gap between the two systems and 
certainly leads to more realistic and predictable results531. It is important to point 
out that consideration of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work 
when the work was created, is expected to avoid the impracticality and risk 
exploiters could face as their conduct may become impermissible when the 
author changes residence532. Moreover, exclusion of the application of current 
habitual residence is rational since one cannot reasonably foresee change of 
habitual residence.  
 
In relation to existence, scope and duration of moral rights (in non-infringement 
scenarios), the search is naturally for the law with the real connection to the 
dispute. As these issues are raised in a non-infringing scenario, the strongest 
candidate to determine whether the right exists or not, and if so to what extent, is 
the law of the place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when 
the work was created. Accordingly, application of the proposed rule means that 
the same law will determine question of initial ownership, authorship, existence, 
scope and duration of moral rights (raised in non-infringement scenarios). 
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 This was the objection to author’s residence as a connecting factor under ALI Draft No.1, 
cited in Gottschalk, 2007, p 207 (fn 108). 
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Cross-border infringements of moral rights, including questions of existence, 
scope and duration which are raised during the process, are to be attached to 
general personality rights in conflict-of-laws. The basis of attachment is the 
similar functionality moral rights share with general personality rights. When 
infringement occurs questions of existence of the right, its scope and duration 
are raised, hence, the scope of law applicable to the infringement issue should 
also cover these questions. The place where the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur is where the actual 
creator's rights are directly or substantially damaged -or are likely to be so. This 
place is certainly of significant importance to the defendant as it is the place 
where his loss occurred or likely to occur. Furthermore, existence, scope and 
duration of copyright in infringement scenarios reflect the balance that countries 
try to strike between interests of authors and that of the public533.  In other 
words, the state has an interest in striking a balance between the freedom of the 
public to use and modify the work vs. the author's right to prevent them from 
doing so. This justifies application of the law of this particular place to 
determine whether the right exists at the first place or not, and if so then its 
scope and infringement conditions. The proposal to subject the same set of 
issues to two different choice-of-law rules is probably contrary to the 
conventional approach. Nevertheless, it is justified in this writer's opinion 
because the related interests in infringement situations are different from those in 
non-infringement situations, namely, the state's interest in striking a balance 
between private and public interest which is only triggered in infringement 
scenarios.  
 
As for infringement taking place in more than one country including ubiquitous 
infringement, the general rule which is application of 'the law of the place where 
the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur or are 
likely to occur', is a flexible rule that is suitable for traditional infringement 
scenarios as well as ubiquitous infringement scenarios. However, there is a 
possible trouble with application of this general rule to ubiquitous infringement 
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situations, which is application of multiple laws at the same time. This is 
attributed to how 'the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage' 
could have taken place in more than one country. Thus, to avoid application of 
multiple laws, a presumption was needed and thus, the country to 'which the 
publication or broadcasting service is principally directed or, if this is not 
apparent, the country in which editorial control is exercised, then that country’s 
law shall be applicable'. There are important factors that would help determine 
whether publication or broadcasting is considered principally directed towards a 
certain country or not, this includes 'the language of the publication or broadcast 
or by sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of total sales or 
audience size or by a combination of those factors'. However, if these factors 
were not clear then law of 'the country in which editorial control is exercised' 
will be applied.  
    
For example, if a painting is displayed without attribution to its actual creator on 
a website, and the website is in Spanish, with Spanish advertisements for 
products that are mostly known in the Spanish market. In this scenario, it is 
explicit that the online publication is principally directed to Spain (or probably 
to Spanish speaking audience). Therefore, Spanish law applies if it was proven 
that Spain was the country with the largest audience. Yet, if this was not 
apparent, then the law of the country in which editorial control is exercised shall 
be applied. 
 
Application of lex loci protectionis to simultaneous infringement has not been 
favored by commentators like Dr. Eechoud. She argues that in simultaneous 
infringements scenarios only ‘effective places of use’534 are to be considered 
when determining the applicable law both concerning the unlawfulness of the act 
and consequences of infringement535. The advantage of this ‘effective – use’ 
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exploit the copyright or related rights are injured, or -in the case of moral rights- where the 
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approach is that it reduces the potentially applicable laws. If there is no effective 
use in the country it will have no interest in applying its law since the local 
balance between private and public interest is not endangered536. The ‘effective – 
use’ method is a practical method with less difficulties, therefore, if a moral right 
was infringed in one jurisdiction the law of that jurisdiction will be applied, if a 
moral right was infringed in 10 jurisdictions, 4 of which are of an ‘effective – 
use’ to the author, then only laws of these 4 jurisdictions will be considered537. 
 
In this sense, it is clear that the ‘effective places of use’ coincides with 'the place 
in which the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur or 
are likely to occur', as both rules target the same category of factors. 
Nevertheless, there is an important difference in the result the two rules lead to. 
The ‘effective places of use’ approach surely reduces the number of applicable 
laws when compared to lex loci protectionis, however, could still lead to 
application of more than one law to the situation if more than one country were 
to be considered effective places of use. The situation is not similar in relation to 
art (5a) as it is supported with specific presumption to point at one single law to 
be applied to the situation despite its ubiquitous nature. 
 
To have one general flexible rule that can be applied to both traditional as well 
as to online scenarios should be favored. A rule that is specifically customized 
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Jurcys, 2009). 
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for online scenarios or satellite scenarios should also be expected to develop as 
rapidly as the online world develops, a matter that is impossible in practice. 
Supporting this approach is Prof. Von Hein who also favored adopting a flexible 
general rule to all situations538. Although his suggestion is in relation to violation 
of personality rights, yet the concept is one and can be extended to include moral 
rights, a general flexible rule should be adaptable to technological developments.  
 
In point of fact, the difference between the real world and digital world should 
not be overestimated. The mere fact that a defamatory material for example is 
published online instead of in print should not necessarily lead to a different 
outcome in PIL539. In addition to that, in today's globalized world it is difficult to 
clearly identify where the injury occurred, even if one was able to identify the 
geographical borders of where injury to his personal reputation occurred, it does 
not mean that the injury will be limited to this particular identified jurisdiction. 
A very good illustrative example is given by Dr. Kuipers:  
 
For example, academics specialized in European Union law or private 
international law inherently have an interest in protecting their good 
names throughout the European Union. If a Swedish author would be 
accused of plagiarism by a Slovakian colleague in a law review 
exclusively distributed in Slovakia, there would be an apparent interest 
in redress since, even if the author does not have any connections with 
Slovakia whatsoever, he will have to work together with Slovakian 
colleagues in international working groups and conferences. The place 
of injury would be impossible to define here…540 
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 Kuipers, 2011,  p1684. 
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 Kuipers,  2011, p 1700. 
 
212 
 
   
B. Moral rights in cross-border contractual obligations 
 
1. Proposed rule: 
 
 
The law applicable to contractual waiver of moral rights should be the law of the 
place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when the work was 
created.  
Nevertheless, one needs to keep in mind that, Rome I Regulation does not 
explicitly deal with or specifically address IP rights at the first place. Therefore, 
once the Regulation is amended to explicitly deal with IP rights either under its 
general rules541 or by separate choice-of-law rules, only then one can make 
suggestions concerning moral rights. In which case, it is suggested to make the 
following change to art 10(1) Rome I Regulation to read as follows: 
The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, 
shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this 
Regulation if the contract or term were valid. However, validity of 
contractual waiver of moral rights should be determined by the law of 
the place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when 
the work was created 
 
 
 
2. Analysis: 
 
As moral rights cannot be licensed or assigned, contractual waiver is the only 
way for these rights to be integrated into contracts. Nevertheless, validity of 
contractual waiver of moral rights is related to the grant of the right not the 
contract, hence, should not be subject to the law governing the contract.  
In fact, the law applicable to existence of moral rights should naturally decide 
whether these rights can be waived or not. And as this 'new proposal' suggests 
application of the law of the place of habitual residence of the actual creator of 
                                                           
541
 Art 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation. 
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the work to question of existence, it further suggests the extension of its scope to 
cover question of validity of contractual waiver. As a result, the applicable law 
will not change depending on where the work is exploited or used.  
 
C. Evaluation of the 'new proposal' against other connecting factors:  
 
A connecting factor will connect the factual situation with a particular 
country542, therefore, the search is for the law of the country with the most real 
connection with the legal dispute. The 'new proposal' suggests application of 'the 
place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work' as its principal 
connecting factor. Questions of initial ownership, authorship, existence and 
scope of moral rights (in non-infringement scenarios) in addition to validity of 
contractual waiver of moral rights, are all to be determined by the law of the 
place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when the work was 
created. 
 
The place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work is a suitable 
connecting factor, as it is convenient to place one's legal relationships in the 
country where one is habitually residence. Moreover, as Dr. Morris argues, it is 
hard to see the 'most real connection' in any law other than one's 'domicile' or 
'habitual residence'543.  
 
Habitual residence as a personal connecting factor has gained international 
importance and recognition. It was used as a primary contact in several 
international conventions such as the Convention on the Protection of children 
and co-operation in respect of intercountry adoption 1993, Convention of civil 
procedure 1954, and Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. As for 
the related conventions to the question of this thesis, habitual residence has been 
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 Castel, 1978, pp  2-2. 
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 A. H. Paliwala, 'Habitual residence in Private International Law' (DPhil thesis, University of 
London 1972) 385 (hereafter referred to as  Paliwala, 1972).  
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used in the BC, and at the EU level, habitual residence has been used in the 
Rome I and Rome II Regulations544.   
 
However, what justifies favouring habitual residence over other connecting 
factors is the balance it strikes between copyright and general personality rights. 
Balance between copyright and general personality rights is essentially needed 
in relation to moral rights. This is because existence of these rights is attached to 
the existence of copyrighted works, whereas functionality of moral rights is in 
essence that of general personality rights545. 
 
Habitual residence as a concept is the result of international unification efforts, 
especially at the Hague Conference on PIL546. The concept was created as an 
answer to the difficulties associated with 'nationality' and 'domicile' as 
connecting factors. As a personal connecting factor, habitual residence is 
considered to be a compromise between domicile and nationality547. Yet, the 
function of habitual residence as Cavers sees it is not a half way between 
domicile and residence, rather it is a suitable connecting between a person and a 
territory that is not based on the notion of headquarter. Clearly, habitual 
residence comes to an end when one stop using it habitually and therefore one 
could end up with no habitual residence anywhere548. Habitual residence is a 
                                                           
544
 Moreover, art 19 of the new PIL law in Japan states that the law applicable to defamation 
and damage to reputation is the law of place of victim's habitual residence, the argument is that 
habitual residence reflects the closest connection with the infringement.  For more details see 
Jurcys, 2009, pp 4-5.    
 
545
 See our previous discussion in Part 3 – Chapter III. 
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 Paliwala, 1972, pp 172, 204.  
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 For more details see David F. Cavers, The choice of law: selected essays 1933-1983 (Duke 
University press, Durham 1985) 246-249, 253 (hereafter referred to as Cavers, 1985). 
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factual concept rather than a legal one549, and its use was mainly supported by 
the '...disagreement in finding a uniform definition of domicile and also avoid 
questions of dependent domicile.'550  
 
Selection of 'habitual residence' is compared to other potentially applicable 
connecting factors, in particular 'nationality' and 'domicile'. Yet, it is important 
to mention that nationality and domicile are strong alternative candidates only as 
connecting factors applicable to issues of authorship and ownership. Extension 
of the application of the same connecting factor i.e. habitual residence to 
existence and scope of moral rights, in addition to validity of waiver of moral 
rights, is not the conventional approach but is only what is proposed under our 
new proposal.  
Moral rights are linked to copyright with respect to their existence. The new 
proposal recognizes this link and proposes to apply the law of habitual residence 
of the actual creator of the work to determine existence of copyright as well as 
moral rights (in non-infringement situations). As for the validity of waiver of 
moral rights, it is subject to the same choice-of-law rule because the actual 
interest is related to the grant of the right. 
In relation to cross-border infringement scenarios, the chosen connecting factor 
is 'the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage'. Once again, 
this particular connecting factor was tested against other potentially applicable 
connecting factors before it was chosen, the strongest candidates in this category 
–bedsides lex loci protectionis which has already been eliminated- are the place 
with the closest connection to the dispute or most significant element and the 
defendant's place of residence or place of establishment.  
  
                                                           
549
 However, Niboyet disagrees with this view and sees habitual residence as a term of law that is 
to be governed by lex fori to determine what constitutes habitual residence, Paliwala, 1972, p 
457. 
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1. Habitual residence vs. Author's nationality and author's domicile: 
 
After the two World Wars millions of people were forced to leave home and 
ended up as ‘stateless persons’. At the same time, economic growth increased 
mobility and move of people, and as a result ‘nationality’ as a connecting factor 
was no longer useful551. The concept of 'domicile' developed between the 12-19th 
centuries, the strong move towards domicile started in the post-war period as an 
answer to the difficulties associated with 'nationality'. It was seen as a 
compromise between the notion of territoriality and personal law, nevertheless, 
the concept was not a satisfactory alternative because it had no uniform 
meaning552. Hence the emergence of habitual residence as a connecting factor.  
 
There are certain issues which are related to the person yet are not part of what is 
referred to in this thesis as general personality rights. These person-related rights 
or interests are one's legal capacity and personal status. These two primary issues 
are evidently related to the person, therefore, the applicable law to these matters 
had to be attached and connected to the person concerned no matter where he is. 
In reality, this line of thinking was behind the idea of applying personal law to 
issues related to persons553. Italian scholars argued that one's personal status and 
capacity should enjoy stability and consistency and this can only be achieved if 
these issues are subjected to the law of one's domicile. This was also supported 
by the French school as well as the Dutch school. Things however, changed in 
1851 when Mancini published his article advocating for what he called principle 
of nations. He based his principle on his argument that laws are there to be 
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  Hisham Ali Sadeq, Lessons in private international law (Al-Dar aljame’iah, Beruit, no 
publication year) 188 (hereafter referred to as Sadeq). 
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applied to persons not to jurisdictions. This particular argument marked the 
beginning of the emergence of the principle of personality of laws554. 
In brief, most countries apply law of one's nationality or domicile to issues of 
personal status555, there is however, disagreement regarding whether nationality 
or domicile556 is the closest connection holding a person with certain legal 
system557. The argument supporting application of the law of one's nationality is 
that questions and issues related to the person's status and capacity are personal 
issues that need to be decided according to a personal law, this is expected to 
guarantee that the same law provides the same result wherever the person is558. 
The law of one's nationality is usually the law of the state where the person '… 
grew up, learned to acquire respect, consciously or unconsciously, for his social 
obligations and whose law, in the last analysis he has come to accept and 
trust…'559  
On the other hand, the strongest argument in support of applying law of domicile 
is that one's settlement in a particular place makes his connection with this place 
stronger than his connection with the country of his nationality560. The same 
argument however, is used by some scholars in a negative sense, as to say that 
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 Alsayed, 2007, pp 122-123. 
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 Sadeq, p 187. For general discussion regarding domicile and other personal connecting 
factors see Clarkson and Hill, 2006, pp 20-51. 
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 In general, before the French revolution the dominant connecting factor was domicile. 
However, after the revolution it changed to nationality, Hisham Khalid, an introduction to 
Arabic private international law: a comparative study (Dar Alfikr Aljamie, Alexandria 2003) 88-
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domicile gives consideration to the interests of the society rather than the true 
link the person shares with the country. 561  
 
a. Nationality: In relation to author's moral rights, the issue is not exclusively 
related to the author's personality. The copyrighted work is a crucial factor that 
must be taken into consideration, and thus, one should ask whether there is any 
real connection between the author's nationality and his work?  Nationality does 
not appear to have any real connection with the author and his work. Therefore, 
this point of attachment although applicable to one's capacity and legal status is 
not suitable for author's moral rights, because moral rights do not fall under 
capacity or legal status.  
 
b. Domicile: The clear lack of connection between nationality and author's 
moral rights is less obvious when it comes to domicile as a connecting factor. It 
is true that nationality and domicile are commonly applicable to one's capacity 
and legal status. Yet, there are certain shared elements between domicile and 
habitual residence that make eliminating domicile in favor of habitual residence 
a tricky task562.  
Domicile and habitual residence are both based on one's connection with a 
certain place i.e. both require one's residence in a particular country. However, 
the crucial difference between the two connecting factors lies in the intention 
behind this residence. Domicile requires one to have indefinite intention to 
reside in a particular place563, however, habitual residence does not require 
indefinite intention to reside in a particular location. Rather, what is required is 
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 Paliwala, 1972, p 222. 
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 Note that the defendant's domicile is an essential connecting factor in relation to jurisdiction; 
Khalid, 2003, pp 88-94. 
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 The test of intention is well established in the case law; for example in Irvin v Irvin [2001] 1 
FLR 178 an intention to remain temporarily for duration of a job was not enough to establish 
domicile. For more details and case law regarding the test of intention as a requirement of 
domicile see Clarkson and Hill, 2006, pp 33-36. 
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for one to consider a particular place to be his ordinary home564. As the test for 
habitual residence is less demanding, the concept of habitual residence has been 
adopted by number of international agreements, for example The Hague 
Convention on Civil Procedure of 1896, Rome I Regulation and Rome II 
Regulation. 
 
With regard to moral rights, 'habitual residence of the actual creator of the work' 
is favored over domicile for two main reasons: 1. The test for habitual residence 
is less demanding 2. The author strongly relates to the place where he is 
habitually resident when creating his work, as this place is where he ordinary 
resides and where he calls home, thus, is expected to know laws of his personal 
residence best. Therefore, authorship and initial ownership are to be determined 
by the law of this particular place. This cannot be applied to domicile, because 
an author could be living in country (x) where he has created his work, however, 
country (y) is where he attaches his indefinite intention to reside. In this situation 
country (y) has no real or actual connection with the work except for the author's 
intention. Accordingly, habitual residence is favored over domicile.  
 
2. The  place where the most significant element or elements of the loss or 
damage occur vs. The defendant's place of residence or place of  establishment:  
 
The defendant's place of residence or place of establishment as a connecting 
factor ignores the injured party i.e. the author. Furthermore, it could help 
infringers get away with their acts by choosing to carry out their acts in 
jurisdictions where there is weak or no moral rights protection. As a result, this 
connecting factor is rejected and the place where the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage occur is preferred.  
 
 
 
                                                           
564
 There is no rule regarding the length of time required for a place to become home or the 
strength of intention; however, habitual residence is not acquired merely upon one's arrival to a 
country and an intention to remain in a country for short or limited period of time (e.g. for work 
or studies) is sufficient to establish habitual residence; Clarkson and Hill, 2006, pp 45-48. 
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3. The  place where the most significant element or elements of the loss or 
damage occur vs. The place with closest connection to the dispute: 
 
The  place where the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage 
occur together with the place with closest connection to the dispute, are two 
connecting factors that reflect one principle which is identification of the country 
with most significant relationship with the issue and application of its law.  
For example, the 'most significant relationship' is the adopted principle in The 
2nd Restatement, the Restatement couples this principle with a list of choice- 
influential considerations that a court takes into account to determine which 
legal unity is that of the most significant relationship.  
'The law of the place with the closest connection to the dispute' leads to a case 
by case solution565 which provides courts with flexibility and wider discretion 
power. The flexibility of this connecting factor was considered by commentators 
such as Professor Kuipers to be an overlooked advantage 566 that '... would 
enhance legal certainty by the application of a single law to an infringement of 
personality rights...'567 
However, what is considered as an advantage by some commentators is 
considered a disadvantage by others. Commentators such as Mr. Stone 
understand 'the closest connection' and 'most significant element' rule to be a 
'formula of chaos'568.  
 
 
D. Summation: 
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 The closest connection '… could be tailored to fit the particular circumstances of each case…' 
Kuipers, 2011, p 1701. 
 
566
 Kuipers, 2011, p 1703. 
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 Kuipers, 2011, p 1705. 
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 Stone, 1995, p 5. 
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The principal connecting factor under the new proposal is 'The law of the place 
of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work when the work was 
created'. The proposition is to apply this particular law to determine issues of 
ownership, authorship, existence, scope and duration of moral rights (in non-
infringement scenarios), in addition to validity of contractual waiver of moral 
rights.  
 
Selection of this specific connecting factor is supported by several arguments: 
 
Firstly, questions of ownership and authorship: There is no explicit rule in the 
related international and regional instruments that deal with the issue (except for 
art 14bis (a) BC concerning ownership of copyright in cinematographic works). 
As a result, commentators called for the application of lex originis. However, 
they failed to reach a unanimous agreement concerning the definition of the 
country of origin. Moreover, allocating the country of origin is further 
complicated when the work is first published online. Hence, these difficulties 
weakened lex originis and encouraged the search for other connecting factors. 
'Habitual residence' as an alternative connecting factor is clearly identified. In 
addition, the place of the actual creator's habitual residence is not affected by the 
method of publication of the copyrighted work (whether printed or online).  
 
Secondly, issues of existence, scope and duration of moral rights (in non-
infringement scenarios): The conventional approach is to apply one choice-of-
law rule to questions of existence, scope and duration of the right, in 
infringement and non-infringement scenarios. As a general rule, these legal 
issues are to be governed by lex loci protectionis. However, lex loci protectionis 
is based on the principle of territoriality which is an outdated principle. 
Furthermore, application of the rule leads to serious complications most notable 
of which is the application of multiple laws at the same time in ubiquitous 
infringement situations. For all the problems associated with application of lex 
loci protectionis, this writer calls for total abandonment of lex loci protectionis. 
Alternatively, she argues that the special nature of moral rights calls for the need 
to identify the interests that are actually affected in each situation. In non-
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infringement situations, determination of existence, scope and duration of the 
right does not trigger State's role in finding a balance between public (users) and 
private interest (author). Accordingly, this writer believes that a distinction 
between infringement and non-infringement situations is a must. In non-
infringement situations, as the State's task in striking a balance is not evident, 
this writer calls for application of the law of habitual residence of the actual 
creator of the work when the work was created. This is supported by the fact that 
the same law is proposed to determine ownership and authorship. Hence for 
reasons of uniformity the same law which determines who the author of the 
work is should determine existence, scope and duration of the right.  
 
Thirdly, in relation to validity of contractual waiver of moral rights: Under the 
present situation, art 10(1) Rome I Regulation applies. According to which, 
validity and existence of a contract or a term in a contract depends on the 
applicable law if the contract or the term was valid. The general approach is that 
application of this rule to validity of contractual waiver of moral rights should be 
rejected. This is because validity of waiver is a matter related to the grant of the 
right. Hence, and as the present writer already argued for the application of 
habitual residence to determine authorship, existence, scope and duration of the 
right, she calls for application of the same law to determine the validity of 
contractually waiving moral rights.  
 
The proposed applicable choice-of-law rule to infringement of moral rights in 
traditional and ubiquitous situations is 'The law of the country in which the most 
significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to 
occur'.  
 
Selection of this rule should be approved for several reasons: 
 
First of all, in relation to infringement of IP rights, lex loci protectionis is the 
internationally accepted rule. The rule is based on the principle of territoriality 
and its application is associated with serious complications. As the situation 
stands today, infringement of moral rights is subject to this particular rule, like 
the case with infringement of copyright in general. However, the current writer 
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is in favor of moving towards total abandoning of this rule, hence, she rejects its 
application to moral rights infringement.  
 
Second of all, a choice-of-law rule that is to be based on the allocation method 
needs to determine the 'seat' of the legal relationship. To do so, one has to point 
out those interests that are actually harmed in infringement situations. With 
regard to moral rights, infringement of moral rights is an attack on personality 
related interests i.e. the author's right in his name, reputation and privacy. 
Therefore, this writer calls for attaching moral rights to general personality 
rights in cross-border torts. In the light of the recent developments at the EU 
level, this writer supports attaching moral rights to general personality rights 
under the proposed art 5a (in its final form) in the Rome II Regulation. That is 
application of the law of the country in which the most significant element or 
elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur. 
This place has evident connection with the legal issue at question. Moreover, it 
is general and flexible enough so that it applies to traditional as well as to online 
scenarios. In addition, this approach will find support from those in favor of 
applying the 'effective-use' rule to multi-state infringement cases. As questions 
of existence, scope and duration are raised during infringement proceedings, the 
law of the country where the most significant element or elements of the loss or 
damage occur or are likely to occur should also determine these questions. 
 
 
E. Interim conclusions: 
 
The aim of this 'new proposal' is to find the most suitable connecting factor that 
would be applied to moral rights in cross-border situations. As explained earlier 
in this research, moral rights reflect an intersection between copyright and 
general personality rights, the present legal situation addresses moral rights in 
conflict-of-laws as an element of copyright while ignoring the connection these 
rights share with general personality rights. On the other hand, scholars who call 
for detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict of laws, call for total 
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attachment of moral rights to general personality rights, therefore, ignoring the 
link moral rights have with copyright.  
The 'new proposal' intended to select connecting factors that would recognize 
the link moral rights share with these two fields both in cross-border torts and 
contractual obligations.  The analysis and evaluation of the chosen connecting 
factors reflected their suitability, and revealed the inadequacy of the other 
connecting factors.   
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Part 5 
 
Conclusion 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis illustrated that attachment of moral rights to copyright in conflict-of-
laws is inadequate. For this reason it suggested addressing the question of 
applicable law to cross-border moral rights disputes from alternative copyright 
perspectives. 
 
A. Assessing the obvious inadequacy in the Status Quo: 
 
In Part 2, where the status quo of moral rights was given detailed examination, 
three main problems were identified:  
1.  The complete disregarding to the position of moral rights in conflict-of-laws.  
2.  The complications of applying lex loci protectionis to moral rights.  
3. The total silence in the international and regional instruments on the 
applicable law to authorship and validity of contractual waiver of moral rights.   
The existence of these problems illustrates that the present legal framework is in 
need of a re-think. This necessarily opens the door for further investigation in 
search of alternative solutions. 
 
B. Examining the existence of unsatisfactory solutions in the present 
proposals 
 
Discussion throughout the thesis showed that there is limited number of studies 
and proposals dedicated to the question of moral rights in conflict-of-laws. 
Nevertheless, those few studies which propose to apply different choice-of-law 
rules to moral rights do so only on the basis of the personal link authors share 
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with their works. Hence, these proposals mainly revolve around the application 
of the author's personal law e.g. the author's nationality with regard to the 
question of authorship. Most if not all of these proposals submit to the 
territoriality principle adopted in international and regional instruments, 
applied in the context of infringement (in its traditional and ubiquitous sense).  
No serious arguments currently exist in the literature with regard to how the 
peculiar nature of moral rights effectively renders the territoriality principle 
irrelevant.  
  
C. Exploring the validity of detaching moral rights from copyright in 
conflict-of-laws: 
 
The search for solutions to the already identified problems began in Part 3 of this 
thesis. The limitations of the current proposals mean that there is room for a 
fresh perspective. 
The thesis provided an investigation of the issues from an alternative perspective 
- more specifically from the perspective of general personality rights in conflict-
of-laws. The thesis also explained the theoretical basis for choice-of-laws rules. 
It mainly focused on the Statutist theory and the allocation method, as the two 
most important ones to date. The 'allocation method' was recognized as the most 
used method in most countries in the world including the EU.  
Accordingly, with regard to moral rights this thesis based its search for more 
appropriate choice-of-law rules on the allocation method. Under this method, 
what must be identified is the 'seat' of the legal relationship. The identification of 
a single seat in a legal relationship is favourable as it usually leads to uniformity 
of results regardless of where the case is brought.  
This study also investigated the judicial decisions in relation to moral rights and 
general personality rights in both legal traditions. This examination was carried 
out with certain queries in mind, whether there was a tendency for courts to 
understand moral rights as part of personality rights rather than copyright in 
cross-border disputes. While civil law courts seem to have such a tendency, the 
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lack of cross-border moral rights disputes in common law courts meant that one 
can only speculate as to the future. Ultimately, the thesis argues that 
expectations for the position of cross-border moral rights in common law courts 
ought not be very different from those for civil law courts. This was based on the 
fact that common law tradition recognized and protected the essence of general 
personality rights and moral rights. Accordingly, it was concluded that common 
law tradition also recognized the similarity between the two sets of rights and 
these effects in conflict-of-laws.  
    
D. The new proposal: 
 
In Part 4 of this thesis a new proposal is offered. The new proposal addresses 
moral rights in cross-border contracts and in cross-border torts. The premise, 
upon which the newly proposed rules are based, recognises the link moral rights 
share with general personality rights and copyright. The link with the first is in 
terms of functionality, whereas the link with the second is in terms of existence 
and birth point. This is a crucial factor for determining the 'seat' of the legal 
relationship so that only the law most closely connected to the 'centre of gravity' 
is applied.  
Thus, the thesis argues that the 'seat' in moral rights disputes differs from one 
situation to another: 
1. Authorship and ownership: in order to determine who the author of the work 
is, there needs to be a single reference point so that authorship does not differ 
from one state to another. The proposal calls for application of the law of the 
place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work, when the work was 
created. The question of who the author of the work is does not require an 
intervention from the sovereign power to strike a balance between the public and 
private interests. Instead, the issue is essentially understood to be related to the 
author. Therefore, a 'personal' connecting factor is favoured, and habitual 
residence is said to be more advantageous than domicile or nationality.   
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2. Questions of existence, scope and duration raised in non-infringement 
scenarios: since these questions are brought up in a non-infringement situation, 
the 'centre of gravity' arguably falls under the copyright category. The thesis 
proposed an application of the law of the place of habitual residence of the actual 
creator of the work when the work was created, calling for a clear departure 
from the territoriality principle and lex loci protectionis.  
3. Questions of existence, scope and duration raised in infringement scenarios: 
since these questions are typically raised in infringement situation, the 'centre of 
gravity' arguably falls under the personality rights category. This is because the 
most significant element in infringement scenarios is the damage the author 
suffers. Author's interests that are subject to damage in infringement scenarios 
are almost identical to the damages incurred in personality rights infringement 
scenarios. Therefore, the thesis proposes to draft a particularly designed choice-
of-law rule that is similar to article (5a), or to attach moral rights to the article 
proposed to be included in Rome II Regulation under the title 'Privacy and rights 
relating to personality including moral rights of authors and performers'. The 
proposed law to be applied is that of the country in which the most significant 
element or elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur. 
4. Ubiquitous infringement: As the rule proposed to be applied to moral rights 
infringement is generally flexible, there is no need to depart from it in relation to 
ubiquitous infringement. However, there is a need for a presumption as to where 
the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur. This is the 
law of the country to which the publication or broadcasting service is principally 
directed or, if this is not apparent, the country in which editorial control is 
exercised. 
5. Validity of contractual waiver of moral rights: as the question is understood to 
be related to the grant of moral rights, the thesis proposes the application of the 
law of the place of habitual residence of the actual creator of the work. This is a 
natural consequence since existence of moral rights is to be subject to the same 
rule.  
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E. Final remarks and recommendations:  
 
The difficulties of departing from the territoriality principle due to policy 
considerations cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, departing from norms has never 
been impossible. Moreover, for such departure to be achieved, it must be 
supported by scholarly works. This thesis is intended to be a contribution to the 
existing literature dealing with a branch of a general topic that is centuries old.  
It is hoped that the following recommendations are taken into account in future 
considerations for the position of moral rights in conflict-of-laws: 
- Selection of 'habitual residence of the actual creator of the work at the time the 
work was created' as the principle connecting factor. It is understood to reflect a 
realistic understanding for the 'personal' element in relation to moral rights 
combined with the other important factor which is copyright. 
 
-  Attachment of moral rights to general personality rights in cross-border 
infringement scenarios. The infringed interests of both sets of rights are 
purposely similar and hence, the 'seat' is no different. 
 
 
-  Favouring a rule that is flexible and general enough so that it applies to 
traditional and online scenarios. The overwhelming fast development of 
technologies call for the adoption of a general flexible rule that could easily 
accommodate future unexpected developments. 
 
-  Abandoning the lex loci protectionis rule in all international and regional 
instruments. This recommendation is clearly in contradiction with the currently 
applicable international conventions, or at least to their most accepted 
interpretation such as the BC. However, the approach followed by the new 
proposal is supported by the fact that the scope of lex loci protectionis has never 
been clear, furthermore, scholarly attempts both on individual and institutional 
levels (like the ALI principles) suggest that there is a growing tendency towards 
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limiting the application of lex loci protectionis in certain scenarios. Ultimately, it 
is no longer possible to look for solutions in a globalized world while one still 
maintains a territorial perspective.   
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